On August 22nd, it marked the 120th birth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping. Before and after this date, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) media consecutively published commemorative articles. Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the 120th birth anniversary symposium commemorating Deng Xiaoping. Suddenly, “Deng Xiaoping” became a hot topic on the internet again. Some people believe that Xi might be returning to Deng’s reforms and opening up policies.
Is that really the case? Many also hold a skeptical attitude towards this. Since Xi came to power 12 years ago, he has been suppressing Deng while elevating Mao Zedong. Those against Xi have been raising Deng in opposition to him. In this context, it is necessary to explore the differences between Xi and Deng’s reforms and opening up policies.
Why did Deng Xiaoping advocate for limited decentralization of power? There are two main reasons: firstly, in 1977, when Deng Xiaoping returned to work, the highest authority in the CCP, government, and military was concentrated in Hua Guofeng’s hands, the successor designated by Mao Zedong before he passed away. Hua was the CCP Central Committee Chairman, Prime Minister of the State Council, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In order to implement his reform and opening up policies, Deng Xiaoping had to decentralize the power held by Hua Guofeng. Secondly, during Mao Zedong’s leadership, although Mao formally held the positions of CCP Central Committee Chairman and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, in reality, the highest authority of the party, government, and military was concentrated in Mao’s hands. Mao’s centralized power was a significant factor leading to the havoc of the ten-year Cultural Revolution.
How did Deng implement “limited decentralization” of power?
Firstly, he divided Hua Guofeng’s power into three parts: Hu Yaobang became the CCP Central Committee Chairman (later renamed CCP General Secretary), Deng Xiaoping became the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Zhao Ziyang became the Premier of the State Council.
Secondly, after amending the constitution to establish the position of the President in 1982, different individuals held the positions of CCP General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Thirdly, the authority of the party, government, and leadership of state-owned enterprises was limited and decentralized.
In contrast, Xi Jinping advocates for “the party, government, military, civilian, east, west, south, north, and center, the party leads everything”, reverting back to Mao Zedong’s era of “the party’s unified leadership”.
Xi not only holds the positions of CCP General Secretary, President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, but also serves in over a dozen committees or leadership groups, such as Chairman of the National Security Commission, Director of the Central Comprehensive Deepening Reform Commission, Director of the Central Finance and Economic Commission, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Director of the Central Comprehensive Law Governance Commission, Director of the Central Audit Commission, Leader of the Central Taiwan Work Leadership Group, Leader of the Central Military Commission Deepening National Defense and Military Reform Leadership Group, and the General Commander of the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center, among others.
When Deng Xiaoping summarized the lessons of the Mao Zedong era, he specifically mentioned that “leaders at all levels of government are involved in many things they shouldn’t be, cannot handle well, and cannot manage”. Therefore, in 1980, Deng proposed to “solve the problem of the party representing the government”, suggesting that some leading figures at the central level should not concurrently hold government positions, focusing on managing the party, guiding the party’s policies and directives. Deng believed that “this approach is conducive to strengthening and improving the unified leadership of the central government, facilitating the establishment of a strong and effective work system at all levels of government from the top down, and effectively managing the government’s jurisdiction”.
Xi and Deng’s approaches are diametrically opposites in many aspects, moving back to the “party-state integration” advocated by Mao Zedong.
After the 20th National Congress of the CCP, Xi transformed the State Council into the executive organ of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the current Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang, is the weakest premier in the 75 years of CCP rule. Xi changed the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council to the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, transformed the Ministry of Science and Technology into the Science and Technology Commission of the Central Committee of the CCP, and also established the Central Social Affairs Department, transferring some functions from the State Council to the Social Affairs Department.
Starting from 1980, Deng Xiaoping mentioned the drawbacks of the lifetime tenure of officials multiple times and proposed abolishing the system of lifetime posts for officials.
