Analysis: The Chinese Communist Party leadership is sluggish, Xi Jinping situation precarious.

In the past three years, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been embroiled in internal struggles, resulting in chaos. The latest to fall is Ma Xingrui, a member of the CCP Central Political Bureau. With the upcoming CCP 21st National Congress next year, all eyes are on Party leader Xi Jinping as he has yet to appoint a successor, and the entire leadership, including provincial committee members, is facing severe aging. Experts believe that the CCP’s one-party rule cannot solve the problem of succession, and Xi Jinping’s autocracy has blocked the CCP’s future path, posing a dangerous prospect for himself.

Xi Jinping is seen as one of the templates for succession rules set by Deng Xiaoping. Prior to Xi, Hu Jintao became a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee at the age of 49 and took over as the Party leader at close to 60. Xi himself became a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee at 54 and assumed the role of Party leader at 59.

In 2018, Xi Jinping abolished the term limit for the Chinese presidency, disregarding the CCP’s unwritten rules on succession. During Xi’s tenure, potential successors such as Sun Zhengcai, Hu Chunhua, and Chen Min’er, were either imprisoned or marginalized. As of now, Xi’s successor has not emerged, clearly indicating his intention to remain in power at the upcoming party congress.

An article by The Economist recently highlighted the aging leadership of China, citing analysis from the research group “Gavekal Dragonomics,” indicating a significant aging trend within the CCP leadership. Formerly, the Central Committee had many formal members in their 40s and early 50s, but now the youngest is around 56. Data compiled by Gavekal Dragonomics shows that provincial-level party committees are also aging, with most members now in their 50s.

It appears that Xi Jinping is not welcoming young and potential successors into his inner circle. The median age of the entire Political Bureau is 66, the highest this century. The youngest member among the seven current Standing Committee members, Ding Xuexiang, is 63. The appointment of a candidate in their early 50s at next year’s congress could be a distant possibility and subject to scrutiny.

The article suggests that appointing a younger successor to Xi could weaken his power. Xi may prefer to surround himself with loyal older individuals. However, political storms may arise in China, even with a Political Bureau filled with “loyalists.” Since the 20th National Congress, over one-fifth of the Central Committee’s formal members have been purged. While corruption may be cited as the primary reason in most cases, eliminating potential competitors is also a possible factor.

According to incomplete statistics compiled by Epoch Times, nearly 70 members of the Central Committee elected during the 20th National Congress have been purged, accounting for around 18% of the total members.

Professor Wen Guanzhong from Trinity College in the United States commented to Epoch Times that Xi, by removing potential successors and not appointing new ones, has made clear his intention to continue in power. Whether he can achieve this desire depends on domestic and international factors. As long as he holds military power, no one within the party can challenge his authority unless there is an economic collapse or conflict with the world’s strongest nations.

Veteran political commentator Chen Pokong analyzed for Epoch Times that the leadership transition within the core of the CCP involves stability of regime, and Xi has tied the survival of the regime to himself alone. This is attributed to both institutional and personal factors.

Chen stated that from an institutional perspective, succession within the CCP’s one-party rule often involves bloody turbulence, as seen in the abnormal removals of Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang. Prior to Xi Jinping’s rise, the unexpected 2012 CCP political turmoil saw a power struggle between the princeling Bo Xilai and Xi Jinping. After Xi seized power and attempted to rule for life, the CCP underwent another intense upheaval, particularly during the 20th Congress involving internal shuffling of lists, forcefully removing former General Secretary Hu Jintao from the venue.

Chen noted, “That was a kind of coup, sowing the seeds of political turmoil.”

From a personal standpoint, Chen believes Xi Jinping’s cognitive barriers make him an outdated figure wandering on the stage of the new century, out of touch with the times and public sentiments. Xi has a negative reputation internationally and is hated domestically, losing loyalty within the party and military. “This monster, born out of the party’s system and a monstrous individual, has pushed the CCP into a dead end.”

Recently, the CCP has been appointing a group of officials at the departmental and deputy departmental levels in critical positions. However, most of these officials were born in the late 1960s, with few from the post-70s generation. Currently, there are only six officials from the post-70s generation at the departmental level, mostly serving as provincial governors. They include Liu Xiaotao, Governor of Jiangsu Province (born in July 1970), Lu Dongliang, Governor of Shanxi Province (born in December 1973), Wei Tao, Chairman of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Government (born in April 1970), Liu Jie, Governor of Zhejiang Province (born in January 1970), Adong, the first secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee (born in November 1970), and Li Yunze, Director of the China State Administration of Finance (born in September 1970).

Simultaneously, the CCP authorities have created an atmosphere unwelcoming to young officials. Last year, the “Chinese Organizational Personnel Report” published an article ridiculing young officials, claiming that while they may meet the “young” standard in their positions, they may not be suitable for major responsibilities, asserting that young officials need gradual nurturing.

Chen Pokong expressed that senior officials are inherently dangerous, akin to tigers, be they Xi Jinping’s faction or anti-Xi faction members, including Xi’s close confidants He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Ma Xingrui who have been ousted.

As for the relatively younger officials, they now harbor resentment towards Xi. Chen Pokong pointed out that Xi Jinping has seized opportunities from two generations, depriving those from the “60s generation” and aiming to control the prospects of the “70s generation.” There is little hope for the “70s generation” officials to succeed.

However, Chen Pokong believes that Xi is sitting on a volcano, as the entire CCP is perched on the brink, with one-party rule becoming outdated. China has undergone the era of reform and opening up, entering the era of the Internet, where people’s thoughts are changing. Xi Jinping’s continued re-election poses a significant risk for himself. If Xi were to die for some reason or be overthrown, whoever comes next would alter his policies – the instinct for survival does not support the Communist Party.