China mainland’s express delivery stations, once considered a representation of low-cost and low-threshold entrepreneurship, are rapidly transitioning from being “community ATMs” to “high-risk running away zones.” A large number of operators are choosing to transfer ownership at low prices or directly close down. This once booming business model is becoming what many describe as an “industry poison.”
Express delivery stations are vital nodes in the end of community logistics, providing services such as parcel collection and delivery, extended pickup times, and increased security, catering to the needs of office workers. A few years ago, express delivery stations were still packaged as the “solution for the last mile,” and many entrepreneurs believed it to be a “small business that earns steadily.” However, reality is swiftly rewriting this narrative.
On platforms like 58.com and Xianyu, express delivery stations from all over the country are densely listed for transfer, with transfer prices generally plummeting to tens of thousands of yuan, many labeled as “urgent transfer” or “quick sale at a low price,” yet still lacking interest even after multiple price reductions.
Several station operators vented on transfer information and social platforms, stating that they are in a long-term state of high intensity and low return. An owner of a station in Guangdong said, “The only time I had a complete rest in the past five years was when we closed due to a typhoon last month.”
Some did the math: “Three mao and five fen per parcel, eighty thousand parcels per month, it seems like a lot of turnover, but after factoring in labor and rent, it’s still a loss.”
A recent report by “China News Weekly” quoted a station operator named Cheng Si, who stated that the station operated from 9 a.m. to 10 p.m. every day, seven days a week, with a “97” level of intensity that left her physically and mentally exhausted, earning just over six thousand yuan a month, saying, “It’s better to just go to work.”
Chinese financial bloggers Zhang Yichi and Wang Xiaofang cited industry data on their WeChat public accounts last month, indicating that over half of the 187,000 express delivery stations nationwide suffered losses last year. The average survival cycle of stations plummeted from 2.3 years to 11 months, with a closure rate of 43% within six months of opening, and nearly 60% of stations either being forced to transfer ownership or close within a year.
Termed as the “worst retreat of 2025” by the certified “Micro-Innovation Research Center Founder, Chief Researcher, Weibo contracted self-media” Jin Cuodao in an article published in December 2025, this situation is believed to be closely related to the disorderly expansion of the number of stations.
Jin Cuodao mentioned that express delivery stations were not initially capital-dominated commercial projects, but rather a “local method” formed spontaneously by deliverymen and community small shops to alleviate delivery pressure.
In 2013, Rookie Stations were formally incorporated into the Alibaba system, promoted by Jack Ma as the chairman and with an initial investment of up to hundreds of billions of yuan, becoming one of the core strategic elements of Rookie Network. Subsequently, Rookie Stations, with their open mode of “universal platform access,” nearly undertook deliveries from almost all mainstream express delivery brands on the market.
With the introduction of Shunfeng’s “Yishoufa,” Yuantong’s “Mama Station,” Zhongtong’s “Tuxi Life,” and Jitu’s “Neighborhood Station,” capital and platforms began a large-scale “land grab.”
Data shows that the number of stations surged from less than 50,000 in 2019 to over 400,000 by the end of 2022, covering almost all major communities nationwide. In many cities, there are even two to three different brand stations in the same neighborhood, making clustered competition the norm.
If uncontrolled expansion was the external factor, then the years-long price war in express delivery directly depleted the profit margins of the stations.
In an article on The Paper, technology blogger “Bad Review” pointed out that to compete for deliverymen and market share, many companies have been cutting delivery fees, even resorting to delivery subsidies and other methods to win orders, ultimately pushing cost pressures down to the bottom.
Recalling, an operator named Cheng Cheng who took over a station five years ago that once handled 95% of the surrounding deliveries. However, after the pandemic, several new stations suddenly appeared nearby, causing not only the loss of cooperative deliverymen but also a series of complaints, malicious competition, and even sending prohibited items to her station.
Simultaneously, in the context of the industry price war, end delivery fees have continued to decline.
Many operators stated that single-item delivery fees have dropped from the peak period of 1.5 yuan to the current 0.7 yuan or even lower, where “previously, delivering 100 items could earn 150 yuan, now can only earn 70 yuan.”
In extreme cases, there have been instances like “0.8 yuan nationwide delivery” in Yiwu, where even basic costs are difficult to cover. Express companies are further squeezing end delivery fees, with stations bearing the brunt.
With multiple factors compounded, express delivery stations are gradually falling into a predicament of “high labor, low returns, difficult exit.”
On one hand, stations bear the rigid demand for end services, while on the other hand, their bargaining power continues to weaken. Those that can endure continue to persevere, while those that cannot choose to transfer ownership; however, buyers are becoming increasingly scarce, eventually leading to closures.
Industry insiders point out that today’s stations have transitioned from being a “startup hotspot” to an awkward presence in communities – platforms expand, costs sink, yet risks concentrate on the operators at the terminal end. “Only the bosses tough it out – if they can’t hold on, they transfer ownership; if they can’t transfer, they close down, forming a vicious cycle.”