Recently, the Chinese Communist Party has expanded its scrutiny of retired officials, citizens’ passports, and officials with overseas family connections, sparking public concern. Many experts point out that these measures have shifted from traditional anti-corruption efforts to political loyalty and regime security checks, reflecting the authorities’ anxiety about officials defecting or becoming disloyal, highlighting their high level of concern for political stability and power security, while the risk of power struggles is on the rise.
In regions like Hunan, Jiangsu, and Gansu in China, there has been a recent tightening of restrictions on retired officials traveling abroad. The scope of restrictions has expanded from just bureau-level cadres to even department-level or section-level personnel. The way in which retired officials in key positions can travel abroad has also shifted from a simple filing system to a more rigorous approval process, with passports now needing to be kept by the original unit.
According to interviews conducted by Dajiyuan with several insiders in the system, retired officials are still being included in the organizational management system. A retired official in Jiuquan, Gansu, stated that the original restriction for department-level officials of three years post-retirement for travel abroad has now been extended, and even some section-level retired officials now require approval to travel abroad.
A retired official at the deputy department level in Hunan told the media that despite being retired for over three years, he still had to reapply for permission to travel abroad, with the passport needing to be returned two days before departure and handed over again upon return.
Meanwhile, multiple sources informed Dajiyuan that ordinary citizens in regions like Gansu, Guizhou, and Yunnan are also being required to surrender their passports for “centralized safekeeping” and must provide advance notification and reasons for any planned overseas trips.
In addition to retired officials and ordinary citizens, political screening regarding officials’ overseas relationships is also being escalated.
According to a report from the South China Morning Post on February 18, in recent years, Beijing’s oversight has expanded from the traditional concept of “naked officials” to what is referred to as “quasi-naked officials,” which are officials whose children reside overseas while their spouses remain in China.
Insiders say that these officials are now under intense monitoring and are required to report relevant information promptly.
The report cited sources saying that the Communist Party’s Organization Department conducted a nationwide survey in the first half of last year, delving into the overseas relationships of core personnel. Some senior executives of state-owned enterprises and heads of research institutions were reassigned or removed from sensitive positions because their children hold foreign green cards or reside abroad.
The report stated that this “zero tolerance” towards overseas backgrounds has directly led to the interruption of many officials’ careers. Even if there is no direct evidence of corruption on the part of the officials, solely having children with foreign status could result in severe organizational actions.
These measures not only target current officials but also extend to retired officials and employees of institutions. In some regions, retired officials are required to continue surrendering their passports and report their travel plans, reflecting the institutionalization of cross-border movement control.
Professor Sun Guoxiang from the Department of International Affairs and Business at National Huah University in Taiwan expressed to Dajiyuan that the Chinese Communist Party’s rectification efforts have expanded from traditional anti-corruption to the realm of political loyalty and regime security. He noted that the policies targeting previously “naked officials” were mainly aimed at preventing asset flight in the past, but the current measures like those against “quasi-naked officials” are focused on preventing officials from defecting during political turmoil.
Sun Guoxiang’s analysis highlights that the authorities are strengthening control in an attempt to rebind officials and their assets within the system, reducing the risk of systemic dissent in crisis situations.
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies told Dajiyuan that this phenomenon reflects officials’ conflicting positions: “Anti-American policies are for work, while arranging for family to live in America is for personal life.” Many officials enforce anti-American diplomatic policies while concurrently having their children living in Western societies like the United States, suggesting a crisis of trust within the system.
Assistant researcher Wang Xiaowen from the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security Studies further acknowledges that this restructuring reflects the authorities’ heightened anxiety about power security.
She points out that with power concentration, the authorities rely more on political loyalty examinations to ensure control, saying that “the more insecure they feel, the stronger their desire for control,” demonstrating that political security has become a core principle in personnel management.
In fact, the rectification of officials’ overseas relationships has been ongoing for years. A report by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the United States points out that the CCP’s policy towards “naked officials” has gone through three stages: early registration-based management, subsequent promotion restrictions, and in recent years, a comprehensive cleaning phase.
The report indicates that in the early years of Xi Jinping’s presidency, technical bureaucrats with international backgrounds were still seen as important resources. However, in recent years, as political security considerations have intensified, overseas family backgrounds are increasingly viewed as potential risk factors.
The report mentions that some senior officials with international backgrounds have been reassigned or resigned early due to their family’s residence abroad. For example, former central bank governor Yi Gang and several deputy ministerial-level officials were dismissed before reaching retirement age, believed to be related to their overseas family backgrounds.
Additionally, the centralized passport management system has gradually expanded. Since 2014, strict passport management has been implemented for department-level officials, and in recent years has been extended to teachers, employees of institutions, and ordinary citizens, indicating an ongoing expansion of control measures.
Experts generally agree that the core goal of this series of measures is not only anti-corruption but also preventing internal centrifugal tendencies within the system.
Sun Guoxiang states that strengthening exit and asset flow management helps to reduce the risks of officials and assets fleeing abroad but also indicates an increasing emphasis on regime security in governance.
Shen Mingshi believes that officials arranging for family members to live overseas reflects uncertainties about the future environment.
Wang Xiaowen further points out that this governance logic prioritizing political security could drive the system towards a more closed and inward-looking direction, essentially leading to a state of “isolation.”
She notes that Xi Jinping’s continual acceleration of purges fundamentally stems from his extreme insecurity about his own position of power, signaling a fierce power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party in the post-Xi era.