As Ukraine enters its fourth year of war, the conflict is increasingly being driven by time and attrition. The fighting continues at a high intensity and large scale, with the cost of ending the war steadily rising and diplomatic and strategic adjustment space significantly shrinking. The outcome of the war is increasingly determined by the resilience of all parties to endure long-term attrition, rather than a single battlefield performance. What is most unsettling is that this war is missing the moment when it could still be stopped.
Recent diplomatic efforts surrounding the Ukraine war have been intensifying. Just as some European leaders and Washington express hopes for a ceasefire, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, in an interview with Russian state TV Rossiya-24, publicly accused Europe of “reviving Nazism.”
He claimed that Brussels, Berlin, London, Paris, and the Baltic countries are using the Ukraine war to consolidate their own political position and obstruct diplomatic solutions related to the conflict. Lavrov stated that Europe is promoting ideas and practices similar to Nazism.
At the same time, German Chancellor Merkel stated that the talks were making hopes of ending the conflict more elusive. U.S. President Trump said that U.S.-Russia contacts are “closer to peace than ever before.”
“De-Nazification” serves a clear function in Russia’s official discourse. It provides a moral label for Putin’s war, drives emotions for long-term mobilization, and attempts to embellish the war’s moral legitimacy. However, once it enters the realm of reality, what Russia presents to the world is precisely the opposite of its accusations against Europe.
What people see is Russia treading the same failed path of war that Nazi Germany went through during World War II. It is a path of war failure that has been verified in history.
Historical experience shows that the outcome of a war is often predetermined before a complete collapse on the battlefield, depending on whether decision-makers can make wise judgments when there is still room for choice. This was the case on the European front of World War II. Germany’s fate was not sealed before a complete collapse on the Eastern Front; when the war was drawn into long-term attrition, Germany still hoped for a decisive action to change the overall trajectory, but the subsequent developments had already deviated from Nazi Germany’s control and were completely taken over by time.
In 1940, Germany achieved significant victories on the European battlefield. France collapsed rapidly, the Western European order was reshaped, and the German military’s tactics seemed invincible. However, these victories did not bring an end to the war; Britain continued to resist. As the German occupation expanded, the front lines lengthened, and the pressure on defense and supply increased simultaneously. Germany was drawn into a war of attrition, and the war rhythm gradually slipped out of Germany’s control.
At the same time, the USSR in the East was completing total mobilization. The scale of military forces continued to expand, industrial production shifted inland, and the wartime production system began to take shape, changes that began to alter the pace of the war.
In this situation, the German decision-makers pinned their hopes on a larger-scale operation. This choice was based on past victorious experiences and a misjudgment of their own capabilities. Germany still attempted to replicate past blitzkrieg experiences in the hope of a swift resolution.
In the early morning of June 22, 1941, German forces launched a comprehensive attack on the Soviet Union along the 3,000-kilometer border, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Over three million soldiers, thousands of tanks, and aircraft crossed the border. This was one of the largest land military operations in human history, and the German side named this operation “Operation Barbarossa.” Its goal was not only to defeat the Soviet army but also to fundamentally change the course of the war in a single battle.
Germany divided its main forces into three groups and advanced simultaneously towards Leningrad, Moscow, Ukraine, and the Caucasus. This simultaneous multi-axis advancement plan reflected Germany’s high confidence in its maneuver warfare capabilities and its overly idealized goal of total war, aiming for the complete destruction, political disintegration, and economic plunder of the Soviet Union.
In the initial stages of the operation, the German army achieved significant results. A large number of Soviet troops were surrounded in border areas, communication and command systems were severely disrupted, and the air force suffered heavy losses on the ground. In just a few weeks, the German army advanced hundreds of kilometers, capturing millions of prisoners. These achievements quickly strengthened the confidence of the German decision-makers in their existing judgments and made the idea of “ending the war within a season” seem factual.
Germany was not prepared for a protracted war, nor did it have sufficient backup plans because they judged that the Soviet Union did not have the capacity to continue fighting after such a massive blow. It was this judgment that led the direction of the war to deviate from Germany’s expectations. The scale and momentum of Operation Barbarossa did not bring an end to the war for Germany but instead dragged it into a state of continued investment that could not be ended. Operation Barbarossa failed to quickly collapse the adversary but instead trapped Germany in an inescapable quagmire. From that moment on, Germany’s space to correct its errors rapidly disappeared. Subsequent actions were essentially passively moving towards the end under time pressure.
Doesn’t this sound a lot like what Russia is doing to Ukraine today, except Russia’s actions today are far from being as successful as Nazi Germany’s initial actions back then? Germany pinned the success or failure of the war on the goal of “swift defeat” of the enemy, with manpower, supplies, and timelines, the basic premise of the whole war design being “victory in a short time.” This logically aligns with Putin’s claim of a “special military operation.”
Under the guise of anti-Nazi sentiment, Putin launched a “special military operation,” aiming for total invasion, annexation of territory, and overthrow of the Ukrainian government. However, the war failed to end quickly as expected. Instead, it ignited Ukraine’s strong will to resist, strengthened the ties with Europe, and sought support from the U.S. and the rest of the world. As time passes, Russia has not shown the ability to control and ultimately end the war.
The historical defeat of Germany in World War II shows that the crucial factor determining the course of the war does not solely depend on the temporary strength or weakness of one party on the battlefield or the outcome of a single battle but rather on the ability to make the right choice at a critical moment. By continuing to push the war when there is still room for reversal, it may seem proactive but could end up closing off one’s own retreat. Germany’s failure was not due to a lack of military capacity but rather a misjudgment that led to being abandoned by time and having time on the opponent’s side.
Today, Russia is facing a situation highly reminiscent of late-stage Germany in World War II. At the outset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces advanced simultaneously from various directions towards Kyiv, seeking to dismantle President Zelenskyy’s government in an extremely short time frame. The initial actions did not yield the expected results. Instead, Ukraine became more determined, Western intervention deepened, and the battlefield shifted to a war of attrition, now entering its fourth year.
The dilemma faced by Germany after 1941 seems to be repeating itself in today’s Russia. The war continues, but the options left to Putin are diminishing, and time is running out. Every misjudgment in ending the war, every neglect of diplomatic options, or delay in timing is compressing Putin’s time and space. The fate of Germany’s defeat in World War II vividly demonstrates that the truly fatal mistake is to continue stubbornly at a time when correct choices could still be made.
Russia erroneously borrows from historical memories, imposing the “Nazi” label on Ukraine and Europe as a political tool to accuse their opponents, yet their actions resemble real “Nazis.” What is more alarming is Putin’s determination to resolve the so-called “root causes of the war,” much like Hitler’s desire to destroy the Soviet Union back then. In this near-paranoid fantasy, Putin may find it challenging to avoid falling into the same trap as Nazi Germany.