【Epoch Times December 17, 2025】 On December 11, Chinese renowned political scholar Liu Junning released a piece of news: the current Air Force Commander General Chang Dingqiu passed away from a sudden heart attack during the “retained questioning period” by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission.
Upon seeing this news, I felt it was very sudden for three reasons:
Firstly, on October 17, when the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that 9 generals, including Political Bureau member of the CCP, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong and former generals such as Miao Hua, were expelled from the party and the military and transferred to the judicial authorities, I specifically noticed that among the 9 generals, there was no representative from the Air Force among the Navy, Army, Rocket Force, and Air Force.
Secondly, at the Fourth Plenum held from October 20-23, both the Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu and the Air Force Political Commissar Guo Puxiao attended, making them the only military and political leaders from the four major military services present.
Thirdly, Chang Dingqiu, a former pilot, had excellent physical fitness. Passing through a rigorous pilot selection process at the age of 17, he entered flight school and held positions such as squadron commander, flight regiment commander, deputy and full commander of the Air Force Fighter Aviation Division, as well as assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff. In 2015, during Xi Jinping’s first “September 3rd Parade,” Chang Dingqiu, nearing the maximum flying age for Air Force jet pilots, flew a J-10A fighter jet over Tiananmen Square, making him the youngest major general among the 56 generals leading the parade.
Born in 1967, Chang Dingqiu was only 58 years old this year, in his prime, with excellent physical condition and top-notch medical care. How could he have died so suddenly?
However, the scholar who released this news, Liu Junning from China, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University, has been a visiting scholar at Harvard University in the United States, and currently serves as a researcher at the China Cultural Research Institute of the Ministry of Culture. He is known for his meticulousness, especially in matters concerning human life, particularly the death of a high-ranking general like Chang Dingqiu. Therefore, it is unlikely that he would fabricate such news. If the news is false, he would face legal responsibility.
I further checked the Baidu encyclopedia, and it is common for high-ranking generals like Chang Dingqiu to have an entry. However, to my surprise, the entry detailing Chang Dingqiu’s resume was marked as “closed.” This indirectly confirms that Chang Dingqiu may have indeed passed away.
If the news of Chang Dingqiu’s death reported by Liu Junning is true, then there are many significant issues that need deeper exploration.
After the 20th National Congress of the CCP, at least three prominent CCP officials have died under suspicious circumstances:
The first one is former Politburo Standing Committee member and Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang. Li Keqiang passed away in Shanghai in a “sudden death” on October 27, 2023, after retiring for only 7 months, becoming the youngest premier to die since the CCP’s establishment, raising many doubts. Many suspect that Li Keqiang was “silenced.”
The second is former Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang. Xu Qiliang, who had only retired for two years and three months, passed away in Beijing in a “sudden death” on June 2, 2025. Also a former pilot with excellent physical condition, having already retired without work pressure or health concerns, how did Xu Qiliang pass away suddenly? There are many suspicions surrounding Xu Qiliang’s death as well. Many likewise suspect that Xu Qiliang was “silenced.”
The third is former Deputy Director of the Central Office and Director of the Central Security Bureau, Wang Shaojun. Wang Shaojun passed away in Beijing on April 26, 2023. On April 27, a mainland WeChat public account, “Zhongjing Zhongcheng,” released the obituary of Wang Shaojun’s death, but the post was quickly deleted. It was not until nearly three months after Wang Shaojun’s death, on July 24, 2023, that Xinhua News Agency released the news of Wang Shaojun’s death. There are suspicions surrounding Wang Shaojun’s death as well, believed by many to be a case of being “silenced.”
After the Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong was arrested on March 11, 2025, news emerged of two generals who allegedly committed suicide during the Military Discipline Inspection Commission’s review: one was the news of He Weidong’s suicide; the other was the news of the suicide of He Hongjun, Deputy Head of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission.
The CCP neither confirmed nor denied whether these two generals had committed suicide. He Weidong and He Hongjun have been in a “disappeared” state ever since, and their fates remain uncertain.
Normally, when high-ranking generals are placed under “retained questioning” by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, the highest level of security measures should be taken, including medical provisions, making the likelihood of those being questioned committing suicide slim.
However, historically, high-level power struggles within the CCP have always been ruthless and especially unforgiving when it comes to matters involving military power. If an accident, suicide, or a manipulated death were to occur concerning Chang Dingqiu during his “retained questioning” period, it is also a possibility.
According to reports from CCP state media, the core issues with He Weidong and Miao Hua were not merely related to corruption but more importantly, significant political problems. What are the major political issues that He and Miao faced? As stated in an editorial published by the CCP military newspaper, it was due to “loyalty betrayal” that “severely undermined the party’s principle of operational command and the Chairman of the Military Commission responsibility system.”
“Loyalty betrayal” implies actions such as “treason,” “collusion with the enemy,” and so on; “severely undermining the party’s principle of operational command and the Chairman of the Military Commission responsibility system” suggests acts of “anti-party,” “disrupting military order,” and “seizing power.”
The CCP military newspaper’s article also mentioned that from cases of corruption involving He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others, it was evident that they were deeply influenced by the corrupt practices of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou and even surpassed them. The CCP authorities have explicitly labeled former CCP Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou as “ambitious conspirators” aiming to “usurp the power of the party and state.” Such statements suggest that He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others were considered even worse “ambitious conspirators” who sought to “usurp the power of the party and state” than Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou.
