On January 12, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, breaking away from the repetitive narrative of “overwhelming victory in the fight against corruption and comprehensive consolidation”. Instead, he stated that “the fight against corruption is a major battle that cannot be lost and must not be lost.”
After 13 years of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, why is the focus not on how to win the fight against corruption and achieve even greater victories, but rather on the idea that “losing in the fight against corruption is not an option”?
The harsh reality facing Xi and the hundreds of millions of Chinese people is that the Communist Party’s anti-corruption efforts are leading to even more corruption.
In 2025, there were at least three key indicators showing an increase in corruption within the Communist Party:
In 2025, it was the year when many top generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping were dismissed from their positions. The most notable case was the simultaneous expulsion from the Party and military service, and transfer for judicial trial of 9 top generals including He Weidong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, whom Xi personally promoted at an accelerated pace.
In 2025, at least 22 top generals were unofficially removed from office or “disappeared”. Some of them are: Xu Xueqiang, Minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission; Xu Qiling, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Military Commission; Chang Dingqiu, Commander of the Air Force; Guo Pukao, Political Commissar of the Air Force; Ma Xiaotian, former Commander of the Air Force; Han Weiguo, former Commander of the Army; Li Qiaoming, Commander of the Army; among others.
Xi Jinping, who has been in power for 13 years, has seen almost all active generals fall. As each top general falls, a group of major generals and brigadier generals also fall. How many major generals and brigadier generals have fallen? The Chinese Communist Party dare not disclose this information publicly.
The fall of so many high-ranking military leaders is not only a rare phenomenon in the 98-year history of the Communist Party’s military, but also a rare occurrence in the history of military forces worldwide.
The mid-level cadres are appointed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, including all officials above the vice-ministerial level and some officials at the bureau level.
In 2025, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that 65 mid-level cadres were under investigation, the highest number since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. This number does not include senior military officials.
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection once announced that from January to September 2025, 90 provincial and ministerial-level officials were under investigation. Therefore, including non-military mid-level cadres investigated in October to December, a total of 111 mid-level cadres were under investigation in 2025. This number also breaks the historical record of mid-level cadres investigated since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
Moreover, this number also breaks the historical record of investigated mid-level cadres over the past 40 years of reform and opening up in the Communist Party of China.
In 2025, at least 31 corrupt officials with assets of at least one billion yuan were sentenced, the highest number since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. These corrupt officials had embezzled huge sums of money and were sentenced to various durations, including life imprisonment and the death penalty.
These corrupt officials do not include senior military officials. The reason the Communist Party of China dares not disclose the corruption amounts of senior military officials may be because their corruption far exceeds that of the aforementioned corrupt officials, and they fear that disclosing this information may lead to rebellion among military personnel.
Looking around the world, apart from mainland China, is there any other country or region where so many corrupt officials with assets of at least one billion yuan are sentenced in a single year?
As early as January 2013, when Xi Jinping launched the anti-corruption campaign at the Second Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, he stated that “power must be caged by the system.” By February 2025, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Xi reiterated the need to “cage power with the system.”
However, the key to the increasing corruption within the Communist Party of China lies in the fact that while the leaders of the Party claim to “cage power within the system,” they are actually reluctant to do so. Why is this the case? Let’s take a look at the following three points:
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, which lasted for ten years, An Ziwen, former Minister of the Organization Department of the Communist Party of China, returned to Beijing from his exile and met with Bao Tong, asking, “Who will supervise Mao Zedong?”
It has been 49 years since the end of the Cultural Revolution. For the Communist Party of China, who will supervise the highest leader of the party? This fundamental institutional question remains unresolved.
The Communist Party of China has two key documents on anti-corruption efforts: “Party’s work style and clean government responsibilities system” and “Responsibility system for promoting officials with existing health issues.”
According to these two documents, Xi Jinping, as the highest leader of the Communist Party and government, is the first person responsible for the party’s work style and clean government construction, as well as the first person responsible for the promotion of officials with existing health issues.
Based on these two systems, as corruption within the Communist Party increases, Xi must bear the first responsibility for failing in party’s work style and clean government construction and for promoting officials with existing health issues.
Up to now, has Xi Jinping publicly admitted to the responsibilities he must bear according to the above two “first responsibilities”? Despite scouring all reports in the Communist Party’s official media, not a single statement of self-criticism from Xi Jinping can be found.
