On January 24th, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department, Liu Zhenli, were announced to be under investigation for serious violations of discipline and law. The official Xinhua News Agency’s “Liberation Army Daily” editorial characterized this as a significant development, using terms like “severely trampling and undermining the Chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission,” which has drawn attention.
Analysis by three political commentators on the “Good Morning China” program pointed out that this event appears to be a sudden political coup, as the official terminology used in the announcement suggests that Xi Jinping has long been sidelined. The failure of the old guard within the Party to facilitate a smooth transition has led to the incident where Ma Xingrui’s investigation touched upon Xi’s core interests, prompting a radical backlash. The event has exposed the collapse of trust within the Party, paralysis in the military command system, and a potential future of large-scale purges, but the system might veer towards exhaustion rather than a drastic collapse.
In their analyses, the commentators provided different perspectives regarding the announcement of the investigation into Zhang and Liu.
Commentator Tang Jingyuan highlighted the intensity of the language used in the official report, particularly the addition of the word “trampling,” suggesting a severe undermining of Xi Jinping’s authority. He interpreted phrases like “seriously aiding the influence of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and harming the Party’s governing foundation” as having deeper implications, hinting at hidden agendas and further significant figures involved.
Tang also emphasized the critical role of the Ma Xingrui incident, indicating that his arrest had triggered a strong sense of crisis within Xi Jinping’s team, leading to potential repercussions for other officials closely associated with him.
From a power-play perspective, commentator Qin Peng analyzed that Zhang Youxia’s failure to take decisive action when in a position of relative advantage was crucial to his downfall. He noted that a faction of the old guard had favored a smooth transfer of power through delaying tactics since the Fourth Plenary Session last year, aiming for Xi Jinping to step down smoothly before the next Party Congress. However, this advantage held by Zhang did not result in structural changes, setting the stage for a reversal of fortunes.
Qin Peng believed that the strategy of a “smooth transition” was impractical in reality, providing room for Xi Jinping to counterattack.
Observers viewed Ma Xingrui’s investigation as a significant turning point in the current power play.
Qin Peng analyzed that Ma Xingrui’s close ties to Xi Jinping and his family political network created a sense of “all bets are off,” prompting Xi to adopt a more aggressive response strategy in light of the crisis.
Regarding the timing and method of the arrests, Tang Jingyuan speculated that the events likely occurred during an expanded disciplinary committee meeting on January 16, rather than the official announcement on January 20. He compared the arrest method to historical incidents like the “Huai Ren Tang coup,” where the element of surprise was utilized by taking advantage of routine meetings to catch the target off guard.
He further elaborated on the potential method of arrest, suggesting that Zhang Youxia might have been detained in a public location like the Central Party School, where a small number of plainclothes individuals could easily control an elderly person without their security detail.
Qin Peng added that the arrest operation likely relied on existing security and protection systems. Specialized security forces and the Central Guard system played crucial roles in the day-to-day security and scheduling of high-ranking officials, but under a highly centralized security structure, these mechanisms could become limiting factors for the individuals involved.
After the events unfolded, abnormalities emerged in the Chinese Communist Party’s military command system. Tang Jingyuan disclosed that the original system of the Joint Staff Headquarters meeting had been abolished, replaced by direct instructions from the Central Military Commission through encrypted telegrams to various military regions. Troops nationwide were ordered to stand by, elevate their alert levels, surrender ammunition and phones, and engage in political studies, purportedly to maintain stability but likely to prevent further insubordination.
Quoting a report from The Wall Street Journal, Qin Peng mentioned that during the period of Xi Jinping’s sidelining by Zhang Youxia, thousands of military officers were promoted. These officers, closely associated with Zhang, faced limited options in the future, such as marginalization, early retirement, or being held accountable due to anti-corruption measures.
Tang Jingyuan anticipated the largest scale military purge in CCP history. He suggested that Xi Jinping would need to replace all personnel installed by Zhang with his own loyalists, presenting a monumental task. These individuals would either face dismissal and potential incarceration or rebel against the restructuring.
However, Tang expressed doubt about the military’s resistance capacity, questioning whether years of political indoctrination and anti-corruption campaigns had eroded the individual integrity of many within the ranks.
Qin Peng compared Zhang Youxia’s predicament to that of Prigogine of the Wagner Group in Russia, perceiving both figures to have chosen concession at critical junctures, thereby losing their initiative. He argued that under highly centralized systems of power, leadership transitions were more likely to hinge on internal maneuvering and timing than overt confrontations.
He further pointed out that without clear unified action, the conditions for a large-scale counteroffensive were not fully present.
Experienced political commentator Shi Shan presented a nuanced perspective on the systemic impact of the incident, emphasizing the core disruption to the trust among different factions within the CCP, rather than a question of a military coup or societal trust in the regime.
Shi suggested that any political system’s functioning relied on a minimum level of internal trust. The rupture of such trust among different power groups within the CCP undermined the system’s operational efficiency.
He argued that even without direct confrontations or rebellions, a system could falter due to malfunctioning decision-making and paralyzed execution.
While analyzing potential future developments, Shi Shan recalled the handling of the Lin Biao incident in 1971. At that time, the central authorities opted for a gradual adjustment over several years instead of quick purges to avoid triggering more significant instability.
Shi Shan believed that current circumstances bore some similarities to the past, highlighting the high risks associated with rapid, large-scale purges within the military system.
He further analyzed that Xi Jinping’s current situation differed significantly from Mao Zedong’s following the Lin Biao incident. While Mao still possessed considerable personal prestige post-Lin Biao, Xi Jinping’s foundation of authority within the military and bureaucratic systems was relatively weaker, constraining his operational maneuverability. Consequently, any forthcoming rectification actions were more likely to proceed incrementally and in stages.
Regarding future prospects, Shi Shan did not foresee significant turmoil in the short term. He predicted a gradual descent into a state of dysfunction for the system due to the lack of trust, internal resource depletion, and widespread passive responses.
He contended that the primary risk to the current system lay not in open resistance but in general apathy. Should officials at all levels choose to evade responsibilities and remain passive, the system would gradually lose its capacity for self-repair.
Tang Jingyuan likened the current situation to the Lin Biao incident, suggesting that the impact on the CCP regime was as significant as the “September Ninth Incident” in 1971. He highlighted the challenge Xi Jinping faced, with individuals he personally promoted and trusted within the military system now turning against him and successfully subverting his authority.
Tang concluded that this was not merely about anti-corruption measures but a political upheaval. While Xi Jinping might seem outwardly victorious, his actual power was exceedingly fragile and chaotic. The power play among the top CCP echelons was still up in the air.
All three commentators agreed that 2026 could be a pivotal year for significant changes in the CCP’s political landscape, with the current events likely marking just the beginning of this process.