【Epoch Times January 28, 2026】(Epoch Times contributor Yokogawa News Analysis)
Xi Jinping’s arrest of Zhang Youxia has sparked various hypotheses, with Taiwan being a main thread that connects most of them.
Over the past weekend, social media and public opinion suddenly shifted focus to China. On January 24th, the official website of the Ministry of National Defense of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced that the CCP Central Committee had decided to investigate Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of General Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, Liu Zhenli, for alleged “serious violations of discipline and law.” However, the official announcement did not specify the exact charges.
Prior to this, on January 19-20: Zhang Youxia was absent from the opening ceremony of a special seminar for provincial and ministerial-level cadres at the CCP Central Party School hosted by Xi Jinping, which immediately sparked rumors on overseas social media and X platform of “Zhang Youxia being arrested” or “falling from power.” The rumors quickly spread, including claims of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and Zhong Shaojun being arrested simultaneously, with their families being raided. The arrests were reportedly carried out by the Central Guard Bureau.
This incident marks the peak of the military purge from 2025 to 2026, and is one of the few major events of the highest-level power struggle within the CCP since its inception, comparable only to the events of Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution and the arrest of the Gang of Four marking the end of the Cultural Revolution.
Why did Xi Jinping arrest Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli? This is a very unusual phenomenon. Because the CCP has an unwritten rule, which is not to touch the top leadership unless absolutely necessary, usually referring to central state-level officials. And from the time the news leaked to the announcement, it was only 3-4 days, the shortest time in the military purge.
This indirectly confirms that at some point over the past year, Xi Jinping had partially lost power, but successfully retaliated. The arrest indicates that from Xi Jinping’s perspective, this action was necessary. If power balance is equal or if he has absolute advantage, there would be no need to go to such lengths.
Why was the announcement made so quickly? It indicates that the threat posed was not just from an individual, but from a faction, requiring the rapid psychological dissolution of the opponent’s camp. The announcement is a message to the allies and party members of the opposition, signaling that the matter is over, and resistance is futile.
One example is when Asia Television insisted on announcing Jiang Zemin’s death, only to admit it was fake news the next day. Within such a short time, many key figures from the Jiang faction immediately expressed loyalty to the Hu Jintao faction, and once the false news was known, there was no turning back, effectively dispersing the Jiang faction.
Another point to note is that corruption is not the main issue here; the primary concern is power struggle. The most crucial accusation in the People’s Liberation Army Daily editorial on that day was the violation of “seriously trampling and sabotaging the Chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission,” indicating an attempt to marginalize or undermine Xi Jinping, or seize his power, rather than accusing him of corruption.
What exactly transpired between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia? Various common speculations or possibilities are as follows:
One is the “revenge theory.” According to this theory, there have been rumors that Xi Jinping suffered a stroke or health issues around the time of the Third Plenum, and that the older generation, along with Zhang Youxia, took the opportunity to undermine Xi Jinping. This theory suggests that the older generation and Zhang Youxia possibly even forced Xi Jinping’s hand.
After Xi Jinping recovered, he gradually reorganized his own power, and when the time was ripe, he launched a fatal blow. Personally, I am more inclined toward this theory.
Although the official channels have never admitted that Xi Jinping’s power faced issues, there have been some hints. The most peculiar aspect of the 20th Third Plenum was the release of a lengthy article by Xinhua News Agency titled “Reformer Xi Jinping,” which was taken down a day later. Xi Jinping has positioned himself on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, with all three credited for leading China to “stand up,” “become prosperous,” and “become strong.” Calling him a reformer, however, placed him back in Deng Xiaoping’s shadow, which was seen as an insult, and consequently, the article was removed, indicating that Xi Jinping had indeed faced something he could not control.
This explanation can elucidate the serious charge against Zhang Youxia in the People’s Liberation Army Daily editorial, of “seriously trampling and sabotaging the Chairman’s responsibility system of the Military Commission.” This is the most serious accusation levelled against any top military leader purged so far.
Of course, this theory raises questions about Zhang Youxia’s motive in participating in the actions of the older generation. The most likely reason being that prior to this, he had been involved in purging the Rocket Force and Equipment Development Department.
