Rumors had circulated that retired veterans intervened in the re-election of Xi Jinping as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, resulting in the downfall of Vice Chairman of the Military Commission Zhang Youxia last month. Recently, senior Chinese officials have emphasized taking care of elderly cadres, while also stressing the need to intensify investigations into young officials. Analysts believe that the Communist Party’s release of the “promote the old and suppress the young” trend is related to Xi Jinping’s desire to retain authoritarian power, prevent someone from taking over or even rebelling, thus potentially exacerbating internal strife.
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) official Sun Jinlong, the Secretary of the Party Group of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, attended a work briefing for retired officials and a Chinese New Year tea party on Wednesday, February 4th. Sun first praised Xi Jinping’s so-called “important discourse,” then declared the importance of “adhering to the placement of the work of elderly cadres in an important position, wholeheartedly providing various services and guarantees, ensuring that old leaders, old comrades have a happy and productive life.”
China has a large number of retired high-ranking officials, requiring a huge amount of resources to support them. As the Chinese New Year approaches, similar events where current officials visit retired officials are expected to be held in accordance with tradition. However, it is relatively rare for official reports to emphasize providing good services to “old leaders.”
Contradictory information emerged on February 2nd when CCP Jiangxi Provincial Party Secretary Yin Hong stated during the provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection meeting that efforts should be made to “promote young cadres’ compliance with discipline, and to increase the severity of investigating the violations of laws and regulations by young cadres.”
Political commentator Chen Pokong told Dajiyuan that the comments made by Sun Jinlong and Yin Hong combined to suggest a tendency of “promoting the old and suppressing the young,” which is related to Xi Jinping. “By prioritizing the lives of old leaders, but being quick to investigate the illegal activities of young officials, not only does this concern the issue of the Communist Party’s succession plan, but also reflects Xi Jinping’s personal attitude.”
Chen Pokong explained that Xi Jinping hopes that after retiring from political activities, elderly officials will not engage in governance, therefore he seeks to appease and bribe them, allowing them to live a good life. However, he also implies or threatens that if they wish to return to politics, their benefits may be revoked, or they might even face investigation.
China expert Wang He pointed out that respecting old officials has always been a privileged tradition within the autocratic regime of the Chinese Communist Party. Senior officials enjoy special treatment until death, and this treatment is passed on to their children and grandchildren as much as possible. However, after Xi Jinping came to power, he imposed strict control over elderly officials in politics.
During the Beidaihe Conference in early August last year, a rare article published by the CCP Central Organization Department criticized the issue of overly hastening the aging of officials as part of a bid for “quick successes,” advocating for a gradual cultivation of young officials.
Simultaneously, a significant number of elderly officials beyond retirement age continue to linger in officialdom, including Xi Jinping, Song Tao, Wang Yi, Xia Baolong, Ying Yong, and Chen Xi.
Chen Pokong mentioned that Xi Jinping in particular does not trust young officials. Firstly, because Xi dismantled the leadership term and collective leadership system established during Deng Xiaoping’s era, aiming for lifelong rule. If young officials are promoted to provincial level and then subsequently to the central level, it may raise issues of succession, thereby leading Xi to be wary and wanting to suppress these young individuals. Secondly, in Chinese tradition, “heroes emerge in the younger generation,” meaning young officials may rebel when necessary, a scenario which Xi Jinping fears.
Regarding the suppression of young officials as a collective group, Wang He stated that when Xi Jinping was under the age of 50, he held the position of a full provincial ministerial official, and by 54 years old became a successor as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. However, such instances are currently unimaginable. Xi Jinping now claims to break away from age-based criteria, with very few provincial and ministerial-level officials born after the 1970s, leading to severe aging of officials, driven by Xi’s personal ambition for long-term leadership.
“Wang He noted, ‘Xi Jinping plans to be re-elected at the 21st Party Congress in 2027, so he is very wary of discussions about his successors. By subjecting young officials to numerous tests under the pretext of more evaluation, he makes it more difficult for them to advance.” Senior personnel in the CCP are aging, and the structure of officials’ ages is getting older, causing discontent among young officials, thus making internal power struggles within the CCP more intense.
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, was just sacked last month. Allegedly, one version of the story suggests that Zhang Youxia had backing from CCP elders, potentially intervening in Xi Jinping’s re-election at the 21st Party Congress next year, such as proposing Xi’s successor, leading to Xi’s retaliatory measures.
Wang He believes that the current circulation of the idea to “promote the old” by the Xi Jinping administration is likely related to the recent escalation of political crises within the Chinese Communist Party. With Zhang Youxia once in control of military power and collaborating with CCP elders, Xi Jinping’s authority was almost sidelined. In response, Xi Jinping took action, leading to Zhang Youxia’s downfall, leaving those elders concerned over the potential consequences of Xi’s retaliation. Xi Jinping is seeking stability, hence the need for appeasement on the surface level and using pleasant words. However, Xi will not ease up on his substantive monitoring and soft detention of these elders.