Recently, there has been intense turbulence among senior officials of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and systematic cleansing involving the highest power structure of the military is accelerating. According to sources in Beijing, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia and Commission Member Liu Zhenli have been secretly detained and are currently being held in a highly guarded location in Changping, Beijing, in complete isolation.
Multiple sources have indicated that the preliminary political characterization of Zhang and Liu is not merely about disciplinary violations, but rather they are being accused of “splitting the Central Military Commission,” directly implicating the issue of the Chairman’s responsibility system and the allocation of supreme command authority within the military. In the current political context within the military, such an accusation signifies that the case has been elevated to the highest political level for handling.
It is worth noting that “splitting the party” and “splitting the Central (Committee)” are rare and high-level internal political characterizations within the CCP, usually reserved for defining key figures deemed to pose a substantial threat to the highest power structure. Such characterizations are historically not explicitly stated in public documents but hold decisive power at the internal disciplinary level, with the true political implications typically discerned through subsequent handling. The handling of Zhao Ziyang within the party after 1989 is a classic example of this logic.
Insiders have revealed that the treatment of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli has caused significant shockwaves within the military. Several mid-to-high-ranking military officers have been abruptly asked to halt their vacations, with their scheduled activities canceled, and instructed to “stand by in place.” Simultaneously, the military’s command, propaganda, and political stance systems have been tightened, creating a highly tense atmosphere overall.
According to sources, major military regions and branches of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are currently disseminating the spirit of the so-called “Central Military Commission” through internal versions of the editorial published in the PLA Daily on January 24 under the title “Resolutely Fight and Win the Anti-Corruption Battle in the Military – a Prolonged and Overall Warfare,” demanding that all officers and soldiers maintain “high consistency with the Central Military Commission” in their political stance and actions, without deviating from it.
A military insider pointed out that this method of setting the political tone in advance through editorials from the military commission’s media outlet and imposing a uniform political course of action from the early stages of a case is not commonly seen in recent military crackdowns. Using this as a basis, it can be deduced that the political nature of the cases involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli has been directly determined by the highest decision-making level within the CCP, with the subsequent investigation and handling process leaning more towards executing pre-determined political conclusions.
An analysis by close sources to the military indicates that the focus of the Zhang Youxia case does not primarily revolve around economic issues but centers on the restructuring and reordering of military power structures. The coordinated moves of the military media to set the tone, the highly politicized official announcements, and the rapid circulation of internal documents form a typical “set the tone first, then handle” process aimed at swiftly defining political conclusions and obedience boundaries, limiting the space for discussion within the military.
An analyst pointed out that Zhang Youxia, at the age of 74, does not pose a direct power competition threat to the Chairman of the Military Commission solely based on age structure. The issue lies not in his age but in the influence he represents within the military. Zhang Youxia, with his participation in the Sino-Vietnamese War and long-standing network built within the military, his influence does not solely rely on institutional structures but more on personal qualifications and historical accumulations. This kind of influence has persisted since Xi Jinping took charge of the military and has not been entirely absorbed by the system.
The ongoing 21st National Congress of the CCP and the centenary military parade next year have been brought under focus. According to the current political schedule of the CCP, the 21st National Congress is expected to be held in 2027. Before the Congress on August 1, the CCP will also host the centenary military parade.
Mr. Pan, an analyst, states that the targeting of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, among other heavyweight figures in the military, is not an isolated incident but a politically timed action unfolding around established nodes, indicating that Xi Jinping is eliminating the last remaining independent influential factors within the military, consolidating further centralized control of the military command structure in preparation for the centenary military objectives.
The editorial published by the CCP military newspaper on the 24th indicates that the cases involving Zhang and Liu are not just disciplinary issues within the military but major rectification actions deliberately escalated to a “political struggle” and “ideological issue” height. The publication of the editorial by the PLA Daily, being the media outlet of the Central Military Commission, succinctly articulates the positions at this juncture, carrying strong internal mobilization and political tone-setting implications.
Mr. Pan, familiar with the workings of the CCP’s political, governmental, and military systems, suggests that the title of the editorial from the PLA Daily for the first time equates anti-corruption within the military with a “war of positions, a long war, and a total war,” where the combined terms are not rhetorical embellishments but an explicit judgment on the phase characteristics of the ongoing anti-corruption drive within the military. He highlights that the term “war of positions” targets the high levels where the purge candidates are positioned, with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli holding key roles in the military power structure.
Mr. Pan explains that the term “long war” signifies that this cleansing round is not just a short-term operation but a systematic inspection of existing power networks and interest chains within the military regarding the procurement field. He emphasizes that mentioning “the deeper you dig, the less corrupt is not a mere antithesis but implies the CCP’s anticipation of deeper-rooted issues surfacing during the anti-corruption drive and the political readiness for long-term advancement.
Deeming the term “total war” particularly significant, Mr. Pan underscores that anti-corruption is now viewed beyond individual corrupt acts, but defined as a comprehensive struggle encompassing political loyalty, organizational lines, command systems, and the Chairman’s responsibility system within the Military Commission. This explains the numerous highly politicized expressions in the editorial, such as “political army construction,” “absolute leadership,” and “the foundation of governance.”
Mr. Chen, a second-generation “Red” growing up in the military system, sheds light on the deeply entrenched corruption issues within the military. He mentioned that the military has been a focal point of CCP corruption due to its highly closed and insulated nature, with the military affairs being outside the jurisdiction of the public legal system. He stated that during the early stages of the “Reform and Opening-Up,” the military was heavily involved in smuggling activities, with military-plated vehicles becoming untouchable by local law enforcement. He added that, “It can be said that the PLA, in a certain sense, pioneered smuggling, with local authorities refraining from investigation.”
Mr. Chen revealed that corruption issues surrounding military procurement have persistently plagued the military for over a decade. He mentions that before Zhang Youxia was promoted, the Military Discipline Commission was aware of his corrupt activities, indicating that “corruption is not an issue when you need them, disloyalty is the issue, or rather, being suspected of disloyalty is the real issue.”