On January 17, the anti-corruption data released by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) website showed that in 2025, a total of 115 officials at the provincial level or above were investigated and prosecuted throughout the year.
However, on the list of mid-level cadres investigated and prosecuted in 2025 released by the CCDI website, there were only 65 individuals, including 51 officials at the provincial level.
115-51=64. Who are these 64 individuals? Because the list of cases on the CCDI website does not include senior military officials investigated and prosecuted by the military disciplinary committee. It is evident that these 64 individuals are senior military officers investigated and prosecuted by the military disciplinary committee.
In 2025, a total of 64 senior military officers were investigated and reviewed, breaking the historical records of senior military officers investigated and prosecuted since Xi took office in 2012, since the reform and opening up of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978, and even since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Shortly after the conclusion of the 20th National Congress of the CPC, the Chinese military experienced at least three waves of purges: in 2023 following the missile force major case, in 2024 following the Miao Hua major case, and in 2025 following the He Weidong major case.
According to the data from the CCDI, there were 87 mid-level cadre cases filed in 2023, but the list published on the CCDI website only included 54 individuals, with the remaining 33 likely being senior military officers; in 2024, there were 92 mid-level cadre cases filed, but the list only included 58 individuals, with the remaining 34 being senior military officers.
In summary, in 2023, 2024, and 2025, the total number of senior military officers investigated and prosecuted by the military disciplinary committee over the three years was: 33+34+64=131. This means that in the three years since the 20th National Congress of the CPC, a total of 131 senior military officers have been investigated and prosecuted, not including those who were dismissed or retired early without being investigated.
How should we view the fact that so many senior military officers have been investigated and prosecuted, especially in 2025?
I believe that the data breaking historical records mentioned above can at least illustrate three points:
On January 16, a high-level meeting of the Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection was held, with only two senior generals in attendance: Zhang Shengmin, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the Secretary of the Military Commission Discipline Inspection, and Han Shengyan, the Commander of the Central Theater.
The expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection in January 2025 was attended by 14 senior generals, including He Weidong and Zhang Shengmin on the stage, and officials such as Xu Xueqiang, Xu Qiling, Wang Xiubin, Chen Hui, Xu Xisheng, Ling Huanxin, Wang Renhua, He Hongjun, Xu Deqing, Guo Puxiao, Li Wei, Zhang Hongbing offstage.
Out of the 14 senior generals attending the meeting in 2025, only Zhang Shengmin attended the January 2026 meeting. Another senior general, Han Shengyan, was promoted to this rank in December 2025.
On December 22, 2025, the Central Military Commission held a ceremony to promote senior generals, with only four senior generals in attendance, including Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission Zhang Youxia and Zhang Shengmin, Military Commission members Liu Zhenli and Minister of National Defense Dong Jun, which was 16 fewer than the previous promotion ceremony on December 23, 2024. These 16 senior generals included He Weidong, Chen Hui, Wang Qiang, Xu Xueqiang, Wang Renhua, Xu Deqing, Hu Zhongming, He Hongjun, Li Wei, Guo Puxiao, Chang Dingqiu, Wang Houbin, Xu Xisheng, Yang Xuejun, Xiao Tianliang, Ling Huanxin, and Zhang Hongbing.
From October 20 to 23, 2025, the Communist Party of China convened the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Party Central Committee, with 22 senior generals absent, including eight senior generals who had already been publicly announced as having fallen from grace, such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutong, Yuan Huazhi, Wang Chunning, and 14 other senior generals who were “missing.” These 14 senior generals included Wang Haijiang, Wu Yanan, Huang Ming, Li Wei, Wang Renhua, Xu Xueqiang, Xu Deqing, Ju Gansheng, Xu Zhongbo, Xu Xisheng, Li Qiaoming, Hu Zhongming, Liu Qingsong, and Zhang Hongbing.
