For decades, the United States has been exploring, researching, and developing hypersonic weapon technology. Historically, funding for such research has been relatively limited. However, in recent years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly expressed a strong desire to accelerate the research and deployment of these hypersonic weapon systems. The argument for increasing funding for hypersonic weapons is gradually gaining support from lawmakers, despite being based on unrealistic assumptions about the capabilities of competitors, lacking convincing technical or strategic reasons to prove their necessity. Before hastily investing more funds into these platforms, the Pentagon must demonstrate that developing hypersonic weapons is not just about matching our international counterparts materially but truly advancing U.S. strategic interests. So far, this rationale has yet to be confirmed.
Hypersonic weapons, commonly categorized as hypersonics, are typically divided into two main types: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM). Among them, HGVs are further categorized into long-range and theater-range vehicles. Hypersonic glide vehicles are launched by rocket boosters into space, then re-enter the atmosphere and glide to their targets without propulsion. Long-range HGVs are designed for global strategic strike missions with speeds exceeding Mach 15. In contrast, theater-range hypersonic weapons are designed for shorter-range regional missions with lower speeds, typically around Mach 5-10, aimed at evading regional missile defense system detection. Additionally, hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) can also be launched by rocket boosters and powered by scramjet engines during parts of their flight, which intake air from the atmosphere to burn fuel. Their speeds range from Mach 5-10.
A common viewpoint in the hypersonic weapons debate is that the U.S. needs these capabilities to compete with Russia and China. Both countries are developing hypersonic technology and claim to have already begun deploying hypersonic systems. China reportedly deployed a single platform called the ‘DF-ZF’ on its medium-range ballistic missile ‘DF-17’, a short-range hypersonic vehicle, with the regime claiming it is operational and has dual capabilities to carry conventional and nuclear warheads. China is also developing a hypersonic cruise missile code-named ‘Xingkong-2’, but this system has only undergone limited testing and has not been deployed in combat. Meanwhile, Russia has reportedly deployed three systems claiming to be hypersonic weapons, including the short-range ‘Tsirkon’ hypersonic cruise missile, the long-range ‘Avangard’ hypersonic glide vehicle, and the short-range air-launched ballistic missile ‘Kinzhal’. All these weapons faced issues during testing or achieved limited success in combat.
Both China and Russia are developing hypersonic military technology, which has raised concerns among some who believe the U.S. is falling behind in military technology and now needs to “catch up” with its adversaries. However, these concerns are largely unfounded. The operational performance of these hypersonic systems in real scenarios remains questionable, and whether the adversaries’ hypersonic technology truly impacts the U.S. military’s qualitative edge also raises significant doubts. After the failure of the 2011 Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 (HTV-2) test, the U.S. largely shifted focus from developing long-range systems to prioritize theater-range hypersonic systems capable of executing conventional counterforce missions by breaking through regional defenses to launch high-precision conventional warheads. This remains a primary motivation for Washington’s support of hypersonic technology.
The U.S. Department of Defense views hypersonic weapons as a potential component in countering emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. A2/AD refers to efforts by countries like China and Russia to use advanced missile defense systems, electronic warfare, intelligence capabilities, and other technologies to restrict U.S. access to critical areas, making it challenging for the U.S. military to operate in those regions. In theory, hypersonic technology could provide a means to strike high-value, time-sensitive targets in these areas and offer a potential survivable offensive option for the U.S. when taking action to neutralize key elements of A2/AD networks.
However, if the U.S. is truly seeking solutions to what it perceives as A2/AD challenges, some existing technological capabilities can already meet the military’s needs. Congress and the Department of Defense should consider more carefully examining ‘maneuverable reentry vehicles’ launched on traditional ballistic missiles as a possible alternative to overcome A2/AD defenses. These reentry vehicles can essentially accomplish all tasks that hypersonic technology can achieve, executing theater missions, with shorter construction times and lower costs compared to new hypersonic platforms. Without such comparative analysis at this critical juncture, addressing the performance issues of hypersonic weapons and pursuing hypersonic technology could lead U.S. military procurement to become a reactive process rather than a rational assessment of military needs.