If Xi himself doesn’t follow the above two responsibility systems, does the Communist Party have practical systems in place to hold Xi accountable for violations of party discipline, government discipline, or legal responsibilities?
The answer is: no.
The lack of institutional guarantees for supervising the highest leader of the Communist Party of China is the biggest institutional loophole in the anti-corruption efforts of the Communist Party. Without addressing this key issue, the fight against corruption by the Communist Party is superficial and will only lead to more corruption.
Looking at the world, countries and regions that have relatively well-resolved corruption issues among officials mostly have implemented the system of declaring and disclosing the assets of officials.
The system of declaring and disclosing officials’ assets has three key elements: first, officials voluntarily declare their assets; second, the public has strong oversight rights over the declarations of officials and can immediately report any falsifications; third, there are strong supervisory bodies to investigate cases of false declarations or reports of falsification.
Does the Communist Party of China know that the system of declaring and disclosing officials’ assets is fundamental to combating corruption? The answer is: yes. As early as 1988, at the “two sessions” of the Communist Party of China, a delegate raised a legislative motion regarding the declaration of public servants’ assets. In 1994, the 8th NPC Standing Committee formally included the “Property Reporting Law” in the legislative plan.
However, today, 31 years later, the Communist Party of China still has not enacted the Law on the Declaration and Disclosure of Assets of Officials.
Why?
Xi Jinping has investigated at least 200 generals in his 13 years in power but has not publicly disclosed the specific amounts of corruption of any of them.
If the Communist Party truly wants to combat corruption, it should actively and consciously establish and implement relevant systems for the supervision of the highest leader of the party, the declaration and disclosure of officials’ assets, and the legal oversight of the media in accordance with the law.
However, to this day, after 76 years of Communist Party rule, these three fundamental anti-corruption measures have not made any progress and may have even regressed, or they have intentionally not been legislated. The Communist Party refuses to implement these oversight systems, showing that it has no real intention of caging power within the system. The Communist Party’s claim to “cage power within the system” is merely self-deception.
One effective way to combat corruption is to have a robust system of media oversight. News media expose, track, and investigate corruption cases, which is what corrupt officials fear most. However, to this day, the Communist Party has prevented the media from supervising corruption cases and has concealed, covered up, and concealed again when such cases arise.
Since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, no media have openly exposed major corruption cases within the military, from the Rocket Force scandal, to the Equipment System scandal of the Military Commission, to the case of Miao Hua, the Political Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission, and the case of He Weidong, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, as well as cases in the navy, army, air force, missile force, armed police forces, and other military units.
When it comes to these major cases, before they occur, did any media publicly expose them? No. After the cases are exposed, are there any follow-up reports? No. Are there any in-depth investigations? No.
The Communist Party has continued to cover up and conceal these major cases.
According to my preliminary analysis, since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China, 35 generals have been officially investigated, including 16 generals, 15 major generals, and 4 brigadier generals.
Of these cases, only two severely violated discipline and law, and the authorities authorized Xinhua News Agency to report on them when they were expelled from the Party. These two generals are: Li Shangfu, former member of the Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense, and Wei Fenghe, former member of the Central Military Commission, State Councilor, and Minister of National Defense.
The official report from the Central Military Commission’s spokesperson on the expulsion of He Weidong and nine others from the Party amounts to a mere 44 words: “After investigation, these 9 individuals have seriously violated party discipline, are suspected of serious criminal offenses in the performance of their duties, with particularly huge amounts involved and extremely serious nature, leading to extremely negative impact.”
Regarding Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were there any effective media supervision before they were arrested? Practically none. After their arrest, apart from the authorities publishing a tiny bit of information, there were no reports by the media conducting lawful oversight.
The Communist Party upholds its media as being loyal to the party, turning the media into a mouthpiece for the ruling Communist officials and completely failing to perform its function of public oversight.
If the Communist Party truly intends to combat corruption, it should proactively establish and enforce these supervision systems, including oversight of the highest leader of the Communist Party, the declaration and disclosure of officials’ assets, and the lawful supervision of the media.
However, to this day, after 76 years of Communist rule, these fundamental anti-corruption measures have not made any progress, but have instead stagnated (Mao Zedong even hypocritically engaged in self-criticism; has Xi Jinping ever engaged in self-criticism?), or intentionally avoided legislation, or turned them into nothing.
How can the Communist Party’s “anti-corruption” efforts achieve real results? How can they not lead to more corruption?
This text is a translation and rewrite of an article.