The Constitution amended in December 1982 stipulated that the President and Vice President of the country, the Premier and Vice Premier of the State Council, the Chairman and Vice Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, “shall not serve more than two consecutive terms”. This provision marked the end of the system of lifetime tenure for “party and state leaders”.
In November 1989, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping resigned from the post of Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, and the following year, he also resigned from the post of Chairman of the National Military Commission, officially retiring. Other CCP elders, including Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, subsequently stepped down from their leadership positions.
After being reelected as the CCP General Secretary at the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017, Xi immediately set about amending the constitutional provisions regarding the term limits for the President and Vice President.
In March 2018, the “Constitutional Amendment” passed by the 13th National People’s Congress removed the provision that the President and Vice President “shall not serve more than two consecutive terms”. This meant that the President and Vice President could hold office for life.
Since Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform and opening up policy in 1978, until Xi Jinping, no CCP General Secretary had been reelected for a third term. However, in 2022, Xi achieved a “third term” at the 20th National Congress of the CCP. To this day, Xi has not designated a successor. Many suspect that Xi may also want to establish a lifelong system in the position of the CCP General Secretary.
In December 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping said: “The most frightening thing is silence. As soon as there is some discussion among the masses, especially sharp discussions, it should be traced to so-called ‘political background’ and ‘political rumors’. Files should be opened, crackdowns should be conducted, and this abominable practice must be resolutely stopped.” He emphasized the “Three Nos” principle: no pulling pigtails, no labeling, no hitting with sticks.
Although Deng did not strictly adhere to his own words, there was a relatively free period of speech in China before the June 4th incident in 1989.
After 12 years of Xi’s rule, control over speech has become increasingly severe. Because Xi advocates for party control over everything, CCP’s media belongs to the party, and all other media outlets are also under the banner of the party.
What does it mean for “media to belong to the party”? It means that all media in China must be “highly consistent with the party center,” allowing only one voice, which is the party’s voice.
Any speech that the CCP deems not in line with the party center is suppressed.
The CCP’s “Disciplinary Regulations” specifically stipulate penalties for those who “irresponsibly discuss the central government.” Those who spread such discussions through the Internet, radio, television, newspapers, flyers, books, or engage in seminars, forums, symposiums, and other methods of irresponsible discussions may be warned, disciplined or even expelled from the party, based on the severity of the offense.
What constitutes “irresponsible discussion” and how it is defined is determined by the party. Chinese entrepreneur Ren Zhiqiang, for example, was sentenced to 18 years under the pretext of corruption by the Xi authorities for an article criticizing Xi after the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020.
While Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up primarily focused on the economic sector, with significant achievements in loosening restrictions on private enterprises.
As a result of Deng’s relaxation of restrictions on private enterprises, the private sector contributed over 50% of China’s tax revenue, over 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), over 70% of technological innovations, and over 80% of urban labor employment.
However, during Xi’s 12-year rule, although he verbally supported the development of the private sector, in practice, the trend shifted towards the expansion of state-owned enterprises, severely regulating private sector growth.
In 2020, a regulatory storm swept through the private economy sector, causing significant damage to rapidly growing private enterprises in industries such as tutoring, e-commerce, online banking, electronic gaming, and ride-hailing platforms that had thrived over the past few decades.
Many private entrepreneurs fell into hardship.
On November 11, 2020, Sun Dawu, the chairman of the Hebei Dawu Group, along with his wife, two sons, two daughters-in-law, other family members, and several company executives, totaling 28 individuals, were arrested by the CCP police on charges of causing disturbances, disrupting operations, and other offenses. On July 28, 2021, Sun Dawu was sentenced to 18 years in prison and fined 3.11 million yuan by the CCP court on charges of gathering crowds to assault state institutions, obstructing official duties, causing disturbances, disrupting operations, forced transactions, illegal mining, unauthorized occupation of agricultural land, illegal absorption of public deposits, among others.
