【Epoch Times, April 4, 2026】 After disappearing from public view for 8 months, Ma Xingrui, a member of the CCP Politburo and former Party Secretary of Xinjiang, was officially announced to have fallen from grace by the CCP on April 3.
Independent commentator Cai Shunkun analyzed in an interview with NTD Television on April 3 that Ma Xingrui’s case, on the surface, appears to be a corruption investigation. However, during the investigation, a hidden and intricate political network was exposed, which happened to violate a major taboo of the CCP leadership.
Cai Shunkun speculated that Ma Xingrui’s case is likely to have broader implications in the future. More importantly, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign over the years has actually failed. Xi is currently facing a situation similar to Mao Zedong’s later years, marked by increasing distrust and suspicion towards those around him.
According to Cai Shunkun, since being removed from the position of Party Secretary of Xinjiang last year, Ma Xingrui has been serving as the Deputy Head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group and has been under investigation by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The main reason for this investigation is that Ma Xingrui’s wife Rong Li and her secretary Li Guanglu were previously arrested. After their interrogation revealed numerous issues, Ma Xingrui’s case dragged on for a long time as more details were uncovered.
Rong Li had engaged in highly unusual activities, such as gifting Hong Kong insurance policies worth millions or even tens of millions to many officials’ wives and children. This involved a wide range of individuals and a large number of people. The crucial aspect is that the gift recipients did not see it as bribery, nor did the givers view it as corruption, as everything was cloaked in personal relationships. However, it ultimately formed a hidden and highly intricate political network.
Cai Shunkun pointed out that for Xi, mere greed for money is not the most frightening aspect. What truly alarms him is the formation of political alliances, agreements, and connections through the exchange of benefits. The practice of forming cliques, factions, and teaming up is considered a significant threat by Xi. While simple corruption is a monetary issue, the latter could potentially amass substantial power within the Party or military, posing a significant threat to Xi.
He emphasized that the core issue in Ma Xingrui’s case revolves around factional politics rather than just ordinary corruption. Ma Xingrui had previously worked in the military-industrial complex, where corruption was widespread. However, his corruption during that period was possibly moderated compared to some individuals who had no boundaries. As Ma Xingrui owed his rise to power to Peng Liyuan, the problems existing in the military-industrial complex during his tenure theoretically could have been accounted for.
However, the situation changed in Guangdong and Xinjiang. There have been rumors suggesting a special relationship between Ma Xingrui’s family and Peng Liyuan’s family, even rumors of a close family tie. Though unconfirmed officially, Cai Shunkun believes that without this special background, it is challenging to explain how Ma Xingrui managed to ascend rapidly in such a short time.
During his tenure in Guangdong, Ma Xingrui, relying on his special relationship with Xi Jinping and Peng Liyuan, acted arrogantly and had a strong desire for power. When Xi Jinping assigned Ma Xingrui to Guangdong in 2013, it was perceived as a means to oversee Hu Chunhua, the former Party Secretary of Guangdong and current Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Hu Chunhua, knowing he had lost the opportunity to become Xi’s successor, refrained from intervening in major projects, turned a blind eye to many significant matters, and avoided involvement in corrupt dealings, leaving ample space for Ma Xingrui.
After being transferred to Guangdong, Ma Xingrui first served as the Deputy Party Secretary of Guangdong Province and Secretary of the Politics and Law Committee for about two years before being appointed as the Party Secretary of Shenzhen. Shenzhen, a vital economic hub in Guangdong and a symbolic city, was significant politically and economically. Controlling Shenzhen meant controlling significant political and economic resources.
In Shenzhen, Ma Xingrui marginalized the old power base of Wang Rong, the former Party Secretary of Shenzhen, and nurtured a group of loyalists. He then served for a little over a year in Shenzhen before being promoted to Governor of Guangdong and working alongside Hu Chunhua. In just over four years, he rose from being parachuted into Guangdong to leading Shenzhen and then becoming the provincial governor.
Cai Shunkun believes that these developments indicate that Ma Xingrui played more than a conventional role during his time in Guangdong but had a certain “warlord” status, suggesting that he likely had a hand in many major projects.
Regarding Xinjiang, the situation is likely even more severe. Cai Shunkun stated that Xinjiang heavily depends on central government funding. If the rumors claiming direct misappropriation of central funds by Ma Xingrui and subsequent money laundering through illicit means are true, it would be extremely malicious. There are even reports suggesting that Li Guanglu accepted inflated cash amounts from a Zhejiang entrepreneur merely for deciding whether a certain store should be shut down or dealt with. If these rumors hold weight, it would certainly not be an isolated incident.
Cai Shunkun believes that Ma Xingrui’s audacity may be largely due to his reliance on the special relationship with Peng Liyuan, believing that this protective umbrella would shield him from scrutiny.
Moreover, despite Xi Jinping’s seemingly stable power, he is far from carefree. The continuous waves of purges within the Party and military post the 20th National Congress indicate that stability on the surface does not equate to peaceful slumber for Xi.
As Xi ages, his suspicion and distrust towards those around him have intensified, resembling Mao Zedong’s disposition in his later years, constantly suspecting others of forming factions, alliances, and operating duplicitously, ultimately jeopardizing his authority and position.
According to Cai Shunkun, Xi broke the CCP’s long-standing rule that top leaders should not exceed two terms of ten years each. By disrupting the original succession plan, Xi is reluctant to relinquish power, fearing that it could lead to repercussions for himself and his so-called “Xi’s faction.” This reluctance and fear explain why many interpret the 20th National Congress as a substantive restructuring of power within the Party. Notably, Hu Chunhua, once seen as a top contender for succession, failed to secure a seat as a Political Bureau Standing Committee member at the Congress and was even excluded from the Political Bureau, being relegated to serve as a Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. This stands in stark contrast to the succession dynamics during Hu Jintao’s era.
Externally, it appears that Xi has been personally overseeing, directing, and selecting Central Committee members, alternate members, and Discipline Inspection Commission members post the 20th National Congress. However, the aftermath reveals a significant number of Central Committee members and alternate members facing investigations, being sidelined, or losing influence, indicating serious issues in personnel selection and anti-corruption efforts.
Cai Shunkun posits that despite over a decade of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, far from achieving decisive results, it has paradoxically exacerbated corruption within the bureaucratic system. This relentless anti-corruption drive underscores the need for continuous purges, highlighting that this approach has not effectively addressed the underlying issues.
Against this backdrop, Cai Shunkun suggests that the Ma Xingrui case is likely to continue to unfold, potentially implicating more individuals, including high-profile figures like Hu Chunhua, members of the CCP Central Political Bureau Standing Committee, and Li Xi, the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The key will be what Ma Xingrui ultimately reveals.
Furthermore, Cai Shunkun mentioned that there is speculation suggesting that the individual actually driving the Ma Xingrui case may not be Li Xi but rather Liu Jinguo, the Secretary of the Central Secretariat, Deputy Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and Director of the National Supervisory Commission. Descriptions of Liu Jinguo in public portray him as an extremely strict investigator with no nepotism tendencies, and not even other Standing Committee members necessarily get special treatment. If Liu Jinguo is indeed leading this case, he could directly report to Xi Jinping, even if it involves higher-ranking officials.
If this speculation holds true, Liu Jinguo’s role in Xi Jinping’s systemic purges resembles that of Kang Sheng.