The Chinese Communist Party has been quietly enticing South Pacific island nations with large sums of money to expand key civilian infrastructure such as airports and ports into dual-use military facilities. It is believed that the CCP may use these infrastructure developments to reshape the geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, posing a threat to US and global security, and therefore the US should take countermeasures.
In a recent article on The Heritage Foundation website, senior researcher Brent Sadler from the Allison Institute for National Security and research assistant Allen Zhang from the Asia Research Center pointed out that Chinese state-owned enterprises have been covertly transforming small airports and ports in certain countries into facilities capable of accommodating Chinese warships and aircraft.
For example, after extensive renovations by the CCP, the Luganville Wharf in Vanuatu, a South Pacific island nation, can now dock large Chinese warships. A report by the Czech think tank Sinopsis in 2025 revealed that there are nearly 40 dual-use facilities in the region, including expanded airport runways and ports, with a total investment of around $3.55 billion.
The article warned that this indicates the CCP’s deliberate development of a regional network of dual-use military and civilian infrastructure. If successful, in times of crisis, China could possess mobility and operational reach.
The authors cautioned that while the ultimate purpose of these facilities remains largely unknown to the outside world, dual-use infrastructure likely serves military functions and aligns with China’s emphasized agenda of military-civil fusion.
The article highlighted that the deployment of Type 055 destroyers (claimed by China as one of the most advanced surface combatants) to these small regional ports indicates that these facilities may now be part of China’s strategic considerations. China could potentially use these island ports and makeshift landing strips as operational bases or logistic support points, thereby disrupting fuel and ammunition shipments, compromising coordination between the US and its allies, or establishing new operational assembly points.
While these scenarios are speculative, they must be taken seriously. The US government should formulate appropriate strategies to counter this issue or urge Pacific island nations to reduce their reliance on China. As a precautionary measure, the US should also prepare for worst-case scenarios, assuming that China might utilize these dual-use facilities in conflicts, and accordingly develop multi-layered strategic responses.
The first step involves strengthening maritime cooperation with South Pacific countries. Although the US Coast Guard has agreements with 12 Pacific island nations, fast response patrol boats deployed from Honolulu take several days to reach the South Pacific. To address this issue, the US Coast Guard could enhance these agreements by extending deployment periods, increasing patrol frequencies, or establishing logistic support centers in American Samoa.
These agreements not only enhance regional law enforcement and disaster response capabilities but also provide valuable information to US defense planners about the operational statuses of port facilities. During the Blue Pacific Operations patrol, the US patrol vessel “USCGC Harriet Lane” visited the Port of Vila in Vanuatu, and months later, two Chinese destroyers arrived at the same port.
The second step involves incorporating these dual-use facilities into emergency plans. The Department of Defense should establish standards for defining dual-use facilities, assess specifications, sustainability of forces assigned, and how China could potentially employ them during crises, with a focus on strategic locations.
The annual Department of Defense report on Chinese military power should disclose this analysis, enabling US defense officials to understand the locations of these dual-use facilities and the risks they pose, conduct wargaming exercises, and ascertain whether China could leverage these facilities as bargaining chips in crises.
The final step entails real-time monitoring of China’s construction of such dual-use facilities. The Compact of Free Association mandates that the US provide military aid to the Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia. The US could advocate for establishing a Pacific Fusion Center to integrate maritime intelligence and assist other COFA member states lacking effective maritime surveillance capabilities and technologies in monitoring the transformation of these critical infrastructure facilities and tracking movements of the Chinese naval vessels.
The article noted that financial considerations are also crucial. The increased deployment of the Coast Guard, assessments by the Pentagon, and the establishment of the Pacific Fusion Center all require funding. Encouraging COFA member states to allocate a portion of the $7.1 billion COFA funds towards these initiatives or providing infrastructure investments to Pacific island nations could help thwart China’s ambitions.
In conclusion, China’s integration of these dual-use facilities into military strategies or impacts on force deployments remain unclear. The US cannot afford to be complacent and must prepare meticulously through layered planning starting now.