While Deng’s reform and opening benefited a select few CCP elite families, workers, farmers, soldiers, students, and various other professions gained some benefits. For example, the restoration of the college entrance examination system (Gaokao) allowed many children of farmers to change their destinies through education. This is one of the reasons many people still cherish Deng’s reform and opening policies.
Who benefited from Xi’s 12-year rule of reform and opening? Those high-ranking officials who were not investigated by Xi in his selective anti-corruption campaign, such as the families of Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun, Wu Guanzheng, He Guoqiang, Zhang Gaoli, Liu Yunshan, etc., may have been the main beneficiaries.
Apart from the privileged elite families, the vast majority of China’s middle and lower-class citizens did not reap benefits. This is a crucial factor leading to the boiling discontent in today’s Chinese society.
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping compared China to developed capitalist countries and realized the significant gap between China and these countries. He then proposed the foreign policy of “keeping a low profile and biding time.”
What does “keeping a low profile and biding time” mean? It means acknowledging that China is not a strong country but rather “having a large population but a weak foundation”, unable to compete head-to-head with the leading capitalist power, the United States. Therefore, China should act low-key, be pragmatic, say less, and do more, seeking support from the US and other Western developed countries to open markets to China and provide funds, technology, talents, services, and various forms of support to strengthen China’s power and strive for a favorable international environment.
Once Xi came to power, he believed China had become the world’s second-largest economy and was impressive. Abandoning Deng’s strategy of “keeping a low profile and biding time”, Xi began pursuing “great power diplomacy” and gradually embarked on a confrontational path with the United States under the banner of “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”.
In the year of the pandemic in 2020, Xi initiated a cold war with the United States, with five significant events: firstly, in January-February, CCP warships performed military maneuvers in the central Pacific near the Midway Islands. Secondly, in March, the South China Sea strategic nuclear submarine’s “fortress sea area” was declared operational. Thirdly, in June, the deployment of the space war against the US was announced. Fourthly, starting from July, a series of intensive military exercises were initiated from the Bohai Sea to the Yellow Sea to the East China Sea to the South China Sea and inland. Fifthly, on August 25th, the People’s Daily published a long article criticizing the United States, with the central idea being: the United States is the worst, and the “People’s Republic of China” is the best.
The result: Sino-US relations deteriorated to their lowest point in more than 40 years of diplomatic relations, and relations between the CCP and many countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, India, Australia, Canada, Lithuania, among others, plummeted.
Today, looking around the globe, the CCP does not have a true friend. The few countries that have close relations with the CCP, such as Russia, North Korea, Iran, etc., are also dreaming different dreams, and they merely use each other.
The common point of Xi and Deng’s reform and opening policies is that they insist on the CCP’s leadership to maintain one-party dictatorship.
Deng initiated reform and opening up when the CCP was on the brink of collapse due to Mao’s ten-year Cultural Revolution, aiming to rescue the party.
Xi, on the other hand, led the reform and opening up amidst various underlying problems accumulated during the Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin eras, with the CCP becoming the most corrupt party in the world. Xi’s reform and opening up aim to protect the party.
Whether rescuing the party like Deng or protecting the party like Xi, both aim to defend the CCP’s “party above all”, upholding one-party dictatorship.
The reform and opening up under Xi and Deng ultimately converge on preserving the one-party dictatorship of the CCP.
How to maintain one-party dictatorship? It means “the power of the gun dictates”, whoever disagrees shall be suppressed. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping ordered the Tiananmen Square massacre. Following that incident, Deng personally blocked the path of political system reform within the CCP. From that time until Deng’s passing, there was no mention of political system reform.
From 1989 to the present, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, the CCP’s political system reform has not made any substantial progress.
In 1986, Deng Xiaoping said: “If you only reform the economic system and not the political system, even the economic system cannot be reformed.”
After Xi came to power, he continued to centralize power politically, moving from concentrated power to extreme authority. Under such an authoritarian regime, is there room for political system reform?
The political system reform of the CCP is dead, which means the reform and opening up of the CCP is also dead.