Recent sources close to the Chinese military have indicated to Epoch Times that there have been unusual changes in the day-to-day operations of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It has been noted that the level of involvement of the Vice Chairmen of the CMC in certain affairs has been significantly adjusted, with some tasks previously undertaken or assisted by the Vice Chairmen now being progressed in a manner different from before. Several military insiders have pointed out that the grassroots level has clearly felt the top-level attempts to address this change and fill the operational gaps accordingly.
While these sources did not specify the exact reasons for these adjustments, they emphasized that this operational state is not normal and is gradually becoming apparent following recent developments such as the investigation of individuals like Zhang Yuxia. One informed source told Epoch Times, “From an internal operational perspective, it appears more like a temporary arrangement rather than a formal adjustment at the institutional level.”
Traditionally, within the Chinese Communist military’s operational practices, the Vice Chairmen of the CMC play a crucial role in bridging the gap between the highest decision-making levels and the practical execution systems of the military. They participate in decision discussions at the CMC level while also being responsible for driving implementation within various military branches, theaters, and organizational systems. Over the years, the Vice Chairmen have frequently been seen in important military conferences, theater inspections, and internal mobilization activities, with their public appearances being considered an important signal of the smooth operation of military power.
Mr. Liang, a military scholar specializing in the command structure of the CCP military, analyzed that the operation of power within the Chinese Communist military is not simply about “centralization equals smooth operation.” On the contrary, the more power is highly centralized, the more it requires intermediary levels to share the specific coordinating and executing pressures.
He pointed out that the presence of Vice Chairmen of the CMC is intended to address the issue of the highest level being unable to directly oversee the entire military operation. “The Vice Chairmen are not a decorative position but a functional one, especially during times of instability or systemic adjustments within the military,” he noted.
Public information indicates that the power structure of the CCP’s Central Military Commission has been highly centralized in recent years, yet the Vice Chairmen have not been marginalized as a result. On the contrary, during multiple military reforms and theater adjustments, Vice Chairmen like Zhang Yuxia have often played a crucial role in implementing directives and stabilizing systems.
Following the Zhang Yuxia incident, there have been changes in the presentation of high-level activities of the CMC within CCP military reports. A review of Chinese military websites and publications such as China Military Online, Liberation Army Daily, and China National Defense News reveals that recent public reports have mainly focused on Chairman Xi Jinping’s meetings with foreign dignitaries, with little coverage of other high-level CMC activities. The collective appearances of Vice Chairmen and CMC members have noticeably decreased from past common occasions.
In response, Mr. Liu, a military scholar, told reporters that in a highly centralized command system, public activities serve as an “organizational signal.” He explained, “Who appears and who doesn’t are indications to the military system of where the current focus of power lies.” He further noted that when the Vice Chairmen levels are absent in public events for an extended period, the grassroots find it more challenging to determine the priorities of orders and the boundaries of execution, leading to hesitation and delays.
Political commentator Jin Zhe, speaking on the matter, stated that within the highly centralized command structure of the CCP, the Vice Chairmen of the CMC are not an institutionally “irreplaceable” role. However, their absence-based operation directly affects the rhythm between decision-making and execution. “This doesn’t mean there is a power vacuum within the military, but rather, it concentrates the previously dispersed military pressures on Chairman Xi Jinping and the newly promoted Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin,” Jin remarked.
He added that in practical terms, the habitual work of some grassroots officials still leans towards Zhang Yuxia. “When the original coordination points suddenly fail, the transmission of orders slows down, and the feedback loop is extended.”
He concluded, “A military in such a state is more like a sports car with the engine running but unable to operate at high speed.”
Currently, the Chinese official authorities have yet to provide any explanations regarding the operational state of the CMC. There have been no disclosed institutional adjustment arrangements through official military channels. Several analysts interviewed believe that in the absence of transparent mechanisms, external observers must rely on operational cues and changes in public opinion to assess the actual state of the military power structure.