Zhang Youxia served as Minister of General Equipment Department since 2012 and continued as Minister of the Equipment Development Department after military reform until September 2017, for a full five years, making it certain that he would be implicated. Moreover, he had already been under investigation since 2023. For self-preservation, he would not rebel outright, but strategically joining the older generation aligns with his interests. The motive of the older generation, on the other hand, was likely to prevent Xi Jinping from undoing all the achievements of reform and opening up. This assumption provides a plausible explanation for Xi Jinping’s deep animosity toward Zhang and his subsequent actions.
The second possibility is the “jealousy theory.” After taking office in 2012, Xi Jinping used the anti-corruption campaign to eliminate the Jiang and Tuan factions, a move to solidify his own position and avoid Hu Jintao’s fate of being a puppet leader behind the scenes, following the unwritten rules of the CCP.
However, the purge of the other two circles did not seem necessary but can explain his character. All the designated or potential successors he had were eliminated because any successor was deemed a threat in the eyes of a lifelong autocrat. By removing all potential successors, Xi was basically paving the way for extending his term in office. Similarly, the “crown prince party,” including figures like Liu Yuan and Wang Qishan, were disposed of once they served their purpose in assisting his anti-corruption efforts.
From this perspective, Zhang Youxia, serving as a member of the “crown prince party” with combat experience as a top military leader, posed a threat to Xi Jinping just by his mere existence.
The third theory is the “failed coup theory.” This theory suggests that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli attempted a coup but were foiled due to being betrayed. In reality, the feasibility of this theory is exceptionally low, as no general could mobilize troops in Beijing to counter the Central Guard Bureau. The security of national-level and a few vice-national-level officials is managed by the Central Guard Bureau, and any attempt to challenge it would be futile.
Zhang Youxia has connections and friends among senior military leaders, but he could not challenge the Central Guard Bureau. Although the Joint Staff Department, led by Liu Zhenli, oversees the Central Guard Bureau, the actual power of mobilization lies with the General Office, under Cai Qi.
Just like Wang Dongxing in the past, who was able to mobilize the Central Guard in apprehending the Gang of Four because he was the head of the General Office. Both Cai Qi and Zhou Hongxu, the Director of the Central Guard Bureau, naturally held absolute advantages in the chain of command since disobeying external commands meant rebellion, which historically led to severe punishments.
While a military rebellion and a political coup by the Central Guard Bureau are distinct, Zhou Yongkang was an exception because he had control over the People’s Armed Police, a military force, though mobilization was overseen by the Ministry of Public Security and the Central Politics and Law Commission, exploiting a flaw in the system. This is why Xi Jinping brought the People’s Armed Police back under the Central Military Commission’s management.
Since the senior officials do not control the Central Guard Bureau, how could they sideline Xi Jinping? There is only one circumstance under which this could happen: if Xi temporarily lost ability, such as due to a stroke, leading to an emergency expanded meeting of the Political Bureau or Standing Committee inviting older generation members. Any interim resolutions made at this meeting would need to be followed by Xi Jinping, until he could use the opportunity to counterattack with the Central Guard Bureau. Therefore, if Xi Jinping was once sidelined, it would not be considered a coup but rather a procedure adhering to party regulations.
Strictly speaking, Xi Jinping’s arrest of Zhang Youxia could be considered a coup as it did not follow the CCP’s established procedures. Who decided to arrest Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli? The announcement specified the CCP Central Committee. The term “CCP Central Committee” is quite vague, encompassing the Central Committee, the Political Bureau during recess, or the Political Bureau Standing Committee. Why was the specific level of the decision-making body not clarified? Because it was more of a coup, there were no formal meetings or decisions, hence it was simply attributed to the CCP Central Committee.
The convening of the provincial and ministerial-level officials could be seen as galvanizing officials from various provinces in Beijing. Similarly, after the arrest of the “Gang of Four,” major provincial and municipal officials were summoned to Beijing for consultation, with Ma Tianshui representing Beijing. The appointment of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman is approved by the Central Conference of the CCP and negotiated by the CMC, targeting two top officials at once this time, even if there was a vote within the CMC, it would result in a deadlock, hence this qualifies as a coup.