The CCP military newspaper’s article further emphasized the need to “thoroughly investigate” the problems involving He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others; stating that if the “black sheep” are not completely eradicated before the shots are fired, it would leave a significant political security risk with unimaginable consequences at critical moments.
These statements indicate that the CCP will continue its extensive purge within the military, while also suggesting that individuals like He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others may be involved in plotting rebellion or mutiny.
Following the Fourth Plenum, a group of senior military leaders within the CCP may be undergoing intense investigation by the Military Discipline Inspection Commission, and Chang Dingqiu could be one of them.
The nine generals announced to have fallen from grace by the CCP on October 17 could be seen as the “anti-party faction led by He Weidong and Miao Hua.” This “He, Miao anti-party faction” includes nine generals ranging from the Central Military Commission to the Eastern Theater, Navy, Army, Rocket Force, Armed Police, and others, with the exception of the Air Force.
The 14 generals absent from the Fourth Plenum held from October 20-23 include: Wang Haijiang, Commander of the Western Theater Command; Wu Yanan, Commander of the Southern Theater Command; Huang Ming, Commander of the Northern Theater Command; Li Wei, Political Commissar of the Information Support Force; Wang Renhua, Secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Military Commission; Xu Xueqiang, Minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission; Xu Deqing, Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command; Ju Qiansheng, Commander of the Strategic Support Force; Xu Zhongbo, former Political Commissar of the Rocket Force; Xu Xisheng, current Political Commissar of the Rocket Force; Li Qiaoming, Commander of the Army; Hu Zhongming, Commander of the Navy; Liu Qingsong, Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command; Zhang Hongbing, Political Commissar of the Armed Police Force.
These 14 generals may be implicated in major cases involving the Rocket Force or related to He Weidong and Miao Hua. This includes military and political leaders from the Central Military Commission to the Navy, Army, Rocket Force, and other units, with the absence of a general representing the Air Force.
With He and Miao organizing a “rebellion” within the military, how could there be no Air Force generals involved?
It is possible that Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu, after the Fourth Plenum, was implicated by He, Miao, and other senior generals associated with them.
Looking at Chang Dingqiu’s resume, he was one of the “young guard” representatives promoted by Xi Jinping within the military ranks.
At the end of 2013, at the age of 46, Chang Dingqiu was promoted by Xi to become the Chief of Staff of the Shenyang Military Region, becoming the youngest active-duty senior officer in the Air Force at the time.
In January 2016, at the age of 49, Xi promoted Chang Dingqiu to become the Deputy Commander of the newly established Southern Theater Command, making him the youngest active-duty theater-level senior officer in the entire military.
In December 2017, at the age of 50, Xi promoted Chang Dingqiu to be the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission, becoming one of the senior military officers in charge of air combat operations.
In August 2021, at the age of 54, Xi promoted Chang Dingqiu to be the Air Force Commander, making him the highest commanding officer of hundreds of thousands in the Air Force. Later that same year, he was promoted to the rank of General, becoming the youngest general since the reinstatement of military ranks by the CCP in 1988.
At the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, after being “elected” under Xi’s scrutiny, Chang Dingqiu became a candidate member of the Central Committee. At the 20th National Congress held in October 2022, again under Xi’s watch, he was “elected” as a member of the Central Committee.
At the time, Xu Qiliang was promoted by Xi from Air Force Commander to member of the Central Military Commission, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Politburo Standing Committee member.
Chang Dingqiu’s extraordinary career progression indicates that Xi had a keen interest in him as one of the most important leaders within the Air Force following Xu Qiliang. He was also considered one of the key figures in Xi’s “Xi family military.”
If nothing unexpected occurs, Chang Dingqiu might have been further promoted by Xi to become a member of the Central Military Commission, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and a member of the Politburo.
However, it is unlikely that Xi would take down the youngest general he personally nurtured and promoted, Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu.
The most plausible scenario is that the Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, led the takedown of Chang Dingqiu.
After Xi fell ill and was hospitalized in July 2024, under the strong leadership of Zhang Youxia, one by one, Xi’s trusted associates in the military were taken down, including the aforementioned He Weidong, Miao Hua, the 14 generals, and the three major aides of Xi – Qin Shengxiang, Zhong Shaojun, and Fang Yongxiang. Xi’s authority had long been sidelined.
It is probable that Zhang Youxia, along with the newly appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Shengmin, obtained concrete evidence proving Chang Dingqiu’s involvement with the “anti-party faction” led by He and Miao, and after the Fourth Plenum, presented this evidence to Xi, seeking his approval to take down Chang.
The extensive military purge that occurred within only three years after the 20th National Congress of the CCP was even sharper, fiercer, and more brutal than the military purges of the decade prior to the Congress. Most of Xi’s trusted associates, including those within his “Xi family military” lineages, had been nearly completely eradicated. If Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu indeed passed away during his “retained questioning” period, Xi would truly find himself isolated within the military.
In 2022, when Xi achieved his “third term” during the 20th Congress, he reached the pinnacle of his power throughout his life. However, by 2025, Xi had plummeted from the apex of power to the nadir of authority.
If the youngest general, Air Force Commander Chang Dingqiu, personally nurtured and promoted by Xi Jinping, has indeed died, then Xi’s grand dream may be on the verge of collapse.
Epoch Times first reported.