Up to now, almost all active senior generals promoted during Xi’s administration, including those in charge of military and political affairs in the Central Military Commission departments such as the Political Work Department, Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Equipment Development Department, Joint Staff Department, Joint Operations Command Center, Navy, Army, Air Force, Rocket Force, Information Support Forces, Eastern Theater Command, Western Theater Command, Northern Theater Command, Southern Theater Command, Central Theater Command, Armed Police, and the National Defense University, have been purged.
Xi Jinping’s personally appointed and rapidly promoted senior officials, including the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Member of the Politburo of the CPC, He Weidong, have become seriously corrupt.
The first, second, third, and fourth commanders of the Rocket Force promoted by Xi – Wei Fenghe, Zhou Yaning, Li Yuchao, and Wang Houbin – all fell as seriously corrupt officials.
Xi’s three “military secrets” – Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Fang Yongxiang, all encountered problems.
According to the data on the CCDI website, from the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012 to the 20th Congress in 2022, the Xi government has investigated and prosecuted a total of 553 mid-level cadres.
At the 20th Congress of the CPC, Xi claimed, “The fight against corruption has achieved an overwhelming victory and has been fully consolidated.”
However, from the 20th Congress of the CPC until now, in just over three years, the number of mid-level cadres investigated and prosecuted has reached a staggering 315. This includes 7 in 2022, 87 in 2023, 92 in 2024, and the highest in 2025, totaling 129 individuals (115 officials at the provincial level or above plus 14 bureau-level officials appointed and removed by the CPC Central Committee).
In just one year in 2025, at least 31 corrupt officials were sentenced to over a billion yuan each, the highest number of billion-dollar corrupt officials sentenced since the 18th National Congress of the CPC.
These 31 corrupt officials sentenced to over a billion yuan each include: Li Pengxin, Former Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang Party Committee, convicted of 822 million yuan bribery; Qi Tongsheng, Former Chairman of the Ningxia Federation of Literary and Art Circles, convicted of 1.11 billion yuan bribery; Xu Zuo, Former Deputy General Manager of Zhongxin Group, convicted of 1.47 billion yuan bribery; Guo Zhongwen, Former Director of the State Sports General Administration, convicted of 2.36 billion yuan bribery; Li Gang, Former Director of the National Security and Supervision Commission stationed in the Central Organization Department of the CCDI, convicted of 1.02 billion yuan bribery; Li Quan, former chairman of Xinhua Life Insurance Company, was convicted of embezzling 108 million yuan and accepting 105 million yuan in bribes; Li Xiangan, Former Deputy Director of the Heilongjiang Provincial People’s Congress, convicted of 1.17 billion yuan bribery and embezzlement of 1.68 million yuan; Yang Fasen, Former Standing Committee Member and Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Committee of Qinghai Province, convicted of 1.47 billion yuan bribery; Chen Yan, Former Vice Chairman of the Guizhou Provincial Political Consultative Conference, convicted of 3.57 billion yuan bribery; Tang Renjian, Former Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, convicted of 2.68 billion yuan bribery.
Liu Xingtai, Former Deputy Director of the Hainan Provincial People’s Congress, 3.16 billion yuan; Qin Rupei, Former Vice Chairman of Guangxi, convicted of 2.16 billion yuan bribery; Wu Yingjie, Former Secretary of the Tibet Party Committee, convicted of 3.43 billion yuan bribery; Luo Yulin, Former Deputy Director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, convicted of 2.2 billion yuan bribery; Douglas Wan Gui, Former Deputy Chairman of the Xinjiang Political Consultative Conference, convicted of 2.29 billion yuan and sentenced to death penalty; Wang Yong, Former Vice Chairman of Tibet, convicted of 2.71 billion yuan and sentenced to death penalty; Zhang Zulin, Former Vice Governor of Yunnan, convicted of 1.22 billion yuan and sentenced to life; Dai Daojue, Former Vice Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Political Consultative Conference, convicted of 1.07 billion yuan; Liu Yuejin, Former Deputy Director of the National Anti-Terrorism Commissioner, convicted of 1.21 billion yuan; Peng Guofu, Former Deputy Director of the Hunan Provincial People’s Congress, convicted of 1.34 billion yuan; Han Yong, Former Chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Political Consultative Conference, convicted of 2.61 billion yuan.
