The spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Chen Binhua, claimed on the 18th that if Taiwan accepts Beijing’s rule, China will bring better protection to Taiwan’s energy supply as a “strong motherland.” Experts have pointed out that China’s own energy supply is fragile and does not have the conditions to provide stable guarantees to Taiwan; this statement is seen as turning public anxiety during the heightened situation in the Middle East into a narrative for unifying Taiwan.
Amid escalating conflicts in the Middle East, concerns have arisen about potential energy supply risks for Taiwan. Chen Binhua, the spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, stated on March 18th during a routine press conference that if peaceful reunification is achieved between the two sides, with the support of the “strong motherland,” Taiwan’s energy and resource supply guarantees will be more stable.
Chen Binhua claimed that China’s energy system is quite resilient, and if cross-strait connectivity is realized, sufficient electricity can not only meet the demands of Taiwanese enterprises but also alleviate concerns about power restrictions for the public during peak summer usage.
Chen Wenjia, a national security and strategic studies scholar at Kainan University in Taiwan, pointed out that from both a practical and institutional perspective, “unification guaranteeing Taiwan’s energy security” is not a foregone conclusion and may even bring about new risks.
He stated that China itself faces energy dependency and geopolitical risks, and in times of supply tension, the policy logic typically prioritizes safeguarding domestic core needs rather than unconditionally supplying externally; if Taiwan is integrated into a single system, the original diversified import structure may instead shift to become “reliant on a single system,” reducing risk diversification capabilities.
Chen Wenjia further stated that linking energy security with political unification is “essentially a strategic narrative and policy tool,” and that “energy issues should return to professional governance and international cooperation, rather than becoming a bargaining chip for sovereignty relinquishment.”
China expert Li Lin has always told The Epoch Times that Beijing’s assertion that “unification can ensure Taiwan’s energy security” amidst the escalating situation in the Middle East not only fails to conceal China’s own existing Middle East energy crisis and risks associated with international sea routes but also does not assist Taiwan in facing the real energy structural challenges it needs to address.
Taiwan’s energy supply highly relies on imports, historically staying above 97%, but in recent years, sources have been continuously diversified.
Official data from the past two years shows that Taiwan’s crude oil imports from the Middle East have dropped to around 40%, with the United States officially surpassing Saudi Arabia since 2023 to become Taiwan’s largest single source of crude oil, accounting for over 35%.
In monthly data from 2025 and early 2026, Taiwan’s CPC Corporation has further increased its share of US oil purchases, exceeding 35% during certain periods to reduce risks in the Hormuz Strait and increase scheduling flexibility.
Taiwan’s overall reliance on natural gas from the Hormuz Strait is around 30%. In recent years, Australia has become Taiwan’s largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG), accounting for about 38%, while the US has been gradually increasing to over 10%. Taiwan continues to increase the proportions of gas sources from these two countries.
According to official data from the Ministry of Economic Affairs in early March 2026, Taiwan’s actual strategic petroleum reserves have increased to between 120 to 140 days, exceeding the required 90 days, indicating that the government has preemptively increased reserves in response to the situation in the Middle East. The legal requirement for natural gas reserves is lower, needing to maintain a security supply for at least 25 days.
Chen Wenjia stated that Taiwan’s energy security is “not an immediate crisis” but essentially requires “control while strengthening resilience,” while Chen Shimin also said that Taiwan’s strategic petroleum reserves “should be able to last at least three to four months without issues,” and if conflicts do not drag on, the impacts remain controllable.
Li Lin summarized that Taiwan’s solution lies in diversified sources, autonomous systems, international cooperation, and resilient reserves, rather than placing energy security solely on the political promises of the Chinese Communist Party.
“Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan regarding energy issues ultimately remains an extension of its united front tactics and is not a credible security solution,” mentioned Li Lin.
In reality, China’s substantial dependence on Middle East crude oil has risen to 55%. Data shows that the Middle East accounts for about half of China’s total petroleum imports. According to 2025 data from China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC), Middle East crude oil represents around 42% of total imports. Taking into account Iranian crude oil imported through “gray channels,” data from energy statistics agency Kpler from 2025, this accounts for about 13% of total imports to China.
The US think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), recently reported using satellite data that traffic in the Hormuz Strait has dropped to only 8% of normal levels, while China relies on the related maritime areas for about 40% of its crude oil and 30% of its natural gas transportation.
There have been rumors that Iran may “only allow Chinese vessels to pass,” but this has not been officially confirmed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or Chinese authorities.
Even with diplomatic advantages, CSIS and the UK’s Lloyd’s List have pointed out that Chinese vessels do not have substantial safety guarantees as the sea mines deployed in the strait cannot distinguish between nationalities, posing a threat to all ships.
Furthermore, since March 5th this year, most international insurance companies have canceled “war risk” coverage for the strait. This has led to the suspension of voyages by large Chinese shipowners despite Iran’s assurances of non-attacks due to the significant economic risks from a lack of insurance claims.
On March 11th, the Atlantic Council also mentioned that China, despite having around 120 days of oil reserves, still has a fatal industrial sector reliance on Middle East energy.
Chen Wenjia stated that although China has significant strategic petroleum reserves and relatively diversified sources from Russia, Central Asia, and maritime transport, once regional conflicts escalate, supply and price stability will still face direct impacts, making it “difficult to completely escape geopolitical risks.”
Additionally, Brussels-based think tank Bruegel revealed on March 17th that before the outbreak of war, Iran accounted for 13% of China’s crude oil imports, around 1.4 million barrels per day; following the conflict, Iran’s exports collapsed, leaving China with a daily supply deficit of 1 to 1.4 million barrels.
The report further mentions that China still needs around 5.4 million barrels of crude oil imported through the Hormuz Strait daily, and even with increased supplies from Russia, it is not sufficient to make up for the blocked gap in Middle East imports. The report also notes that oil prices have surged to around $100 per barrel, and with each 25% increase in oil prices, China’s GDP could drop by about 0.5%.
Partially due to China’s use of the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and teapot refineries to purchase Iranian oil using the Renminbi, avoiding Western sanctions, these channels are currently stalled due to the war.
Chen Shimin, a political science professor at National Taiwan University, estimated that China has about 4-5 months of strategic petroleum reserves, but prolonged conflicts in Iran would inevitably cause harm.
He told The Epoch Times that China’s trade surplus in 2025 continued to rise to nearly $1.2 trillion, stemming in part from the industrial sector’s long-term use of cheap oil from sanctioned countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Russia, as “China can acquire oil at about 25% – 30% cheaper prices on the market, enabling it to sell globally at low prices.”
If these sources of inexpensive oil are cut off, Chinese companies may end up paying hundreds of millions of dollars more for oil each year, putting economic growth under pressure.