Chinese Communist Party Extends Exit Control to Civilians, Passport Applications require Five-level Political Review

Recently, in Wugang, Hunan Province, there has been a situation where applying for a passport requires submission of multiple materials and approval by five departments. Some citizens have expressed that the process is so complicated that it is difficult to complete, leading them to eventually give up on the application. Relevant documents indicate that the exit application review now covers various aspects including finances, communication, and social relationships.

A “Passport Exit Application Approval Form” from Wugang City has been circulating on the internet, sparking significant external attention. This form, which requires seals from five levels of authorities including the village, township, police station, public security bureau, and the “Anti-Fraud Office,” reveals that the Chinese Communist Party’s control over citizens’ exits has evolved from traditional administrative services to a comprehensive “political review” mechanism.

An frustrated woman at the certification window expressed, “Getting a passport is really difficult, there are so many materials required that it is practically impossible to prepare them all, it’s basically a way to prevent people from leaving the country.”

According to leaked documents, residents in Wugang City wishing to apply for a passport not only need the signature of the village (community) secretary but also have to undergo review by the police station chief, town secretary, county public security battalion chief, and finally be scrutinized by the “Anti-Fraud Coordination Office.”

Hunan resident Teng Huang (pseudonym) mentioned in an interview that the difficulty of applying for a passport has indeed increased for residents recently. He said, “Here, we have to go to the street office to apply for a certificate, specifying the destination and purpose of travel. If it’s for tourism, they also need to verify backgrounds, check for legitimate occupations, bank account statements, social security payment records, making it very complicated.”

Aside from the cumbersome five official seals on the “Passport Exit Application Approval Form,” the list of required documents is also alarming. Applicants are asked to submit completely transparent financial records, including detailed transaction records of the past year from WeChat, Alipay, and screenshots of all bank cards under their name obtained through “Cloud Flash Pay.” In terms of communication privacy, they are required to undergo a “comprehensive communication search” to check all phone cards under their name and generate a report. For social relationship bindings, a guarantee letter from a domestic organization is also required.

An Anhui Christian, Mr. Wang, revealed to reporters that his multiple attempts to obtain a passport have been rejected by the public security bureau. The Exit-Entry Administration window clearly stated that his application needs approval from the national security agency, and even Hong Kong and Macau pass issuance has been denied. Despite repeated inquiries to the national security agency for reasons for rejection, the vague response of “just wait a little longer” was received, with no formal reply ever provided. This kind of administrative delay of “no response, no acceptance, no resolution” has left him practically stranded in a border blockade dilemma.

In recent years, Chinese authorities have been continuously tightening control over residents’ exit. The control path visibly shows an expansion from high-level Party and government officials to employees and managers of state-owned enterprises. This system centered around “pre-approval, centralized collection, and distributed issuance” of passports signifies that the freedom of movement within the system has been entirely incorporated into the organizational review logic.

Entering 2026, the exit threshold has further risen from within the Chinese Communist system to outside it. In January of this year, the scope of restrictions specifically targeted retired officials and public servants. By March, the restrictive measures expanded in some provinces to ordinary residents.

Anhui scholar Zhao Hualin (pseudonym) told reporters that this multi-level approval system effectively decentralizes the exit approval authority originally held by central or provincial levels to the grassroots. He said, “This means that any village secretary or police officer can deprive a citizen of their legitimate right to exit by refusing to sign. This ‘fragmented power’ governing logic makes leaving the country no longer a right protected by law but a chip in the hands of grassroots officials. I heard in some places even requiring bribery to apply for an exit permit.”

Zhao Hualin further analyzed that amidst escalating social conflicts and continuous random violent incidents, authorities, in order to prevent so-called “hostile forces” from inside and outside colluding, are implementing dual-sided lockdowns by restricting residents from leaving and preventing foreigners from entering. Officially termed as “eliminating security risks,” in reality, it goes beyond regular security measures and is utilizing big data for pre-crime restrictions on citizens’ activities.

Chinese officials typically justify such policies under the guise of “combating telecom fraud.” However, several public policy scholars point out that anti-fraud is just a superficial reason, and the core lies in the tightening of capital and population movements within the background of economic downturn and social instability. This increasingly stringent approval system is pushing Chinese society towards a kind of disguised universal “soft detention.”