This week on Monday, December 1st, The Stanford Review published an investigative report revealing a Chinese head of the Earth Sciences Department at Stanford University collaborating long-term with HPSTAR, an organization listed by the U.S. Department of Commerce as posing significant national security risks, purportedly linked to the “Chinese nuclear weapons program.” The individual in question served as a visiting scholar in this program, conducting research and training technical personnel related to the project, raising concerns about national security.
The Stanford Review is a conservative student-run publication circulated within Stanford University. According to their investigation, the Beijing High Pressure Science and Technology Research Center (HPSTAR) was placed on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List in 2020 as a significant risk to national security. The list indicates that HPSTAR is directly affiliated with the China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), responsible for nuclear weapons research, development, and testing on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, having been flagged as a risk entity by the U.S. back in 1997.
The brochure from HPSTAR for the 2017-18 school year indicates that the center was approved by the CCP’s Central Organization Department in 2015, with Mao Hekuang, a member of the American Academy of Sciences, serving as its legal representative, brought back to China through the Thousand Talents Program. The brochure also mentions opportunities for outstanding students to conduct experiments and exchanges at various institutions, including the Carnegie Institution for Science, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and Stanford University.
The investigation reveals that Mao Hekuang’s daughter, Wendy Mao, the head of Stanford University’s Earth Sciences Department, has publicly published research papers that do not directly involve weapon experimentation, design, or development but focus on studying material reactions under extreme high-temperature and pressure conditions using techniques such as diamond anvils, synchrotron radiation beams, and X-rays. This precise knowledge of high-pressure measurements and theoretical understanding is considered a fundamental basis for modern nuclear and advanced weapon design.
Over the past twenty years, Wendy Mao has collaborated with HPSTAR on at least fifty research papers. Their joint research projects have received funding from various U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Energy, several national laboratories under the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and NASA.
Wendy Mao also trained at least five employees for HPSTAR, who later became doctoral students at Stanford University and the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory. One of these former HPSTAR employees went on to participate in projects funded by the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
After working at HPSTAR for three years, one doctoral student joined Wendy Mao’s lab at Stanford for their Ph.D. studies. The other four individuals, after receiving training in Mao’s lab, returned to China to work at HPSTAR.
Wendy Mao herself was a visiting scholar at the HPSTAR Shanghai lab between 2016 and 2019, holding an HPSTAR email address. However, she did not disclose this position on her internal resume and personal information at Stanford University. According to the investigation, security experts point out that under U.S. Department of Energy Order 486.1A, individuals with access to the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory must disclose their foreign connections, a requirement that Wendy Mao did not fulfill.
In September of this year, Wendy Mao co-authored a paper with three HPSTAR collaborators introducing HPSTAR researchers using advanced equipment from U.S. government labs.
The investigation cited the opinion of LJ Eads, a research intelligence, data analysis, and technology development expert.
Eads believes that while basic research is legal, the use of sensitive equipment is still subject to export controls, and HPSTAR should not be allowed access to U.S. Department of Energy’s national labs. Wendy Mao may have facilitated the use of these export-controlled items at HPSTAR, calling it a “startling lapse in security research.”
Eads informed the Review that Wendy Mao, leveraging her positions at Stanford University and SLAC, effectively provided HPSTAR-affiliated scientists with opportunities to access resources, training, equipment, and funding at U.S. national laboratories, indicating a channel through which the Chinese research system seeks to nurture talent overseas.
Apart from collaborating with HPSTAR and CAEP, Wendy Mao’s research partners also include Beijing University of Science and Technology and Northwestern Polytechnical University, both directly under the CCP’s Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, and categorized as key military universities within China’s defense system. The institutions associated with her research also encompass the designated key military laboratory of the CCP – the State Key Laboratory of Nanostructured Materials at Shanghai Jiao Tong University.
Wendy Mao’s father, Mao Hekuang, was a leading expert in high-pressure science in the U.S. and previously led the “Carnegie Energy Department Alliance Center” (CDAC) funded by the NNSA. CDAC collaborated with the NNSA to provide training to ensure the readiness and maintenance of nuclear weapons stockpiles.
After retiring in 2012, Mao Hekuang was employed at the China Institute of Atomic Energy Planning and subsequently established HPSTAR as a subsidiary under CAEP. The center’s website refers to Mao as the “director,” mentioning his approval by the CCP’s Central Organization Department in 2012 as part of the “Top Thousand Talents Program” to return to China.
The investigative report also includes information from archiving pages on HPSTAR’s website related to Wendy Mao, showcasing her email addresses at the center and Stanford University. The authors of the investigation confirm that this report is based on testimonies from China experts, high-pressure material science specialists, and public documents validating Wendy’s extensive cooperation with organizations promoting the CCP’s nuclear agenda.
Finally, the report quotes Eads once more, stating that Wendy’s case is not an isolated incident. He found that at least 1,300 research papers from Stanford University publications touch on entities related to the CCP’s military-civil fusion system. This indicates a broader pattern of collaboration linking Stanford researchers with CCP institutions of clear defense significance.