Recently, there have been continuous discussions about the dissatisfaction of the “second-generation reds” within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) towards Xi Jinping, such as taking advantage of Xis declaration of war on Taiwan to seize power through a military coup. Although the authenticity of such rumors is difficult to confirm, they undoubtedly will have an impact on the dynamics within the CCP leadership. In the past, various leaks within the CCP were mainly aimed at pressuring Xi Jinping from different factions to compromise or share power, but the recent leaks are mainly focused on directly removing Xi from power, which is unusual just before the upcoming CCP Third Plenum in July.
Over the years, there have been instances of insiders leaking information from within the CCP. For example, after the Beidaihe meeting in 2023, a group led by Zeng Qinghong deliberately leaked information to Japanese media, initially claiming that retired members of the Politburo Standing Committee in Beijing had unanimously criticized Xi Jinping; however, only a few, including Zeng Qinghong, went to Beidaihe to question Xi Jinping. Later, they included the former military head Chi Haotian, and after the sudden death of Li Keqiang, they were also implicated.
These leaks mainly revolve around political struggles. Although they may involve military matters, there is some stretch in the connections. While they point towards Xi Jinping, there is no direct intent to overthrow him; rather, it seems to be a strategic move to gain leverage in internal power struggles or to disrupt the status quo.
The recent leaks are different as they have a clear objective of attempting to seize power through a coup and overthrow Xi Jinping, with the military playing a significant role, as it is considered the most crucial tool by the CCP leadership. Such leaks have a greater potential impact, regardless of their veracity, as they would increase Xi Jinping’s concerns about the military.
The leaks specifically mention former Minister of National Defense of the CCP, Li Shangfu, labeling him as a “two-faced person” who outwardly supports Xi Jinping but privately, when with other high-ranking officials like the Commander and Political Commissar of the Rocket Force, believes that Xi Jinping declaring war on Taiwan is a “suicidal move.”
Compared to previous leaks, these latest leaks undoubtedly add a certain level of credibility. There were previous rumors about Rocket Force generals being ‘cowardly’ and being reported by those around them; now, with the addition of Li Shangfu, the implications are even more significant.
Li Shangfu, who used to serve as the director of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center and later as the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Strategic Support Force, along with former Rocket Force Commanders and Deputy Commanders, have expertise in military affairs. Although they may not be experts, they are not complete novices, and they likely understand the gaps between CCP’s aerospace, satellite, and missile technologies compared to the US, making a war with the US unlikely to be winnable, hence the alleged ‘cowardice.’
Former Rocket Force Political Commissar Xu Zhongbo made a public appearance during the CCP’s Two Sessions in March, indicating a safe landing for him. If he is also deemed a “two-faced person,” Xi Jinping may not let him off easily. However, as the focus of the leaks is on the military, amidst a purge within the military, it undoubtedly creates pressure within the CCP leadership.
The leaks mention Li Shangfu, the Rocket Force Commander, as well as Liu Yazhou and Liu Yuan. None of them are currently serving military officers and do not command any active units, thus lacking the direct capability to launch a military coup.
The leaks suggest that some within the ‘second-generation reds’ fundamentally oppose Xi Jinping’s personal dictatorship because he does not allow other ‘second-generation red’ families to share the highest powers, leading to widespread dissatisfaction and even hostility. Some strategists have reportedly proposed encouraging Xi Jinping to declare war on Taiwan, pushing him to a ‘suicidal path,’ and then taking advantage to eliminate him.
This is perhaps the main reason why the CCP leadership dares not easily start a war on Taiwan. Rather than fearing losing against the US, the CCP leadership seems more concerned about someone striking from behind.
The CCP had meticulously planned for a military exercise surrounding Taiwan, but the sudden death of the Iranian President likely rattled the CCP leadership, causing chaos in the internal dynamics. This led to the delay of the military exercise that was supposed to start on May 20 or 21, ultimately commencing on May 23, and hastily ending on the following day. During the exercise, instead of staying in Beijing, Xi Jinping was inspecting in Shandong, indicating a disrupted arrangement.