Regarding Taiwan – this theory suggests that Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping had a conflict over the issue of reunifying Taiwan. Zhang Youxia argued from multiple aspects such as military strategy, equipment, joint operations, and combat capabilities that the current People’s Liberation Army was not yet ready for an attack on Taiwan, directly contradicting Xi Jinping’s objectives.
Former US Department of Defense official in charge of China, Taiwan, and Mongolia affairs, Drew Thompson, who received Zhang Youxia during his visit to the US, stated, “I believe he is the only active-duty PLA officer who can provide Xi Jinping with the best and most objective advice on PLA military capabilities (including its shortcomings), as well as the critical military risks and costs of personnel casualties in military conflicts. I think he can objectively evaluate the military capabilities of the US and Taiwan and explain to Xi Jinping the military risks and costs of taking Taiwan.”
This could also be another significant reason why Xi Jinping could not tolerate Zhang Youxia.
In fact, the entire sequence of events ties back to Taiwan from beginning to end. Xi Jinping’s “rise strong” narrative needed a concrete event to demonstrate, which was the unification of Taiwan. Hence, the exposure of corruption within the Rocket Force and Equipment Development Department, which instigated the initial conflict with Zhang Youxia. Their opposition on Taiwan’s strategic approach not only led to their clash but also impacted the CCP’s actual strategy and military strength post the mass purge.
Currently, the Central Military Commission is left with just two individuals – Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin, neither having experienced wielding weapons. While most generals have not seen actual combat, except for Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, who were recently purged.
Disrupting the existing military command system on such a large scale undoubtedly diminishes the combat readiness of the military, because seizing Taiwan requires seamless coordination among various branches, akin to a complex system project. The demand for integrating various military branches surpasses that of the US military’s mission to capture Maduro, highlighting the need for a duration of three to five, ten, or even more years of harmonization.
It’s not that Xi Jinping is averse to taking risks but the stakes are too high. The CCP’s military is designed to preserve power rather than prepare for external warfare, with loyalty taking precedence over professionalism. However, with no official knowing how to demonstrate loyalty, it brings about a beneficial flattening effect. Xi Jinping’s attempt to reshape the military for Taiwan poses a significant threat to many people’s vested interests.
As for the Wall Street Journal’s report on leaking nuclear secrets, it lacks credibility. Setting aside whether Zhang Youxia had access to or any motive to leak nuclear secrets, the scenario is far-fetched. Leaking such information requires either pursuit of fame, fortune, or a specific stance, and being the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, no one could offer him more prestige. And if he is motivated by wealth, then he must be affluent, and no amount of money could persuade him to forsake his existing wealth. If he is not that wealthy, it indicates he isn’t greedy, making it hard to bribe him. Additionally, an idealistic motive such as pursuit of democracy and freedom is even less plausible. External leaks from high-ranking CCP officials are usually purposeful and not something journalists can easily access.
An odd phenomenon in this case is that none of the military regions or commanders hastily expressed support for the party’s central decision, almost none made any statement. Normally, after the case is publicized, public expressions of solidarity are required. The last time provinces and municipalities hesitated to express their stance was before the crackdown on the June Fourth Incident in 1989. When all provinces and municipalities were in a wait-and-see mode, Jiang Zemin took unilateral action to suppress the movement, impressing the older generation.
The consequences that Xi Jinping has brought about are distrust – he does not trust anyone, and no one trusts him, not even those newly promoted by him. There is a certain code of conduct when dealing with opponents; otherwise, even his own team cannot coalesce, and not knowing what is right leads to a lack of loyalty.
This coup is a muddled affair. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s website retracted the statement after publication. Why? Because the investigation and arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were not executed by the CCDI – they did not want to take responsibility for this action. Throughout the whole process, not a single authoritative department stepped up to claim credit for the operation.
This event marks a milestone in the CCP’s path to collapse. Power and prestige do not always align, as Xi Jinping has acquired unchallenged power but suffered a significant loss of prestige. This poses a danger to Xi Jinping himself, as he is unsure of where the next blow will come from. The excessive concentration of personal power indicates a diminishing role of the CCP system.
This could be a prelude to the downfall of the dynasty. By arresting Zhang Youxia, Xi Jinping has essentially eliminated the last internal resistance attempting to save the CCP. When all other reforms have failed, abandoning the CCP becomes the only way out.