In a recent development that has sparked widespread discussions in mainland China, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife were taken into custody by a US military strike team and are facing prosecution. The process has led to varied reactions in China. While Beijing issued condemnation and made principled statements, it did not announce any further actions. A Beijing scholar pointed out that this response prioritizing risk control is seen as a way for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to handle the situation, with the reaction remaining at the level of public support and political statements.
Over the past three days, footage of the arrest of the Maduro couple quickly became a hot topic in Chinese public opinion circles. Many netizens on social media platforms discussed the surprising news of a national president being “suddenly taken away by the US military from a heavily fortified stronghold,” while also mocking this strongman ruler who came to power through unconventional means. Although related discussions were often deleted, they still spread widely within a short period.
A Beijing-based independent scholar specializing in US-China relations pointed out during an interview that while the CCP and Venezuela have established a so-called “strategic partnership,” the actual response following the events does not reflect mutual support between political allies. Instead, it shows a high degree of self-protective logic.
Based on this observation, China quickly shifted its handling of the Maduro incident towards internal risk control. The initial response was not diplomatic “countermeasures,” but an internal risk assessment. The scholar mentioned that after the event, China’s priority was not Maduro’s personal situation but rather assessing the safety of diplomatic personnel in Venezuela, special envoy teams, Chinese institutions, and existing projects.
He noted that when the CCP perceives a situation might spiral out of control, they tend to lower their profile, adjust personnel deployment, and prioritize self-protection before making any public statements. This sequence, deeply ingrained in the CCP’s foreign affairs practices, emphasizes self-preservation as a key consideration before taking a stance on an issue.
In response to these dynamics, an individual familiar with Beijing’s diplomatic affairs, who requested anonymity, stated that the CCP’s reaction was not a spur-of-the-moment decision but a product of the long-standing diplomatic risk management logic. According to this individual, when a situation could potentially escalate into a great power game, China’s foremost consideration is never the “ally” itself but the safety of its personnel, assets, and overall diplomatic security. Diplomatic “principles” always come after risk management.
Moreover, Beijing has neither denied its strategic partnership with Venezuela nor altered its narrative concerning the legitimacy of the Maduro regime. However, in practical terms, Beijing intentionally avoided linking itself to the unfolding events and took a cautious approach.
A Beijing-based expert in Chinese foreign affairs mentioned to the press that the Foreign Ministry does not hold primary authority in such incidents. The expert explained that events involving foreign incumbent leaders, US judicial and military actions, and their implications for Sino-US relations are managed by Beijing rather than dictating the course of events. Without clear directives from the top leadership, any statements could be interpreted as policy signals.
The expert further opined that the so-called “silence period” in China’s diplomatic system is not a sign of hesitation or error but a policy baseline grounded in reality. This period serves to observe Venezuela’s internal trajectory. If continuing to place political capital on Maduro risks a miscalculation, China’s past investments of nearly a hundred billion US dollars may face irretrievable risks. Beijing must grasp the situation before deciding on a political course of action.
During an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on January 5th, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, along with Russia and other countries, criticized the US actions in Venezuela. China accused the US of violating Venezuela’s sovereignty, opposed unilateral military actions, and “urged” the Security Council to fulfill its duties under the UN Charter through political and diplomatic means to address the crisis.
An analyst at Peking University’s School of International Relations, using the pseudonym Hua Yan, analyzed that the statements made by China at the Security Council continued the tone set by previous Foreign Ministry statements, being stern but devoid of concrete action plans. The expert noted that such statements are more like “filing” within the international multilateral system rather than promoting a specific direction for the situation.
Hua Yan explained that the role of such multilateral declarations is to act as a “ceiling.” China must align its position with Russian interests, as it currently maintains the closest ties with Russia and North Korea. The statements made at the UN serve as China’s highest consensus on the matter, closing the discussion. The focus now is on cooling down the situation to prevent further entanglement with the US within a confrontational framework.
Some voices speculate that whether it’s the sudden change in Venezuelan politics or the ongoing turmoil in Iran, the responses of major allies Russia and China are strikingly similar, lingering in the realms of public support and political stances without tangible action, deemed as mere “lip service.”
Comparisons have also been drawn by netizens to the ongoing military and economic aid provided by Western countries to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. They highlight stark differences in the “ally models”: one side offers visible and quantifiable support during crises, while the other swiftly retreats to rhetoric when risks escalate. These discussions suggest that such distinctions are reshaping perceptions of the credibility of major power alliances.
A seasoned media figure in Beijing, Gao Yuqing, emphasized in an interview that whether in Venezuela or Iran, one should not anticipate China intervening to aid in conflicts with other countries during critical moments. Gao remarked, “Whether in Venezuela or Iran, do not expect China to step in to help you fight another country during crucial times. China can receive returns for its economic assistance, even asking for reciprocation from the US. In this regard, support in China’s external relations is mostly based on exchangeable economic interests rather than security commitments or military interventions. When situations escalate and involve high-risk confrontations, Beijing often opts to limit itself to political stances to avoid being dragged into uncontrollable conflicts.”