Wang Yixin, Former Deputy Governor of Heilongjiang Province, convicted of 1.29 billion yuan; Yin Meigen, Former Deputy Chairman of the Jiangxi Provincial People’s Congress, convicted of 2.07 billion yuan; Liu Handong, Former Deputy Chairman of the Jiangsu Provincial People’s Congress, convicted of 2.45 billion yuan; Luo Baoming, Former Secretary of the Hainan Party Committee, convicted of 1.13 billion yuan; Su Zengtian, Former Deputy Director of the Fujian Provincial People’s Congress, convicted of 1.98 billion yuan; Zhang Xijun, Former Deputy Director of the Qingdao Municipal People’s Congress, convicted of 3.17 billion yuan; He Wenzhen, Former Deputy General Manager of China Electronics Technology Group, convicted of 2.89 billion yuan; Zhou Yong, Former General Manager of Shandong High-speed Group, convicted of 1.07 billion yuan; Bai Tianhui, Former General Manager of China Huarong International Holdings, convicted of 11.08 billion yuan; Zhang Hongli, Former Deputy General Manager of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, convicted of 1.77 billion yuan.
The total amount involved in the 31 corrupt officials sentenced to over a billion yuan, according to the official rulings of the CPC, reached a total of 77.5 billion yuan, which may actually be higher.
The billion-dollar corrupt officials sentenced in 2025 do not include senior military officers. The amounts involved in the cases of senior military officers have not been disclosed but may likely exceed a billion yuan each.
The corruption within the CPC is not only widespread but also becoming more severe and uncontrollable, as seen in the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCDI in January 2026 when Xi Jinping shifted the focus from how to “win” the fight against corruption to how not to “lose.”
The widespread corruption among active senior generals in the Chinese military in 2025 is the most prominent sign of the failure of the anti-corruption campaign within the CPC.
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is not genuinely fighting corruption but rather using it as a tool to purge political enemies.
It is evident that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is instrumental in clearing out political adversaries, as showcased by the following facts:
Firstly, it is well known that the former dictator of the CPC, Jiang Zemin, who promoted and used a large number of seriously corrupt officials to govern the country, was not targeted by Xi Jinping. Instead, after Jiang’s death, Xi praised him in flattering terms.
Secondly, during Xi’s second term, the political group of Sun Lijun was investigated, but the main figures behind the Sun Lijun political group—former CPC Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission Meng Jianzhu, and Meng’s superior, former CPC Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice President of the country, Zeng Qinghong—were not arrested.
It is evident that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has been used as a tool to purge political adversaries, given the numerous rounds of purges targeting political adversaries since Xi took office. The numbers of senior provincial and ministerial officials purged by Xi have surpassed the total number from 1978 to 2012 during the rule of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Similarly, the number of senior military officers purged by Xi exceeds the total number of generals who fell during internal and external wars, and the cultural revolution since the founding of the Communist Party of China.
The number of enemies that Xi Jinping has made through these purges and crackdowns is increasing, as evidenced by the sudden reversal in the winds of the anti-corruption campaign during the Third Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee in July 2024, when Xi Jinping fell ill and was hospitalized. Subsequently, a series of senior officials appointed and favored by Xi, including Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member He Weidong, as well as Central Military Commission member and head of the Political Work Department Miao Hua, were removed from office one after another.
Under Xi’s administration, key figures in the military were removed, leading to the dismissal of Xi’s confidants in the military. Xi’s three “military secrets” were all removed. As of now, Xi Jinping, as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, has almost become a commander without an army in the military.
In recent years, Xi Jinping has put forward the “self-revolution” theory as a theoretical basis for his anti-corruption campaign, claiming that it is a self-revolution while in reality, it is about revolutionizing others instead of himself.
However, to this day, as Xi Jinping continues to liquidate his political enemies, by thinking and approving the arrest of so many senior generals, and the myriad of people standing behind them, he may find it difficult to sleep at night.
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