After the Lunar New Year in 2026, the once highly regarded Chinese industrial products e-commerce platform “MyMRO” suddenly collapsed, leaving its headquarters deserted and its core management team missing. Over a thousand suppliers nationwide were owed payments, with amounts involved possibly reaching up to 400 million Chinese yuan. Some suppliers revealed that the police refused to accept their complaints, while officials responded by saying that the platform was “legitimate”.
“MyMRO” is now under Shanghai Wanjiji Zhi Internet Information Service Co., Ltd., the predecessor of which was operated in China by the American industrial giant Grainger. The platform became an independent Chinese-funded enterprise in 2020 and was renamed “MyMRO” at the end of 2022 after completing multiple rounds of financing.
The e-commerce platform mainly provides digital procurement services for non-production materials, focusing on serving central state-owned enterprises and large and medium-sized domestic and foreign enterprises. According to voluntary statistics from suppliers, registered debts exceeded 113 million yuan as of March 6th. The actual total amount of debts owed is estimated to be as high as 400 million yuan, affecting over a thousand suppliers nationwide.
Ms. Xu Xin from Shanghai, who is engaged in supplying automation equipment, has had a cooperation relationship with the Grainger system for over twenty years. On March 11th, Xu Xin revealed to Dajiyuan that since reintegrating into the new company in 2023, her cooperation with “MyMRO” has been relatively limited, with debts amounting to over 30,000 yuan.
However, she also disclosed a more shocking detail – after she stopped supplying goods, “MyMRO” turned to other suppliers to purchase goods through her, with the value of the purchased goods reaching as high as 3.3 million yuan, of which not a single penny was settled.
“They paid me through their suppliers, in cash purchases. Since we couldn’t get the payment from Grainger, we had to stop supplying. After we stopped supplying, they found other suppliers to purchase from us, paying in cash.”
Xu Xin also disclosed to reporters that “MyMRO” had already pledged around 100 million yuan of accounts receivable to the bank before the collapse. This means that if there are any repayments from customers in the future, they will be prioritized by the bank for repayment, leaving suppliers facing a desperate situation of no return. She has already reported the case to the relevant authorities, but there has been no progress so far.
The ordeal of Zhang Tao from Xi’an, engaged in supplying industrial products, is another epitome of the crisis. He only founded his company at the end of 2024 and began cooperating with “MyMRO” in January 2025, mainly supplying to power plants under the State Power Group in Ningxia region, involving various industrial materials such as cutting machines, grinding machines, work clothes, and components, with accumulated advances of over 250,000 yuan, yet to receive a penny.
Zhang Tao explained the operational logic of the entire business chain: “State Grid Buy” and other central state-owned e-commerce platforms have a high threshold, with only a dozen or so qualified among the suppliers nationwide engaged in MRO business, of which “MyMRO” is one.
He said, “The companies we signed contracts with are all subsidiaries, not signed in the name of the parent company. All the contracts signed by our many suppliers are signed by subsidiaries; the subsidiaries cannot collect the payments. They signed the contract with the central enterprise as the parent company, and then signed the contract with us suppliers as the subsidiaries. Even if we sue, we can only sue their subsidiaries; the subsidiaries do not have the payments in their accounts.”
This structure of “parent company receiving payments, subsidiary signing contracts” has left suppliers with almost no legal recourse even if they resort to legal action. Zhang Tao once reported to the State Power Group’s “State Grid Buy” platform, only to be told that the matter was beyond its jurisdiction, with no direct dealings between the two, rendering them unable to assist. Reporting to the public security agencies, he was told it was a contract civil dispute and not accepted.
He said, “The officials replied to us, saying that it was legitimate. It means they have used the rules in a legitimate and compliant way, and then tricked our money into it.”
Zhang Tao admitted that the 250,000 yuan he owed was paid with his credit card, planning to repay the funds after they returned, now becoming an endless pit. “It’s not going well this year; everyone has car loans and mortgages.”
According to public information, “State Grid Buy” is an energy domain professional e-commerce platform created by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission under the State Power Group in 2017. The platform mainly engages in non-bidding procurement and e-commerce procurement, covering fields such as electricity, coal, transportation, and chemicals.
At the 2025 World Internet Conference, the “MyMRO” platform was selected as a “Yangtze River Delta Digital Economy Gazelle Enterprise (Potential)” and planned to promote the company’s listing. However, beneath the prosperity, a crisis had been silently accumulating. After the Lunar New Year in mid-February, the crisis exploded. The platform centralized its layoff of over two hundred employees, paying severance according to the N+1 standard; office points in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and other places gradually closed down; the headquarters’ positions were vacant, equipment was moved out, and the core management team completely lost contact.
