In January of this year, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s purge of top military leaders Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, as well as the Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, has sparked international concern over the latest wave of internal turmoil within the CCP. Yesterday (24th), two internationally renowned think tanks released reports focusing on the negative impact of Xi Jinping’s cleansing actions on the military.
On the afternoon of February 24th (EST), the China Power Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States published the “Chinese Military Purge Database,” which includes data on over a hundred senior CCP military officers who have been purged or are at risk of being purged since 2022. The report describes Xi Jinping as having launched a “political civil war” within the military, with research findings suggesting that the scale of his cleansing operation far exceeds previous understandings.
During Xi’s first five years in power, he had already removed former Central Military Commission Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, as well as Central Military Commission members Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang. The second large-scale cleansing operation since 2023 has seen the removal of six Central Military Commission members, including the recently ousted Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia. Currently, only one person, Zhang Shimin, remains as a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission holding the rank of active general.
The CSIS report indicates that since 2022, a total of 36 generals and lieutenant generals in the CCP have been formally removed from their positions, with another 65 officers either missing or at risk of being purged (based on their absence from important meetings). This brings the total number of confirmed and potential purge victims to a staggering 101, including both active and retired generals (as lower-ranking officer information is less transparent, the database only covers generals and lieutenant generals).
Data shows that 11 retired generals have been purged. Most of the cleansing operations target active-duty military officers. Three key data points highlight the significant blow suffered by the military leadership: first, among the 47 military leaders who were generals in 2022 or promoted to that rank after 2022, 41 people (87%) have been purged or are at risk of being purged (during or after their tenure); second, out of the 35 generals promoted by Xi Jinping since 2020, 32 individuals appear to be under investigation, and 29 have ultimately been confirmed to have been purged or are at risk of being purged; third, aside from generals, out of a total of 176 senior leadership positions within the CCP military, excluding those holding the same positions concurrently, about 52% have been purged or are at risk of being purged.
The report suggests that this wave of purges has nearly touched every level of the CCP military, with the Rocket Force suffering the most severe impact. Among the five regional commands, the Southern Theater Command has been hit the hardest, with its commander, political commissar, and all five deputy commanders being replaced. This means that the leadership of the Southern Theater Command has been completely emptied, with the highest military commander and political commissar positions still vacant.
This cleansing operation has led to the removal of military leadership responsible for planning, overseeing training, and other military operations. The purges have affected departments under the Central Military Commission responsible for coordinating joint operations and cross-service training, such as the Joint Staff Department and the Joint Operations Command Center. It has also affected commanders of theater-level exercises and major military training, as well as commanders of different military services.
The CCP military operates on a dual-track system, including the political track and the operational track. In the CSIS database, 61% of active senior officers come from the operational system. For example, among the purged officials in the Central Military Commission, 80% held critical operational positions, with their influence particularly deep — there are currently no military leaders in the Central Military Commission who originated from the operational system. The proportion of operational-system officers among the purged leadership in various theater commands varies significantly: in the purged leadership of the Southern Theater Command, over 85% were from the operational system, while in the Central Theater Command, only 25% were from that system.
Out of the 52 key leadership positions within the military, only 11 positions (approximately 21%) are currently filled, with many of the purged positions being temporarily filled by acting commanders and political commissars. Another 23 key positions (around 44% of the total) are being temporarily filled by acting or interim leaders. Additionally, 12 positions appear to be vacant, while information is unavailable for about 6 positions.
The report suggests that while the purging of leadership does not seem to have significantly disrupted the normal operations of the CCP military, its bureaucratic structure continues to function, but compared to 2024, the military activities directed towards Taiwan in the latter half of 2025 showed a slight year-on-year decrease. Similarly, the average sailing time of Chinese naval vessels in the waters around Japan in 2025 decreased compared to the previous year.
Some cases indicate that the disruption to the leadership of the CCP military may have weakened its ability to conduct large-scale complex military exercises. In 2025, not only were two major exercises targeting Taiwan delayed, but there were differences in their scale and nature, and even naming conventions differed. The crackdown on the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission may also have weakened the ability to plan and execute joint military exercises with Russia.
Overall, the report suggests that at present, the temporary positions of acting lieutenant generals appear to be sufficient to maintain or sustain small-scale daily operations. However, beyond exercises, it is unclear whether these temporary leaders have the authority and experience necessary to drive significant policy changes within the military, and whether they can handle sudden accidents or crises.
The report points out that when Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership evaluate the military, their primary consideration is the security of their regime. While corruption is often cited as a reason for removing top officials, the scale of the purges cannot be entirely explained by allegations of corruption; political maneuvering is the key factor.
On the same day that the report was released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the U.S., the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) headquartered in London also issued its annual “Military Balance” report, indicating that the ongoing military purge operations initiated by the CCP authorities had created serious gaps in the command system, likely weakening their combat readiness, and the purges may still be ongoing.
According to reports by Reuters, the IISS report also mentioned that if promotions were based on relationships, defective weapons could enter the forces due to contractual issues, and overall morale could be affected, “this purge almost certainly will have an impact in the short term”. However, the report describes these impacts as “temporary”.
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute of National Defense Studies told Dajiyuan that the two rounds of military purges under Xi Jinping’s administration have different characteristics. The previous purging of retired generals Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Fang Fenghui, and Zhang Yang was planned. But this recent purge, especially the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, was not a planned purification but rather an impromptu event driven by Xi Jinping’s anxieties about losing power. So after arresting people, he was eager to provide a reasonable excuse, which was very ambiguous in its propaganda.
Shen Mingshi stated that Xi Jinping’s major purge is disrupting personnel in the military, to the point where replacements for the Deputy Chairman and members of the Military Commission cannot be found. Because the current relationships of the temporary deputies at the major general level with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are unknown – are they loyal to Xi Jinping? These aspects also need to be considered. Xi cannot immediately promote individuals from the major general level to take up positions as full generals in the theater commands; the personnel coming up lack the required expertise, which has an impact on the training and combat readiness of the military and may not be restored in the short term.
Shen Mingshi believes that the major purge has longer-term negative effects on morale. “When Xi arrests Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, many people within the military are discontented, especially seeing that Xi is using people and then discarding them. It will also affect loyalty. Although the CCP has the tradition of the party commanding the gun, if the military completely distrusts you, it will have an impact on the Party’s armed forces system.”
Su Ziyun, Director of the Institute of National Defense Strategy and Resources of the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Studies, told Dajiyuan that the core of military strength lies not just in tangible weapons but in people. If morale is affected, there will inevitably be negative consequences. Originally, this purge was based on Xi Jinping’s personal perceptions. “The first possibility may be that the military is truly rotten to the core, with all senior generals involved in corruption; the second, it is more likely that the military is not following orders, so Xi Jinping is taking political purges, which is more likely than corruption being the reason.”