To understand the reasons behind this, evaluation of the technical and strategic aspects of hypersonic weapons is essential. Such assessment will reveal that some claims about the value of hypersonic weapons are largely exaggerated.
Firstly, hypersonic weapons are described as faster than other delivery systems. While they are indeed faster than current cruise missiles, they are not necessarily quicker than ballistic missiles. Hypersonic flight generates significant resistance and heat in the atmosphere, limiting the speed of hypersonic weapons. Ballistic missiles, especially those launched in a trajectory that minimizes atmospheric interaction, can achieve shorter projection times. This applies to both long-range and theater-range hypersonic weapons. If time to target is a crucial indicator for evaluating weapon system necessity, hypersonic weapons may not necessarily provide a strategic advantage.
Secondly, long-range hypersonic systems face severe technical challenges. Sustained hypersonic flight creates substantial heat stress that could jeopardize the structural integrity of these weapons. Additionally, at the start of the flight of long-range hypersonic vehicles, their speed causes air around the vehicle to ionize, creating a plasma sheath that interferes with radio signals, impeding communication. While the plasma effect gradually diminishes as hypersonic glide vehicles slow down during gliding, it still hampers real-time communication and guidance, making them reliant on pre-programmed instructions and reducing their reaction capability to defensive countermeasures. Theater-range hypersonic weapons designed for shorter distances and lower speeds may not generate a plasma sheath but still encounter challenges related to heating.
Furthermore, the so-called stealth capability of hypersonic weapons may not be as potent as commonly described. While low-altitude flight reduces detection range for ground-based radar systems, these radars can still detect hypersonic weapons at distances of hundreds of kilometers. Additionally, at high enough speeds, the intense heat generated by hypersonic flight in the atmosphere produces a bright infrared signal detectable by space-based early warning satellites. Moreover, even before gliding phase, hypersonic vehicles must first be launched using rocket boosters similar to ballistic missiles. The exhaust plume from these launches is also easily detected by space-based sensors. Once captured by early warning satellites, the weapon’s initial direction is known, enabling defenders to anticipate potential targets and decide on appropriate defense measures. Hypersonic weapons are not invisible bullets.
The key distinction between hypersonic missiles and traditional ballistic missiles may lie in their mid-flight maneuverability. However, like speed and stealth, the maneuverability of hypersonic missiles is also overstated. Changing trajectory during the gliding phase requires aerodynamic forces acting on the vehicle. The maneuver process generates greater drag, slowing down the vehicle, reducing its total range, and intensifying surface heating issues. This means that while evading detection may offer some benefit, hypersonic weapons experience trade-offs between maneuverability, speed, and range, weakening their practical utility.
Additionally, developing hypersonic cruise missiles faces even more challenges. The technology of scramjet engines is still immature, with uncertainties about their ability to sustain stable combustion throughout the flight. High-speed hypersonic cruise missiles powered by jet fuel, such as models under development in the U.S., are limited to speeds below Mach 7-8. Furthermore, appropriate wind tunnel testing facilities for evaluating and improving these systems are lacking. Most existing wind tunnels lack the capability to accurately replicate the high-speed, high-temperature conditions required for testing hypersonic flight, and newly constructed wind tunnels may not fully replicate all aspects of hypersonic atmospheric flight. This shortage of facilities leads to development delays, cost increases, and limits opportunities to enhance and improve hypersonic flight technology.
Moreover, hypersonic weapons face obstacles in electronic design and fortification. Embedded electronic devices must withstand extreme temperatures, mechanical vibrations, and shockwaves during sustained hypersonic flight, yet existing materials struggle to cope with rapid temperature fluctuations experienced during reentry and lower atmospheric flight. Additionally, deployable hypersonic vehicles require performing critical functions, including flight calculations managing command responses and system coordination, flight calculations for trajectory control and sensor management, real-time processing of radar and other sensor inputs, all while maintaining secure, uninterrupted communication with command networks. Designing and configuring one or more subsystems with sufficient computational and processing capabilities to execute these functions without increasing volume or affecting effective payload poses a continuous challenge. Current microelectronics lack an ideal balance between thermal resistance and bandwidth, struggle to avoid compromises in the design process, and few commercial suppliers can meet the stringent requirements for military hypersonic applications. As a result, commercially procured components require extensive hardening to meet extraordinary durability requirements, but not all commercial products are suitable for hypersonic applications. Additionally, most of these components are manufactured by U.S. producers or use technologies subject to U.S. export controls aimed at increasing difficulty for competitor procurement. Some of the issues discussed also apply to maneuverable reentry vehicles, though the heating and vibration duration and the need for communication and maneuvering are significantly shorter compared to hypersonic weapons.
