Recently, the Chinese Communist Party has uncommonly designated a large restricted airspace area in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea for a period of 40 days without publicly explaining its purpose. Military experts in Taiwan believe that this move is not merely a military deployment but also serves as pressure on the United States, Japan, and Taiwan at the same time.
According to a report by The Wall Street Journal on April 5, the Chinese Communist Party established a vast maritime restricted airspace without providing any public explanation, effective from March 27 until May 6. Unlike previous similar alerts that lasted only a few days, this one extends for 40 days. The airspace is extensive, without specified height restrictions, and no announced military exercises, drawing attention and concern.
Military expert Wu Mingjie, who was a former deputy convener of the political division of Liberty Times, a member of the editorial committee of China Times, and a senior reporter for Next Magazine, stated on New Tang Dynasty TV’s news program “Breaking News” on April 9 that Beijing’s actions this time may be creating a form of vague pressure. It aims to both constrain the U.S. military’s deployment in the Indo-Pacific region and issue warnings to Japan and Taiwan.
From a military perspective, Wu Mingjie pointed out that such actions at the current time are quite subtle, possibly driven by considerations of self-defense as well as sending a certain warning signal to external parties. He mentioned a particularly unique military exercise by the Chinese Communist Party at the end of 2024, which Taiwan’s national security department found involved nearly 90 naval vessels scattered within and beyond the first island chain, with 7 airspace reserved areas being set up. The actual exercise activities within these areas at that time could not be fully confirmed, but they were indeed considered no-fly zones.
However, Wu Mingjie emphasized that the location of the current restricted airspace is particularly significant. The related area is located off the coast of Zhejiang, extending from the northern tip of the Yellow Sea to the nearshore waters of Zhejiang. Although it is still some distance from Taiwan, from a geographical perspective, it seems to have a more explicit targeting towards Japan. Simultaneously, it creates sustained pressure on the United States as well.
He believed that the Chinese Communist Party might deliberately use this ambiguous space to make the U.S. military concerned about potential actions in the Indo-Pacific region, thus refraining from easily withdrawing forces from the Indo-Pacific. From this perspective, such actions do indeed have a constraining effect.
Moreover, given Beijing’s dissatisfaction with the Japanese government in recent times, it is not unlikely that this “quasi-exercise” action serves as a warning to Japan. Especially as Japan has deployed Type 12 anti-ship guided missiles in Kumamoto, with an improved range of up to 1000 kilometers covering Shanghai, located in this region; in addition, Japan has also started receiving 400 “Tomahawk” cruise missiles provided by the U.S. These offensive weapons in Japan are bound to deepen the Chinese Communist Party’s concerns about its own security.
Wu Mingjie also noted that the timing of the Chinese Communist Party’s expiration of the restricted airspace is intriguing. May 6 falls exactly a week before the Xi-Trump meeting, an arrangement that helps avoid provoking Trump excessively. Setting the end date on the day before the meeting could easily lead Trump to believe “you are targeting me.” Therefore, Beijing clearly intends to retain a vague space and implement a dual-strategy; this should be the main purpose of the Chinese Communist Party’s actions this time.
He further mentioned reports of live-fire exercises by the Chinese Communist Party in the Yellow Sea on the same day. In other words, Beijing seems to want to make some kind of gesture now but is also wary of going too far; on the one hand, it wants to project a potentially assertive image, while on the other, it does not want to escalate tensions excessively. This strategy of ambiguous space is precisely meant to force the U.S. military to focus on the Indo-Pacific situation.
According to information from the website of the mainland Maritime Safety Administration, Dalian Maritime Safety Administration issued a navigation warning that from 10:00 to 16:00 on April 9, part of the northern Yellow Sea would be conducting live-fire exercises, prohibiting entry. At the same time, Taiwan’s Kuomintang chairwoman, Chiang Liwen, was visiting China, and April 9 happened to be the day before the “Chiang-Xi meeting.”
Wu Mingjie believed that this is also a way to maintain a certain level of pressure on Taiwan, as the timing is quite clever, coinciding with Chiang Liwen’s visit to China. Taking such measures before the Chiang-Xi meeting implies that Beijing’s military actions may still be ongoing preparations.
He stated that from this perspective, the claims made by the Chinese Communist Party regarding peace talks, cross-strait reunification, or cross-strait peace should be doubted. Judging from this action, Beijing’s related demands are likely just part of their united front strategy; the actual preparation on the military side, the hard aspects, are still in progress.
While Beijing intensifies military and political pressure, the U.S. military’s deployment in the Indo-Pacific has not slackened. In fact, it continues to strengthen deterrence against the Chinese Communist Party through joint military exercises. On April 6, the large annual military exercise “Balikatan” involving the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines took place in the Philippines, and for the first time, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force officially participated by sending 420 personnel. People are also observing that the subsequent scale of the follow-up U.S.-Philippine military exercises has not shrunk but further expanded.
Wu Mingjie mentioned that the “Balikatan” exercises have adopted a model of so-called “out-of-area forces deployment”. Forces are deployed and exercises conducted in areas such as the Bashi Channel and the Batan Islands south of Taiwan, as well as in Japan’s southwest islands like the Ryukyu Islands and Yonaguni Island, all directed towards the Chinese Communist Party.
He noted that there were previous reports of two Marine Corps reinforcements from the U.S., one of them leaving from California, with initial expectations of heading to the Middle East but ultimately not doing so. It appears that this unit has instead remained in the Indo-Pacific to fill the void left by the departure of the 31st Expeditionary Unit. This reflects that the overall U.S. military deployment primarily aims to contain the Chinese Communist Party, and there is a possibility of subsequent involvement in the “Balikatan” exercises.
As for why the scale of this year’s “Balikatan” exercises has not decreased but increased, Wu Mingjie believed there are mainly two reasons: firstly, the participation of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force, and secondly, although the U.S. has withdrawn some forces to the Middle East, it has reinforced other forces in the Indo-Pacific, showing that Washington has not relaxed its guard against the Chinese Communist Party.
He argued that this also indicates that Washington is still concurrently focused on Indo-Pacific security and not entirely centered on countering Iran. The primary strategic opponent for the U.S. remains the Chinese Communist Party; hence, a high level of vigilance is maintained in the Indo-Pacific direction.