According to a recent special report released by the Center for Research Security and Integrity (CRSI), between 2019 and 2025, a total of 9.435 billion US dollars in federal research grants flowed to 45 Chinese defense laboratories participating in research projects, resulting in the publication of 313 English-language papers.
This indicates that despite multiple research security policies pushed by the U.S. government, Chinese military research institutions are still able to acquire crucial technologies through academic channels. CRSI suggests that the U.S. should strengthen the scrutiny of “basic research” to further prevent vital research outcomes from being exploited by the Chinese military.
The report analyzed approximately 1,800 academic articles, with 313 clearly indicating U.S. federal funding, covering sensitive subjects such as directed energy systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and high-energy computational physics.
CRSI emphasized in the report: “These are key technological areas that can fundamentally transform future military and combat capabilities, and China’s defense laboratories are directly benefiting from these studies.”
Data shows that nearly 72% of the funding came from the National Science Foundation (NSF). While the agency’s research funds are primarily used for early-stage basic research, the report points out that Chinese entities partnering with them have a clear interest in weapon applications.
Princeton University and the University of Tennessee were singled out as the most frequent U.S. institutions collaborating with Chinese defense laboratories.
The report revealed that researchers from Princeton had jointly published 11 articles with the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), responsible for China’s nuclear weapon development and subsidized by the Department of Energy.
These 11 articles mentioned Princeton receiving donations from the Chinese AI giant iFlytek. The U.S. listed iFlytek on the export control list in 2019, and it remains on the list today.
Additionally, Professor Peter Liaw from the University of Tennessee was identified as the most active scientist collaborating with Chinese defense laboratories. His involvement in 42 papers involved cooperation with the State Key Laboratory of Powder Metallurgy (SKLPM), which has strong connections to China’s atomic bomb and hypersonic weapon programs.
In response to the report, NSF issued a statement acknowledging the importance of balancing scientific collaboration with national security considerations and has increased disclosure requirements for funding recipients regarding foreign collaborations.
A Pentagon spokesperson refrained from directly commenting on the report but mentioned that the Department of Defense is implementing various measures to protect research, including prohibiting funding to entities identified as Chinese military enterprises.
However, when questioned by Bloomberg, the Chinese AI giant iFlytek, which was accused of funding Princeton research, initially denied all allegations and requested specific articles. After Bloomberg provided the report, iFlytek ceased further responses.
The Chinese Embassy in the U.S. claimed that researchers from all countries cooperate to publish papers to “share achievements with the world for the benefit of all.”
CRSI pointed out that the current legal framework’s exemption for “basic research” allows many Chinese entities blacklisted for trade to legally access U.S. technology. To strengthen the protection of America’s research ecosystem, the report proposed the following action plan:
1. Passing the SAFE Research Act: Suggesting that Congress pass this bill to close loopholes allowing unrestricted collaboration with foreign hostile entities and ban federal STEM research funding for individuals partnering with such entities.
2. Establishing the National Research Security, Integrity, and Compliance Center (NRSICC): Establishing a centralized federal agency to unify risk assessment standards across departments, responsible for the review, due diligence, and compliance monitoring of research funding.
3. Expanding the restriction list: Urging the U.S. government to blacklist all 45 Chinese defense laboratories identified in the report to prevent federal funds from flowing to high-risk collaboration partners.
In conclusion, the report emphasized that protecting America’s research achievements not only involves regulatory compliance but also relates to national competitiveness and economic security.