In 2026, the annual Military-Political Symposium of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the capital witnessed a rare occurrence with only 7 Major Generals in attendance, no Senior Generals appeared, presenting a sharp contrast to previous years. Experts suggest that the recent intensive purges of senior military officials have led to a power vacuum in the Central Military Commission, posing challenges to Xi Jinping’s control over the military, indicating potential ongoing personnel shakeups in the future.
Reported by the “Beijing Daily,” the annual Capital Military-Political Symposium took place in Beijing on February 5, 2026. CCTV’s Defense Military Channel footage showed 7 Major Generals and 13 Brigadier Generals attending the meeting, but no Senior Generals were seen, marking a significant change compared to previous years.
Looking back at the Military-Political Symposium in the past two years, in February 2024, then Political Work Department Director of the Central Military Commission Senior General Miao Hua attended, along with 7 Major Generals. In January 2025, then Deputy Director of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission Senior General He Hongjun attended, along with 4 Major Generals.
Over the past three years, only Air Force Deputy Political Commissar Ji Duo has consistently attended the Capital Military-Political Symposium, while other leaders have seen frequent turnover.
Among them, Miao Hua fell from grace in July 2024, and He Hongjun was expelled from the CCP and the military in October 2025. Of the 7 Major Generals who attended the 2024 Military-Political Symposium, Rocket Force Political Work Department Director Zhang Fengzhong fell from grace in October 2025; Central Commission for Discipline Inspection members Leng Shaojie and Yang Xiaoxiang were absent from the January 2026 fifth plenum of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection due to reported issues.
Of note, among the 4 Major Generals who attended the 2025 Military-Political Symposium, Zhu Guobiao and Zhou Junqiang were absent from the 2026 annual meeting, with their current whereabouts unknown.
Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies analyst Shen Mingshi told Dajiyuan that the abnormal situation of the 2026 Capital Military-Political Symposium reflects deep-seated problems in the power structure of the military high command.
Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, there have been multiple rounds of large-scale purges in the senior ranks of the CCP military. According to statistics, publicly investigated active Senior Generals have reached 15, with an additional 20 Senior Generals “disappearing.” Currently, only four Senior Generals are in normal service: Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Shengmin, Defense Minister Dong Jun, Eastern Theater Commander Yang Zhibin, and Central Theater Commander Han Shengyan.
Among the 7 Major Generals who attended the 2026 Capital Military-Political Symposium, the situation of Ding Xingnong, Deputy Political Commissar of the CCP Rocket Force, has attracted attention.
Ding Xingnong ranked second among the 20th Central Committee alternate members and has attended the Capital Military-Political Symposium for two consecutive years. However, he was bypassed twice in 2024 and 2025 central committee appointments and missed relevant central plenums. Observers generally believe that various signs indicate significant uncertainties in his political future.
Ding Xingnong has long served in the former General Equipment Department system, serving as the Political Department Director of the General Equipment Department and Political Work Department Director of the Strategic Support Force before being transferred as Deputy Political Commissar of the Rocket Force in April 2024.
The CCP Rocket Force has become a challenging area for military purges. Since the explosion of the Rocket Force and General Equipment Department case in July 2023, three Rocket Force Commanders and two Defense Ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Feng, have been investigated. Zhang Fengzhong, who attended the Military-Political Symposium in 2024, has also fallen from grace.
On the second day of the Capital Military-Political Symposium (February 6), the so-called Military Commission of the CCP held a cultural performance to express Spring Festival greetings to retired military cadres in Beijing. CCTV reported that the number of current Military Commission members and retired military leaders accompanying Xi Jinping to watch the performance significantly decreased compared to the past two years, with only Central Military Commission Discipline Inspection Secretary Zhang Shengmin present at the event.
Shen Mingshi said that the format of the Chinese New Year’s tea party for retired and retiring cadres before the Chinese New Year this year has significantly changed, shifting from a round table gathering to sitting together in the audience to watch the performance. “This arrangement aims to prevent outsiders from inferring attendance and masking the changes in military personnel and low attendance rates.”
Regarding the emphasis in official reports on “the unanimous support of the veteran comrades for the Chairman-responsible system of the Military Commission,” Shen Mingshi believes this is a political propaganda posture and reflects differing opinions within the military.
He stated that the CCP propaganda system often emphasizes what is lacking. At present, the high-profile declaration of loyalty reflects the existence of different opinions within the military, especially in the actions against Zhang Yuxia and Liu Zhenli, indicating resistance Xi Jinping faces within the party and the military.
From the perspective of “public appearance politics,” commentator Tang Jingyuan analyzed that in CCP politics, the public appearance of senior figures is often seen as an important signal for displaying power and status.
Tang told Dajiyuan that Xi Jinping is currently in a delicate situation, facing discontent within the party regarding his policy direction and personnel decisions. Following his actions against senior military personnel, some methods are seen as breaking established procedures, leading to internal resistance. In this context, Xi needs to strengthen his personal authority through public activities.
The number of military leaders attending the 2026 Capital Military-Political Symposium and the reduced presence accompanying Xi to watch the military’s greetings performance indicate a “vacuuming and hollowness” of the top Central Military Commission leadership. Currently, there is only one Senior General in the Central Military Commission, with a need to fill five more vacancies, alongside several other key positions.
Regarding the future personnel direction within the CCP military, Shen Mingshi believes that the CCP military faces difficulties in personnel promotions, with some key positions remaining vacant for a long time, only filled by “acting” or interim appointments. The number of qualified Major Generals is limited, making it impossible for a large-scale promotion to Senior General in the short term.
He cited the example of the Beijing Garrison Commander to explain Xi’s criteria for selecting personnel. This position remained vacant for a long time before being filled by Chen Yuan, reflecting Xi Jinping’s priority of choosing “loyal and reliable” individuals.
He predicted that the Xi Jinping-led 31st Group Army faction has been purged, and a new foundation of military power has yet to be fully established. Personnel changes in the senior military leadership are expected to continue over the next one to two years.
Tang Jingyuan believes that the reduced number of Senior Generals signifies a limited number of actual operational commanders with real power. The Central Theater Command is responsible for defending the capital, and the Eastern Theater Command directly faces the Taiwan Strait direction, making these two commands critical.
“Who will be promoted to Senior General in these key positions and what their factional backgrounds are will be crucial indicators of the direction of military authority,” Tang said, stating that traditionally, promotion to Senior General is an essential step to enter the Central Military Commission.
Regarding the political trend, Shen Mingshi believes that various military services and theater commands have not shown a clear stance. If the party elders exert political pressure on Xi Jinping during the “Two Sessions” or the Fifth Plenum, the military’s “silence” could evolve into collective actions, leading to more significant political repercussions. However, if the actions of the elder cadres do not succeed, the various military services and theater commands could gradually openly support Xi’s leadership.
Tang Jingyuan noted that major theater commands or service branch heads have not publicly declared support for Xi Jinping’s decisions on dealing with senior military personnel, indicating that Xi’s control over the military still faces resistance. If the orders of the Central Military Commission are met with passive responses or resistance at the theater and service branch levels, it would indicate an unstable foundation of military authority at the highest leadership level.
He emphasized that in the CCP’s political structure, the top leader’s power ultimately depends on controlling the military. If they cannot control the “gun barrel,” their power base will be challenged. Therefore, whether Xi Jinping can force major theater commands and service branch heads to clearly declare their support, reintegrate military authority will be a key point to observe the CCP’s political trend.