Beijing Political Circle Prepares for New Round of Anti-Corruption Campaign
Multiple sources familiar with internal operations in the Beijing political circle have revealed that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee is preparing to launch a new round of large-scale anti-corruption efforts, expected to focus on high-level officials at the provincial and ministerial levels. The campaign is anticipated to commence gradually from early 2026 and continue for at least two years. An insider within the system stated, “Lists have been circulating among a small circle in Beijing, and who shows up first on the meeting screen has become a way to gauge one’s fate in the officialdom.”
As 2025 comes to an end, signs of upheaval continue within the CCP hierarchy. A source close to decision-makers, using the pseudonym Liu Ming, told reporters that, in his understanding, Xi Jinping attributes the economic slowdown, relocation of industries, fiscal pressures, and stagnation in local administration partly to the “corruption, disloyalty, and non-compliance” of military and local officials. “Xi now believes it’s not about the system or external factors, but about officials slacking off. He thinks many are only interested in corruption, unwilling to work, and disloyal to the Party.”
Liu Ming mentioned that due to a short-term lack of alternative officials, the governance approach is gradually shifting towards “investigate finances before taking action,” including probing family-owned real estate, corporate equity, freezing accounts, and even scrutinizing assets of family members. He revealed, “Some in Beijing have started to move their money to different places, preparing to hide their accounts deeper.”
The CCP Central Political Bureau held a meeting in Beijing on December 25 to outline the anti-corruption focus for 2026. Xinhua News Agency reported that the meeting demanded advancing the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party with “higher standards and more practical measures.” It also emphasized the anti-corruption efforts should align with the upcoming “14th Five-Year Plan” (2026-2030) to directly serve disciplines in finance, investment, and social control.
Several political and economic observers analyze that the wording from the Political Bureau is viewed by the public as setting the tone in advance for the 2026 actions. A Beijing entrepreneur commented, “The capital circle is particularly fearful these days, seeking legal advice overnight on how to further conceal shareholdings.” However, the reporter was unable to confirm this information through public channels.
A relative of another official disclosed that discussions within insider circles suggest authorities may focus on high-ranking officials’ overseas assets, especially in Hong Kong.
In contrast to past purges targeting individual corrupt officials, multiple scholars point out that this round of crackdown may involve institutional aspects, including government procurement authorization, local special debt approval, flow of funds in military projects, and “who has signing authority and decision-making power.”
Beijing scholar Mr. Xia analyzed, “The current issue cannot be resolved simply by handling a few corrupt officials; it’s about insiders occupying resources within the system but not executing orders. If the Party continues not to fill its coffers, many things will come to a halt.”
Two days ago, the Chairman’s Meeting of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference revoked the qualifications of 8 members, including Cao Jianguo. According to the Xinhua News Agency’s public release on December 24, the list included Wang Xinghuan, Zhang Dongchen, Cao Jianguo, Liu Guoyue, Ma Zhengwu, Fan Youshan, Zeng Yi, and Yu Peigen.
Multiple media outlets noted that many on the list come from the military-industrial, electronics, and energy sectors. Reports from Hong Kong media indicated that several individuals who resigned have not appeared in public for a long time, sparking speculation, but there is no official explanation at present.
On December 22, the CCP’s Central Military Commission held its first promotion ceremony of the year for the rank of general. The Hong Kong-based “Sing Tao Daily” cited CCTV footage indicating that there were only 6 active-duty generals present, compared to over 20 in a similar event the previous year.
Mr. Xia believes, “If someone is absent, it’s either due to health reasons or they are under investigation.” This assessment is speculative, and there is currently no public evidence to confirm it.
The Political Bureau meeting emphasized that inspections have covered all provinces, regions, and municipalities, and will now extend to the financial system and technology state-owned enterprises. Guangdong veteran financial commentator Liao Hua said, “Most of the officials recently falling from grace in Guangdong were those who had been promoted in the past decade, politically loyal but economically relying on projects and financing platforms to get by.”
He believes that future anti-corruption efforts may directly target financial chains: “Previously, anti-corruption focused on individuals; now it may scrutinize financial records.”
According to reports from multiple media outlets citing information from the CCP’s disciplinary system annual report and compiled by scholars, the supervisory and investigative authorities handled around 16,000 cases in 2025, with around 30 provincial and ministerial level officials held accountable, involving local governments, state-owned enterprises, and the financial system. The military sector is especially sensitive, with multiple media outlets reporting that at least 9 generals were under investigation or expelled from the Party and the military in the past year.
The trend of officials being absent from public events continues to provoke discussion, such as the recent promotion ceremony where only 6 active-duty generals were present, with no authoritative explanation for their absence. Some Beijing academics believe that, while the current anti-corruption campaign is strong, uncertainty remains regarding whether it can address fundamental institutional issues.
The Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CCP is set to take place from January 12 to 14 next year. Political insiders in Beijing anticipate that this meeting may, for the first time, clearly identify which systems, groups of people, and assets will be the focus of the next phase. A source close to the policy circle in Beijing summarized to the reporter, “Now everyone is waiting for January next year to see who attends the meeting, who is absent, who appears in the news broadcast; that day will be the true signal.”