If the CCP leadership is already so apprehensive about large-scale military exercises, it is likely that when it comes to declaring war on Taiwan, decentralizing military authority extensively would be something Xi Jinping would try to avoid. The leaks suggest that when Xi Jinping initiates a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, lower-ranking military officers would have the lead in using force.
From this perspective, it seems that some are anticipating a military coup or mutiny, but without a concrete and well-thought-out plan, it appears that there is a lack of effective organization for a coup. While lower-ranking officers might initiate a mutiny, without the strategic planning from higher-ranking officials and coordinated actions from a larger military force, the likelihood of success is low.
Though a coup or mutiny may be desired by some, the difficulty lies in executing such plans. Those who are truly scheming in private for a coup or mutiny are unlikely to prematurely reveal their plans, nor would they casually share them. Nonetheless, such leaks are still shaking up the political landscape, indicating that someone is contemplating directly targeting the CCP leadership.
The leaks mention that Xi Jinping is cracking down on individuals like Liu Yazhou and Li Shangfu to suppress dissenting voices within the military and the ‘second-generation reds.’ Consequently, more individuals have chosen to become ‘two-faced’ – outwardly showing loyalty while harboring opposing views. The leaks also suggest that due to Xi Jinping’s tight grip through special agents, controlling officials at all levels within the CCP, the only hope lies in ‘two-faced’ individuals within the military taking action, which would require the precondition of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This indicates that during peacetime, the likelihood of a mutiny or coup within the CCP’s military is minimal since no military officer can mobilize troops without orders from the CCP Central Military Commission. Furthermore, if the CCP does not engage in warfare, there would be no distribution of a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. While the CCP aggressively publicized the Taiwan-surrounding military exercise, the fact that live ammunition drills were not conducted likely stems from their fear not of political implications but rather the reluctance to distribute ammunition.
The Rocket Force appears to still be under scrutiny, and while Commanders and Political Commissars can be reassigned from other branches of the military, it is unlikely that all missile brigade leaders could be replaced. If any of them harbor discontent and during the exercises manage to accidentally launch a missile towards the CCP leadership in Zhongnanhai, it could pose serious complications.
The CCP leadership may choose to postpone an all-out conflict and refrain from live-fire exercises, but the mistrust towards the ‘two-faced’ individuals within the military likely remains constant. The sudden death of the Iranian President has added a significant level of stress to the internal dynamics of the CCP, further fueled by recent internal leaks.
Adding to the turmoil, former US President Trump also stirred the pot by stating that if the CCP attacks Taiwan, the US would bomb Beijing. For the CCP leadership, the critical point lies not in whether the US would actually bomb Beijing, but rather if someone within the CCP would inform the US, revealing the whereabouts of the CCP leadership, effectively turning a bombing scenario into a targeted ‘decapitation’ operation.
While the ‘two-faced’ individuals within the military might not be able to initiate a coup or mutiny, they could provide intelligence to the US; similarly, individuals frequently around CCP leadership, if also ‘two-faced,’ might engage in the same behavior. The ‘two-faced’ within the military could provide more detailed information to the US, such as attack plans on Taiwan, military deployments, real data about weapons, etc., which would likely lead to the failure of a CCP war with Taiwan and put the CCP leadership in a precarious position, achieving a similar effect to a coup.
Therefore, the presence of ‘two-faced’ individuals within the military continually keeping the CCP leadership on edge may likely have the most substantial impact in the recent leaks.
The CCP has postponed the Third Plenum to July, indicating unresolved challenges, with Zhongnanhai facing unprecedented pressure.
On May 23, Xi Jinping presided over a symposium in Jinan, Shandong. On May 25, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled “This symposium before the Third Plenum sends important signals about reform.”
The article states, “The party center attaches importance to seeking advice… It sends an important signal for further comprehensive deepening of reform and advancing China’s modernization.”
There is significant concern within Zhongnanhai that officials may not fully comprehend Xi Jinping’s speeches, leading to public disclosures and broader explanations. The article notes, “China’s modernization is the central task of the new era. To further comprehensively deepen the reform, it must revolve around the central task.” The article also quotes Xi Jinping saying, “Further comprehensive deepening of the reform” must be “closely linked to promoting China’s modernization.”
