The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the world’s largest cobalt exporter, has tightened its export quotas, causing a sharp increase in refined cobalt prices and putting China’s new energy and battery industry chain in a material shortage. Multiple economic and international affairs scholars pointed out that this impact exposed three structural risks for China: insufficient sovereignty over upstream minerals, limited overseas control, and lagging alternative technology conversion, while the U.S.-led multilateral mineral alliance is accelerating formation, and the global critical mineral landscape is facing a profound reshuffle.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) officially implemented cobalt export quotas in the second half of 2025 and suspended exports in the fourth quarter. According to a recent report by Reuters columnist Andy Home, the country set the export quota for the fourth quarter of 2025 at 18,125 tons, the annual quota for 2026 at 96,600 tons, and retained a 10% strategic reserve quota.
Due to delays in the new regulations in the DRC, cobalt exports nearly came to a complete halt at the end of last year; the first batch of trucks carrying cobalt ore under the new regulations did not leave the country until January of this year.
The sudden reduction in supply quickly triggered a strong market response. As of now, international cobalt prices have surged from around $10 per pound in early 2025 to $25, an increase of over 150%. Chinese buyers have been forced to dip into inventories, with the extraction volume of cobalt in the Wuxi Stainless Steel Exchange’s warehouse exceeding 3,250 tons by the end of January, accounting for about 37% of total stock.
The DRC has been supplying over 70% of global cobalt ore production for a long time, while China’s refined cobalt production also accounts for over 70% globally, holding a dominant position in the downstream processing sector. However, China has limited domestic cobalt reserves, and its refining capacity highly relies on imported raw materials. This shock highlights its structural vulnerability due to excessive dependency on foreign upstream resources.
Several economic and international affairs scholars summarized this event as three structural risks in interviews with The Epoch Times.
American economist Davy J. Wong proposed the “Triple Structural Risk” framework: firstly, mineral sovereignty is controlled by the resource-rich country’s government, putting direct pressure on China’s industrial chain once policies change; secondly, the energy battery system’s phase-dependent reliance on cobalt has not been entirely eliminated; and thirdly, the key mineral multilateral cooperation led by the U.S. is accelerating, forming medium- to long-term competitive pressure on China.
He bluntly stated that the “fatal wound Beijing faces is not the lack of minerals per se but the structural risks accumulative from insufficient sovereignty, technological dependency, and alliance reorganization in the upstream.”
Sun Guoxiang, a professor at the Department of International Affairs and Business at National Huah University in Taiwan, noted that nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) route still comprises around 60% of China’s electric vehicle battery composition, making it difficult to entirely replace in the short term. He estimated that if the supply continues to shrink, related production capacity for 2026 may decline by 10% to 15%, exerting noticeable upward pressure on vehicle costs.
Sun also pointed out that despite Chinese companies investing over $10 billion in Congo’s mining fields, they face institutional constraints such as local corruption issues, localization policy requirements, and quota distribution based on historical data, leading to a weakened actual control.
He concluded that China’s current cobalt resource layout reveals three major hidden risks: excessive concentration of sources, limited overseas control capacity, and lagging technological path transitions.
Lai Rongwei, Executive Director of the Taiwan Inspiration Association (TIA), emphasized that policy news often ferment in the market first, leading to hoarding behavior by companies that magnify price fluctuations, ultimately translating into cost pressures on end products.
He further highlighted that the more profound implication of this event lies in the structural reorganization of global supply chains: Africa may form two parallel systems in the future—the existing resource network led by Beijing and an alternative supply system led by the U.S., emphasizing transparent governance and environmental standards. This differentiation will extend from upstream minerals to midstream processing and downstream manufacturing, ultimately forming an industry alliance structure with institutional differences.
Cobalt is often directly linked to power batteries, but it is also a critical strategic metal in modern military technology systems.
In the U.S., over half of cobalt demand actually comes from high-performance superalloy industries. High-temperature superalloys centered around cobalt are widely used in aerospace and defense industries, including jet engine turbine blades, advanced nuclear reactor structural materials, and key components of precision-guided missiles and high-end weapon systems.
In contrast to China’s pressure, the U.S. is accelerating the construction of a critical mineral cooperation network.
On February 4, 2026, the U.S. State Department hosted a ministerial summit on critical minerals, with 54 countries including the DRC and the European Commission in attendance.
Vice President Pence announced the establishment of a “Preferred Trade Group” for critical minerals and proposed a price floor mechanism; Secretary of State Pompeo, without naming China directly, clearly pointed out that relevant resources are “highly concentrated in one country’s hands,” becoming a “geopolitical tool of pressure.”
Two days prior, President Trump officially launched the $12 billion “Project Vault” critical mineral reserve project, with some funding coming from the long-term lending authorization of the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
In terms of the layout in the DRC, the U.S. and DRC signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in December 2025; the U.S.-backed “Orion Critical Minerals Coalition” (Orion CMC) announced the acquisition of shares in the DRC copper-cobalt mining project from mining giant Glencore; the U.S. will also invest in building the Lobito Corridor and dams within the DRC to secure stable mineral supply routes in exchange for infrastructure.
Additionally, Cove Capital in New York and a state-owned mining company in Kazakhstan have established a joint venture to develop the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten deposit, with preliminary support from the U.S. government financing institutions amounting to $1.6 billion and priority supply agreements reached with the U.S. Department of Commerce, seen by the industry as a replicable cooperation blueprint.
Sun Guoxiang emphasized that the “de-Chinafication” of supply chains has become an irreversible long-term trend. As more democratic countries enter the African mineral market, intensifying competition will dilute China’s existing advantages; meanwhile, Japan, the U.S., Australia, and some Southeast Asian countries are collaborating in battery materials and critical technology fields, forming industry alliances with institutional hedging significance.