According to the mainland media “Wangjing She” on March 11th, many suppliers in various regions had discovered payment disruptions as early as October to November 2025. The platform’s previous payment routine, settling on time at the beginning and end of each month, ceased quietly since the fall of 2025 – even if downstream central enterprise customers had cleared payments to the platform, suppliers had not received the corresponding payments, only receiving small amounts used to “stabilize the situation”.
What is even more difficult for suppliers to accept is that despite the obvious break in the financial chain, “MyMRO” did not stop taking orders. Instead, on January 29, 2026 – the eve of the Lunar New Year – the platform actively issued new orders to downstream suppliers, urging them to stock up and produce.
Only a few days later, on February 4th, the platform suddenly notified all suppliers to stop supplying goods; on February 10th, they formally informed customers to stop taking orders. This contradictory operation sequence led suppliers to widely suspect that the platform was involved in commercial fraud.
Industry analysts pointed out that the collapse of “MyMRO” was not merely due to operational errors but rather the inherent flaws in its business model.
Yuanjing Gongpin founder Yun Xuehui told mainland media “Yibangdongli.com” that “MyMRO” was essentially a “pass-through platform” – by qualifying through bidding to access the central enterprise procurement system, it subcontracts orders to downstream suppliers, not engaging in performance itself, only collecting service fees.
According to insiders, about 70% of “MyMRO’s” revenue of around one billion yuan came from a single major customer. However, when this customer did not renew contracts in the new year’s procurement bids, the platform’s financial chain came under pressure.
Meanwhile, the platform management long adopted an aggressive expansion strategy, setting up offices in multiple cities nationwide, investing heavily in building digital systems but failing to achieve corresponding revenue growth, leading to a sharp rise in operational costs and rapid depletion of funds.
Even after receiving the latest round of financing from Hongtai Fund in July 2025, the platform still cooperated with the local Chengdu government to plan the construction of the “Western Smart Supply Chain Center”, continuing its lavish spending, which ultimately led to the crisis.
In the early stages of the crisis outbreak, “MyMRO” Chairman Zhou Yanhua communicated with suppliers through video calls, lamenting the immense pressure and depression she faced but not proposing any substantial repayment plan. This move greatly infuriated the suppliers who were already in dire straits.
Shanghai supplier Xu Xin questioned, “Why can’t they provide us with a payment plan when they can afford to pay out millions in severance to employees? She said it’s not easy, but who has it easy?”
“MyMRO” attributed the crisis in its customer notice to “internal shareholder repurchase disputes” causing short-term liquidity pressure. However, many suppliers are skeptical of this explanation, believing that the actual situation is far more complex than the official statement.
Currently, many suppliers have organized voluntary groups to negotiate with the Shanghai headquarters on February 27th and March 3rd, though they haven’t received substantial responses. Some suppliers have compiled evidence and reported the platform to the relevant authorities, accusing it of contract fraud, while others are considering filing civil lawsuits. However, lawyers have informed them that even if they win, since the subsidiaries’ accounts have no assets to execute, the actual possibility of recovery is extremely low.
The collapse of “MyMRO” is a microcosm of the continuing downturn in the Chinese economy. Influenced by factors such as reduced consumption, decreased business orders, and tightened procurement strategies of major customers, many small and medium suppliers who were already struggling to survive have been crushed by this platform’s collapse.
Xu Xin revealed that in the supplier rights protection group she established, new members continue to join every day. The highest single outstanding debt of a supplier in Xi’an amounts to over 27 million yuan, while a Shanghai supplier is owed over 8 million yuan. The total number of suppliers may exceed 1,300, with many relying on credit cards and bank loans to advance payment, now facing a mountain of debt. Some factories have been forced to shut down, some business owners are being chased by employees and upstream for reimbursement, and even face the risk of being listed as dishonesty executors.
“I’ve heard that some people are getting divorced over this, including people from ‘Grainger’ themselves telling me that they’ve destroyed families. ” – Zhang Tao describes the deep reach of this crisis.
According to Zhang Tao, the most urgent need right now is for the government to step in and mediate. He told Dajiyuan, “If the government steps in to mediate, there is a possibility to recover some losses. Right now, we suppliers don’t hold out hope to get them all back, even getting back a part would be acceptable, at the very least, everyone can continue operating normally.”