Ahead of the Third Plenum, Zhongnanhai intentionally released signals of ‘reform,’ seemingly responding to internal and external calls for reform; however, they refrain from abandoning the rhetoric of ‘Chinese modernization,’ continuing to exhibit contradictions.
The article also quotes Xi Jinping saying, “Economic system reform triggers overall reform; it has a significant impact on reforms in other areas.” It becomes the ‘nose of the bull’ for the comprehensive deepening of reforms in the new era.
While Xinhua’s article hints at ‘reform,’ it appears limited to ‘economic system reform,’ sidestepping political system reform. Furthermore, they are hesitant to abandon ‘Chinese modernization,’ indicating that under pressure, the CCP leadership is compelled to make verbal compromises but is unwilling to take genuine action. The unresolved internal struggles within the CCP still lack a consensus, suggesting uncertainty surrounding the Third Plenum. Besides ideological battles, personnel struggles likely persist, where ousted officials necessitate narratives, all while adjustments among current officials remain vital.
Following the CCP’s Two Sessions, waves of personnel changes have been unfolding, with official reports claiming the completion of central institutional reforms, though this process likely continues. Local institutional reforms are expected to be prolonged, and the essential question remains – who is genuinely ‘loyal.’
In early May, the CCP leadership embarked on foreign visits, with Political Bureau members all conveniently out of Beijing, projecting a deep-seated distrust from Xi Jinping towards all around him. How others in the Political Bureau perceive this is a matter of contemplation.
Li Qiang, in hopes of advancement, had closely followed Xi Jinping; however, after becoming a Political Bureau member, he perhaps did not dare aspire to the position of the number two. Constantly being intentionally suppressed and distrusted might leave him restless. Others are likely in similar positions.
While Xinhua Society mentioned that Xi Jinping’s symposium in Jinan on May 23 released ‘important signals’ ahead of the Third Plenum, Li Qiang, unfortunately, could not attend.
On May 27, Li Qiang participated in the China-Japan-South Korea Leaders’ Meeting in South Korea, coinciding with a Political Bureau meeting; upon rushing back that afternoon, he might have made it in time for the collective study session. Li Qiang was supposed to discuss his visit during the Political Bureau meeting but did not get the chance; he probably only had the opportunity to report to Xi Jinping privately.
The Political Bureau meeting endorsed the “Accountability Regulations for Preventing and Resolving Financial Risks (Trial)”, which did not necessitate Li Qiang’s presence; the talk about ‘strengthening the Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership in financial work’ but Li Qiang cannot represent the ‘Party Central.’ While financial regulations need to be stringent, only Xi Jinping can command such actions, and Li Qiang and other Political Bureau members do not hold that level of power.
On May 31, the CCP’s ‘Seeking Truth’ magazine published an article by Xi Jinping titled “Developing New Quality Productive Forces is an Internal Requirement and an Important Focus for Promoting High-Quality Development,” which was part of Xi Jinping’s speech during a Political Bureau study session on January 31.
The article essentially elaborates on what new quality productive forces entail, marking another instance where Xi Jinping publicly showcases his dominance in economics before the Third Plenum. However, the article acknowledges, “There still exist numerous constraints on high-quality development…some areas’ critical core technologies are still under human control, and the situation of some leading cadres having the wrong perception and reverting to the old ways of extensive and inefficient development when faced with contradictions and difficulties persists; some leading cadres have outdated ideas, claiming to promote high-quality development while essentially ‘putting old wine in new bottles’; some leading cadres lack abilities, unable to navigate the new domestic and foreign environments and challenges for promoting high-quality development.”
The ‘Seeking Truth’ article does not elevate Xi Jinping’s status but instead enumerates a series of challenges, effectively highlighting the incompetence within Zhongnanhai or perhaps Xi Jinping himself. These issues likely remain unresolved as the Third Plenum approaches, revealing a host of negative signs. With Zhongnanhai internally leaking information and individuals preparing to oust Xi Jinping, the atmosphere before the Third Plenum seems truly exceptional.
End of article.