The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) of the United States recently announced a proposal to comprehensively upgrade the ban on Chinese telecommunications equipment and services. Experts interviewed indicated that this is a digital defense battle involving data centers, interconnection bans, and electronic equipment testing, revealing the U.S.’s deep strategic layout of “de-Chinafication” in the digital economy and national security field.
The documents issued by the FCC on April 8-9 revealed that the U.S. not only considers communication networks as national strategic infrastructure but also aims to systematically exclude threats with Chinese backgrounds from the U.S. core systems by revoking mechanisms such as the “Section 214 authorization.”
According to a series of documents from the FCC, the federal agency is transitioning from “technical capability review” to “national security and integrity audit” policy changes. They plan to vote on April 30 to completely ban Chinese lab-tested electronic equipment exported to the U.S., including smartphones, cameras, and computers.
FCC Chairman Brendan Carr stated that up to 75% of equipment in the U.S. market is tested in China, but China has not provided reciprocal recognition to U.S. labs, posing a significant national security concern for the U.S.
Analyzing this ban, Wang Xiuwen, an expert on Chinese military affairs at the Taiwan Institute of National Defense and Security Studies, pointed out that the primary strategic goal of this FCC move is to implement the “Clean Network” initiative, which has expanded from 5G to all devices within the communication network.
Furthermore, there are fundamental doubts about the integrity of Chinese labs. Wang described that if China were to embed backdoors in their equipment and the U.S. allowed Chinese labs to test them, it would be like “asking a ghost to fill a prescription.”
The U.S. has already banned 23 Chinese labs. Shen Mingshi, a senior researcher at the Taiwan Institute of National Defense, analyzed for Epoch Times that the FCC is now taking a more aggressive approach by “not recognizing Chinese lab testing results,” requiring all products to be tested in the U.S. to ensure security under “U.S. standards.”
In addition to reclaiming hardware testing rights, the FCC is also targeting telecom operators. Through the revocation mechanism under the Communications Act “Section 214 Authorization,” the U.S. government is systematically revoking operating licenses for Chinese telecom companies in the U.S.
Following the earlier bans on China Mobile, China Unicom, Pacific Networks & ComNet providing telecom services in the U.S., in February 2026, the FCC officially revoked the operating licenses of Hong Kong Telecommunications (HKT) and its parent company PCCW and related subsidiaries, citing their association with China Unicom, vulnerable to influence by the Chinese government, posing a penetration threat to U.S. networks.
The latest Fact Sheet released by FCC indicates that the ban is expanding to data centers and network interconnection. FCC is proposing to prohibit all telecom operators in the U.S. from interconnecting with companies on the “controlled list” such as Huawei, ZTE, and Hikvision.
Additionally, the FCC is considering banning China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom from operating data centers in the U.S., indicating that communication networks are now considered strategic infrastructure.
Based on FCC’s preliminary conclusions, operators in the U.S. and companies on the list should not interconnect to avoid potential national security risks. Sanctions may even be imposed on any telecom operator (regardless of nationality) that continues to use Huawei or ZTE equipment in their networks.
This kind of “collective punishment” reflects the U.S.’s determination to completely remove Chinese elements from its communication chain.
Why is the U.S. adopting such a tough and distrustful attitude towards Chinese tech companies? Shen emphasized that the core issue lies in “the fact that there are no purely private companies in China.” Many companies blacklisted, such as Huawei and Hikvision, have close relationships with the Chinese military General Staff’s Electronic Surveillance Department or state-owned enterprises throughout their development, and their operations are always guided by intelligence units.
Shen cited a typical case: Israeli intelligence agency Mossad once hacked into Hikvision’s surveillance devices to collect big data, successfully tracking the movements of Iranian leadership and high-ranking Revolutionary Guard officials.
He stated that this illustrates that backdoors in electronic devices have become a key aspect of modern intelligence warfare. Allowing U.S. networks to be flooded with equipment with Chinese backgrounds undoubtedly leaves the door wide open.
Wang also mentioned that the recent hacking of a large amount of confidential data from the Tianjin Supercomputer Center in China demonstrates China’s extreme weakness in protecting network security. An “opposing country” that is so negligent in cybersecurity naturally cannot provide equipment and services that other countries can trust.
Furthermore, the change in U.S. policy is also reflected in adjustments to technical standards. Chairman Carr pointed out that while FCC traditionally bases lab accreditations on “technical indicators” to prevent radio interference, they are now shifting towards “national security and integrity audits.”
This change indicates that even if the equipment meets technical standards, if the manufacturing and testing processes are linked to “foreign adversaries,” especially China (the CCP), it will be seen as a national security vulnerability.
Shen mentioned that the forced acquisition case of TikTok by the U.S. and the current FCC ban logic are consistent, both based on taking preventative measures due to threats to national security. This comprehensive strike not only blocks intelligence channels for China but also profoundly impacts its industrial export competitiveness and diplomatic standing.
In January 2025, Michael Schafer, CEO of Compliance Testing, a U.S. testing service company, wrote to President Trump and the FCC, clearly advocating for the $28 billion certification service market to be moved from China back to the U.S.
Schafer advised, “This will be the first step in withdrawing U.S. manufacturing from China and returning it to the U.S.” Through reclaiming equipment testing rights, the U.S. is not only strengthening information security but also creating significant niche markets and job opportunities for related industries domestically.
In response to the U.S.’s actions, the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as usual, lodged protests, accusing the U.S. of “generalizing the concept of national security” and “damaging the interests of all parties.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that restricting Chinese equipment would raise prices in the U.S. market, harming consumer interests.
Regarding this, Wang believes that this is just a narrative from China attempting to use “good quality and low prices” as a cover. In fact, the U.S. has begun to strategically position itself in advanced fields such as AI, robotics, and drones, preventing Chinese products from dominating key future markets.
Shen believes that China’s protests precisely demonstrate that the U.S.’s measures have hit their sore spot. In the current political climate, especially during the Trump administration, policies centered on national security are expected not to change due to China’s protests.
Lin Yi, a commentator on China issues, stated that from routers, drones to data centers, and testing labs, the U.S. is stepping up its supervision of Chinese technology comprehensively. This series of heavy blows indicates that the digital space has become one of the main battlefields in the U.S.-China rivalry.
He speculated that as the U.S. focuses on building a “Clean Network” and excluding Chinese elements, other Western democratic countries are likely to follow suit, regarding China as an “unwelcomed country” in the diplomatic and technological fields.