Even if these engineering and manufacturing obstacles are overcome, most hypersonic weapons remain vulnerable to existing theater missile defense systems. Technical analysis indicates that the U.S.’Aegis’ ballistic missile defense system and the Army’s ‘Patriot’ PAC-3 missile defense system can intercept hypersonic weapons flying at speeds of 10 Mach or slower, at the moment they descend from gliding altitude towards ground targets. This means that theater-range weapons starting to glide at speeds of 10 Mach or slower cannot evade these defense systems. Similarly, hypersonic cruise missiles flying throughout their trajectory at speeds lower than approximately 7 Mach are too slow. Long-range hypersonic vehicles may have the potential to breach missile defense systems, given that they maintain speeds above around 10 Mach when starting to descend towards targets. Russian and Chinese hypersonic vehicles are claimed to operate within the 10-12 Mach range, but the atmospheric resistance they encounter during flight may slow them down enough to be intercepted by the ‘Patriot’ and ‘Aegis’ missile defense systems.
In conclusion, the rationale for U.S. hypersonic technology development remains insufficient. So why are nations like Russia and China racing to deploy what they call “hypersonic” weapon systems?
First, hypersonic technology serves as a way for hostile nations to project power and claim some technical parity with the U.S. Both Russia and China believe that hypersonic technology could offset American advantages in theater missile defense and precision strike capabilities, complicating U.S. defense plans, provided they can overcome the multitude of related technological challenges.
Secondly, hypersonic technology is an effective psychological and geopolitical tool that allows Russia and China to portray themselves as technological leaders in this field, as they believe hypersonic technology can bring global prestige. For Russia, this is also a means to showcase military innovation to maintain its influence in the global arms market, even if the results of these weapons in combat use do not meet expectations. Meanwhile, China sees hypersonic technology as a possible element in challenging U.S. naval dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. Concerns expressed by some U.S. leaders further fuel this sense of threat and exaggerate the perceived threats posed by the advancements in hypersonic technology by adversaries, despite their own significant challenges in this area.
Nevertheless, the U.S. does not have to follow Russia and China on this costly and limited efficacy path. The U.S. has better options to maintain its long-standing military superiority.
In January 2023, a report by the Congressional Budget Office titled “U.S. Hypersonic Weapons and Alternatives” highlighted that deployment costs for hypersonic missiles may be one-third higher than ballistic missiles with equivalent range equipped with maneuverable warheads. This does not account for cost overruns typical in all high-tech military systems. Furthermore, in July 2024, a study by the Government Accountability Office titled “Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Could Reduce Cost and Schedule Risks by Following Leading Practices” found that due to the Pentagon’s failure to adopt leading industry practices and insufficient cost estimation, the Defense Department’s hypersonic weapons development is prone to severe cost overruns and schedule risks. Hypersonic weapons not only fail to revolutionize warfare but present another costly and underperforming project for the Pentagon.
Hypersonic weapons, whether long-range, short-range, or cruise missiles, face technical and production challenges, making their claimed necessity by the Pentagon for breaking through opponents’ “anti-access areas” fundamentally unnecessary.
This is not to say that hypersonic technology has no role in the future of U.S. military strategy, but as of now, their value assertions have not clearly defined their contribution to U.S. strategic interests.
It is now time to critically examine the hypersonic weapon debate, prioritizing strategic value, technical feasibility, and fiscal responsibility rather than the false allure of hypersonic weapons in terms of speed and maneuverability.
This article was published on RealClearWire.