The European Union’s policy towards China is currently undergoing a strategic reorganization. From the exclusion of security equipment, investigations into subsidies, trade in climate policies, to public statements on Taiwan issues, the EU has begun to take countermeasures and no longer avoids confronting China. Experts analyze that the EU-China relationship is gradually showing a trend of prioritizing defense and limiting cooperation, ushering in a new era of “cold peace” or new cold war, as opposed to the Cold War era.
According to a report by Bloomberg on November 10th, the European Commission is considering requiring member states to remove Chinese-made communication equipment such as Huawei and ZTE. On the same day, Agence France-Presse reported that a carbon border tax will officially come into effect in 2026, imposing a “carbon price differential” on high carbon production products such as steel, cement, and electricity, triggering strong backlash from China as one of the major carbon emitters. On the 6th, the European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese tire imports to Europe.
In response to these actions, national security expert Su Ziyun, in an interview with Epoch Times, analyzed that the EU’s actions are not isolated incidents or impulsive decisions, but a strategic repositioning, particularly with the support of the Chinese Communist Party for Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war, intensifying Europe’s vigilance towards Beijing.
“These are just means and tactics, strategically aimed at suppressing the Chinese Communist Party to weaken Russia’s momentum,” Su Ziyun emphasized, describing Europe’s approach to viewing the CCP as a source of geopolitical risk. He described the current situation as a “cold peace,” where lines are drawn on key issues while occasional cooperation continues.
Previously, in April, China restricted rare earth exports, causing significant impacts on the European defense and automotive industries, as 98% of Europe’s rare earths rely on China. During the G7 summit in June, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen openly accused Beijing of exhibiting a “dominant, dependent, and coercive” mode of conduct, signaling that the EU’s defense against China has emerged.
According to a report by the Washington think tank Atlantic Council, the EU canceled high-level economic and trade dialogues with China at the end of June due to a lack of progress in key trade disputes. This meeting was originally a crucial prelude to pave the way for a subsequent leadership summit in Beijing.
At the end of July, Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Beijing, aimed at commemorating the 50th anniversary of EU-China establishment of diplomatic ties and economic exchanges, was reduced to just one day on July 24th.
An article in the Asia Europe Journal in September pointed out that since the 2024 European Parliament elections and the new European Commission took office, Beijing’s positioning has shifted from being seen as a “cooperative competitor” to a “competitive competitor and a systematic (structural) challenger.”
The EU is instituting systemic countermeasures against China’s overcapacity and unfair competition tactics. For instance, Chinese tire imports have surged by 51% since 2021, with prices 30% to 65% lower than European products, demonstrating their export strategy reliant on state subsidies and overwhelming European industries.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a new tool that extends the EU’s climate policy to the trade sector. The COP30 climate summit is being held in Belem, Brazil from November 10th to 21st.
Su Ziyun stated that the carbon border tax reflects the EU’s consensus on sustainable and fair competition values within the community.
Scholar Sun Guoxiang analyzed that CBAM symbolizes the EU’s transformation of environmental protection into institutionalized trade tools, directly impacting export-oriented large economies like China. “This is not just an environmental issue, but a shift towards competitive rules,” he said.
He noted that the EU is gradually establishing technological and normative barriers for Chinese products in the European market.
Besides the economic aspect, the EU’s shifts in political and diplomatic realms are also significant.
On Thursday, the European Parliament passed a report titled “Dealing with Transnational Crackdowns Against Human Rights Defenders,” urging the EU to take action against the increasing transnational crackdowns, including personal attacks, surveillance, and legal pressures. The report specifically called out the Chinese regime as the “worst offender.”
Earlier, Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te was invited to attend the IPAC summit at the European Parliament on November 7th, becoming the first sitting Taiwanese Vice President to deliver a speech at the venue. In her speech, she detailed the military pressure, cyber attacks, and economic coercion faced by Taiwan, resonating strongly with European lawmakers. However, China strongly protested, claiming to have made “serious representations.”
In response, Su Ziyun pointed out that this is a concrete reflection of the EU’s long-term reassessment of its relationship with Beijing.
He believes that the EU is no longer concerned about China’s responses and strategically recognizes Taiwan’s democratic values, including technological development and Taiwan’s control of 51% of global maritime shipping in its waters, elevating Taiwan’s status.
“The situation where we used to consider Beijing’s face began to fade gradually since the end of 2019,” he added, emphasizing that Italy, a G7 member, exiting the Belt and Road Initiative at the end of 2023 is a symbol of the EU’s major strategic shift. Europe is awakening from its economic reliance on China and gradually building a defense line against systemic risks posed by the CCP.
The EU’s internal repositioning of Beijing’s role has already been institutionalized. H.D. Schweisgut, a former EU Ambassador to China, wrote in September about Europe’s deepening reliance on China in critical raw materials and strategic supply chains, emphasizing the need to prioritize economic security amidst changing geopolitical dynamics with the start of President Trump’s second term.
Sun Guoxiang pointed out that while the EU still emphasizes “coexistence of cooperation, competition, and challenge” with China, its operational practices lean towards strategic and defensive measures.
He analyzed that the future EU policy towards Beijing may take on three main directions: strengthening controls in technology and subsidy areas, conditioning cooperation on climate and green energy, and facing internal divisions among member states.
Sun Guoxiang warned, “China may try to create rifts within the EU, but if it fails to comply with the EU’s new regulations, economic conflicts will only escalate.”
The experts above believe that the EU’s multi-layered layout from security, trade to diplomacy indicates that the EU’s policy towards China has entered a new normal of “defense-focused, limited cooperation.” Beijing’s stance in the Russia-Ukraine war, threats to Europe’s rare earths and supply chains, and continued challenges to human rights and international norms have forced Europe to fundamentally adjust its strategic understanding of China.
Su Ziyun described this as a “cold peace,” where ties will not completely break, but Beijing will no longer take advantage. Lines will be drawn on key issues, while cooperation in other areas persists.
On the other hand, Sun Guoxiang viewed this as the beginning of Europe’s “defensive and institutionalized” strategy towards Beijing, not representing full hostility, but cooperation will be based on higher conditions and standards.