During this year’s National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Li Dongsheng, a National People’s Congress delegate and the founder and chairman of TCL, bluntly stated in an interview in Beijing that one of the significant reasons for the sluggish sales of televisions in China is that “TV programs are no longer attractive.” This seemingly ordinary topic of poor home appliance sales has sparked in-depth analyses from various scholars on the cultural industry, consumer structure, and institutional factors.
Li Dongsheng revealed a set of TV sales data that caught attention: In 2024, TV sales in the United States reached 49.9 million units, a 6% increase compared to the previous year, while the Chinese market saw a decline of 9% to 32.895 million units. Calculated by population, in the United States, there are approximately 143 TV sets per thousand people, whereas in China, there are only about 23 per thousand, highlighting a significant gap.
He also mentioned that the film and television industry in the United States has a production value of 45 trillion RMB, while China only has 15 trillion RMB; in China, “many people do not turn on their TV for months. This is not a hardware problem, but the services indeed lack appeal.”
Regarding Li Dongsheng’s assertion that “programs are not attractive,” Chinese commentator Wang He, in an interview with Dajiyuan, commented, “The statement is very reasonable.”
He pointed out that the film and television cultural industry in China has “regressed compared to ten or twenty years ago,” mainly due to the tightening political environment. “The overall political environment in China has ‘shifted left,’ with very strict controls in various aspects, leading to many programs being banned.”
Wang He cited examples such as penalties for talk show actors, the cessation of crosstalk programs, and the disappearance of previously popular talent shows in recent years. Even the annual Chinese New Year Gala, which was once a hit, is now considered “worse every year” by viewers.
In his view, authorities have become overly cautious in the cultural sector, leading to the potential banning of any program with even a slight social expression, resulting in the entertainment industry becoming “lifeless” and lacking vitality, gradually driving audiences away from television.
American economist Davy J. Wong pointed out to Dajiyuan that the problem in the Chinese television market is not just about hardware sales but reflects a gap in the overall entertainment ecosystem.
He believes the robust TV consumption in the United States is due to a comprehensive entertainment industry chain, including Hollywood movies, sporting events, streaming platforms, and advertising, providing diverse content offerings.
In contrast, the entertainment content in China in recent years has become more homogenized, coupled with stricter censorship, leading to many viewers turning to short videos on mobile phones or games instead. The role of television as the center of household entertainment is gradually diminishing.
In addition to content factors, the disparity in TV sales between China and the U.S. also reflects differences in residents’ incomes and living environments. Data shows that the per capita GDP in the United States is around 90,000 USD, while in China, it is about 13,000 USD, indicating significantly higher purchasing power in American households.
Davy J. Wong pointed out that TVs in the U.S. are typical “renewable consumer goods,” with families often replacing them every three to four years, a practice less common in China, where TVs are still seen as durable goods with lower replacement rates.
From a deeper economic perspective, Wang He believes that the fundamental difference in TV consumption between China and the U.S. lies not in goods consumption but in service consumption.
“The gap between China and the U.S. is not in goods but in services,” he noted, highlighting that U.S. consumption is mainly focused on services, while service consumption in China is lower by several tens of percentage points compared to the U.S. The television and cultural industry is a typical service sector, yet these areas are also the most strictly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Wang He pointed out that high-profit service sectors such as telecommunications and banking in China have long been monopolized by state-owned enterprises, making it difficult for foreign and private enterprises to enter. Industries involving ideological factors like social platforms and media are even more stringent, with Google and several American social media platforms unable to operate in China.
As a result, China has a significant trade surplus in goods, amounting to 1.2 trillion USD annually, but a long-term deficit in services trading, indicating a significant lag in service industry development.
Viewing the TV sales gap from a macroeconomic perspective also sheds light on the structural challenges within China’s consumption market. Data shows that in 2025, China’s total retail sales of consumer goods grew by only 3.7%, while GDP grew by 5%, marking the first time retail growth lagged behind economic growth.
Wang He pointed out that while China has a substantial household savings balance on the surface, wealth distribution remains highly unequal. “China’s GDP is around 140 trillion RMB, yet the total bank deposits of households exceed 160 trillion RMB,” with the majority of these deposits concentrated in the hands of few.
For most people, actual incomes remain relatively low. For example, approximately 600 million people in China earn around 1000 RMB per month, while about 180 million rural retirees receive an average monthly pension of just over 200 RMB.
In this scenario, Wang He emphasized that “wealthy individuals cannot consume much, while the majority of those who want to consume do not have the financial means.”
According to the “2026 World Inequality Report” released by the Paris School of Economics (PSE), the top 1% of the ultra-rich in China own 31.4% of the total national wealth, the top 10% hold 67.9%, while the bottom 50% of the population (approximately 700 million people) only possess about 6% of the wealth.
He added that the impact of the pandemic, dynamic “zero-COVID” policies, economic slowdown have led to the rapid shrinkage of China’s middle class in recent years, resulting in a cooling of the consumer market, and even the phenomenon of “downgraded consumption.”
American economist Li Hengqing also pointed out to reporters that although China is referred to as the world’s second-largest economy, wealth is highly concentrated, with the elite holding immense riches, while ordinary people are burdened by mortgages, education, healthcare, and elderly care costs, limiting their ability to spend. In such circumstances, even those with savings are hesitant to consume due to a lack of confidence in the future.
In the face of sluggish consumption, the Beijing government has consistently emphasized the need to expand domestic demand but has not resorted to directly distributing cash to stimulate consumption. Analysts from Goldman Sachs noted that one of the main reasons Beijing is reluctant to “send money” directly is due to various reasons such as political ideology, fiscal pressures, and differing assessments of the consumption issue.
One significant reason is that authorities believe weak consumption is not just a demand problem but also stems from inadequate “consumption scenes.” Hence, they advocate increasing service industries and consumption scenarios through “supply-side reforms.”
However, Li Hengqing believes that this argument overlooks the core issue. He points out that consumption requires two conditions: desire and the ability to pay, with the latter lacking among Chinese people currently.
He criticized the current subsidy policies, which often require consumers to spend money first to enjoy subsidies, stating that “what the ordinary people lack is precisely that ‘money to spend initially,’ providing little help to those without purchasing power.”
The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s 2026 fiscal budget will allocate 250 billion RMB to support the “old-for-new” policy for consumer goods, a reduction from 300 billion RMB last year. Analysts widely believe that the policy’s effectiveness is limited, with one of the reasons being that most people do not have extra disposable income, leading to subdued consumer demand.
Wang He, from a political system perspective, analyzed that the CCP does not view the people as a source of legitimate power but emphasizes control and management.
“The CCP sees the people as adversaries, not as the foundation of its power but as slaves.”
Therefore, in his view, the authorities are reluctant to substantially increase welfare or directly distribute money, with considerations revolving around maintaining political control.
Analyzing the situation holistically, the TV sales gap not only reflects a phenomenon in the consumer electronics market but also illuminates the difficulties in China’s economic structural transformation. On one hand, China has become the world’s largest producer of TV sets, accounting for over 60% of global output; on the other hand, the domestic consumer market has not been able to match the robust manufacturing capability.
Davy J. Wong highlighted that China’s economy has long relied on investment and export-driven growth, with household consumption accounting for a relatively low proportion of GDP, thus still operating under a “production-oriented model.” If domestic consumption cannot absorb production capacity, companies must rely on export markets, increasing the risks of overcapacity and external economic fluctuations.
Wang He believes that the inadequate development of the service industry is a major weakness in China’s economy, closely tied to policy controls. “Many sectors within the service industry involve information and ideology, which the CCP tightly restrains,” making it challenging for cultural and entertainment industries to thrive.
In Li Hengqing’s view, the television industry is a typical example of this contradiction — “having a TV but nothing appealing to watch.” Consequently, stimulating consumption becomes challenging. This seemingly straightforward market phenomenon actually reveals multiple challenges in China’s cultural industry, consumer structure, and institutional environment.
He bluntly expressed that in the authorities’ eyes, once relaxation in cultural censorship occurs, it “equates to shaking the foundation of the party’s governance,” with political security often prioritized over industrial development, concluding that “Li Dongsheng, as a National People’s Congress delegate, does not fully grasp the political reality.”