Despite mortgage interest rates in the United States still hovering above 6%, the local real estate market is somewhat subdued. However, there is one group of foreign buyers from a particular country who are fervently investing in U.S. properties. Over the past year, the amount of money invested in real estate has surged by over 80%, making them the largest group of foreign buyers, more than doubling the second-largest group. Today, I will delve into this powerhouse of real estate buyers and explore why they are so keen on buying U.S. properties. Meanwhile, why are more and more states in the U.S. facing resistance? What is causing this situation, and how should we address this awkward scenario?
Revealing the answer: From April 2024 to March 2025, Chinese buyers purchased approximately $13.7 billion worth of existing residential properties in the U.S., marking an 83% year-on-year increase. Their investments are primarily concentrated in states like California, New York, and Florida, with many transactions conducted in cash. According to statistics from the National Association of Realtors, the second-largest buyer, Canada, only spent $6.2 billion, followed by Mexico at $4.4 billion, India at $2.2 billion, and the UK at $2 billion. Foreign buyers collectively acquired properties worth about $56 billion, with Chinese buyers alone accounting for over 24%.
Within the Chinese community, there is now a concern about being too aggressive in purchasing, fearing being scapegoated and triggering more restrictive buying laws. At the same time, discussions are happening about whether the influx of Chinese capital will drive up housing prices in certain Chinese-populated cities like Los Angeles, the Bay Area, Seattle, New York, and New Jersey. For those looking to buy for personal use, they may find themselves competing with a significant number of cash buyers.
Let’s first discuss why Chinese nationals are heavily investing in U.S. properties. This can be divided into two main factors: the “push factors in China,” internal elements within China pushing capital and demand outward, and the attractiveness of U.S. assets, which still draw a large number of foreign investors.
To put it simply, the first part revolves around “uncertainty in Chinese policies and institutional risks,” which are significant drivers for overseas property purchases, used as a hedge against political and policy risks.
In addition to policy and institutional risks, there is the credit bankruptcy in the Chinese property market. Following high leverage and overinvestment in the Chinese real estate sector, widespread defaults and pressure have emerged since 2021. This has prompted some asset holders to seek diversification “outside the Chinese property market” to prevent excessive concentration of assets domestically.
It can be said that the crisis in the Chinese property market today is not a result of a single event but rather a chain reaction of imbalances from the demand side, supply side, funding side to local finances: “price downturn + transaction cooling + developer credit risks + slow inventory digestion + municipal financial hemorrhage.”
Starting with the price crisis, according to official Chinese statistics (which are often falsified by the Communist Party, hence must be taken with caution), new housing prices are still declining: about -0.4% month-on-month and approximately -2.4% year-on-year in November 2025. More concerning are existing home prices: in November 2025, second-hand home prices fell by 0.94% month-on-month, still expanding. In first-tier cities, the year-on-year decline for existing residential properties was 5.8% (1.4 percentage points larger decline compared to the previous month), indicating increased selling pressure and more visible buyer hesitancy.
The transaction and investment crisis indicates a continuous contraction in sales, construction starts, and investments. For the first 11 months of 2025, various indicators are weakening, with real estate investments, sales area, and new construction all declining (with investments and new starts showing substantial year-on-year decreases).
The developer credit crisis is evident through “life-support-style extensions.” For instance, Evergrande (once considered relatively stable) is facing pressures to extend and avoid default on domestic debts, reflecting tight financing conditions. Major private real estate developers are still restructuring and negotiating, with companies like Country Garden advancing the restructuring of offshore debts, filing for recognition of its Hong Kong restructuring plan in the U.S. courts under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code to handle around $11 billion in debt.
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The issue here is not just about owing money, but rather the traditional model of developers (high turnover, pre-sales for expansion support) failing in a downturn, leading to insufficient cash flow to cover maturing debts; financing avenues contracting; only being able to use “restructuring” to gain time, change interest rates, and reduce debts.
Then why did Country Garden seek debt restructuring and recognition in the U.S.? This typically aims to ensure that the Hong Kong reorganization plan is respected under U.S. jurisdiction, preventing creditors from seeking separate litigations in the U.S. that could disrupt the overall plan. Therefore, this does not necessarily indicate Country Garden entering into liquidation proceedings in the U.S.
Based on publicly available information, Country Garden is concentrating on “debt restructuring and reorganization” at present, without moving into “bankruptcy liquidation (being wound up).” However, it is still facing liquidation requests in Hong Kong. If the restructuring efforts fail, the company may eventually move towards liquidation and dissolution.
Next is the inventory crisis, where the unsold properties are abundant, leading to extended “liquidation periods.” Policies are now focusing on “clearing inventory”: reports suggest that in some cities, liquidation periods (estimated based on inventory sales) are significantly longer than usual. Official actions include curbs on new land supply and the conversion of purchased inventory homes into affordable housing to reduce inventory.
Additionally, there is a crisis in local finances: shrinking land sales revenue, impeding infrastructure and debt handling. A slump in the real estate market directly impacts local “land sale revenue” and related taxes, worsening local debt pressures; this is why the central government is cautious about stabilizing the property market without overly stimulating it to inflate bubbles.
According to a recent report by Reuters, the crisis in the Chinese property market is a significant factor exacerbating consumption decline and increasing deflationary pressures, as real estate accounts for a substantial portion of residents’ wealth, and the declining market weakens Chinese consumers’ purchasing power.
In comparison, the allure of the U.S. real estate market to the Chinese is widely known, even though the American market is currently undergoing adjustments. The structural differences between the U.S. and Chinese market meltdowns are stark. U.S. properties are still considered secure global assets, offering advantages such as well-established systems, market transparency, and predictable pricing.
Interestingly, amid the current tense relations between the U.S. and China, where President Trump often touted his good relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping, various U.S. policies are aimed at curbing Chinese investments, demanding local manufacturing, imposing high tariffs, restricting exports of high-end chips to China, and sanctioning Chinese officials and government. Despite this, Chinese nationals are fervently investing in U.S. properties in 2025.
Naturally, these facts may not sit well with many, but the reality is that Chinese individuals with the means are urgently moving their capital out of China, ensuring a safety net overseas or simply putting down roots abroad. Even if domestic property prices in China are unfavourable, selling becomes a necessity, with concerns about finding “buyers” persisting.
For the general public, the true risk may not necessarily lie in “declining book prices” but in “liquidity breakdown.” When in need of funds or wanting to liquidate a property, it becomes challenging to sell within a reasonable time and at a reasonable discount. Phrases like “missing buyers,” “collective buyer passivity,” “only toughing it out,” and “massive price cuts” are not just casual remarks by Chinese netizens but are actual experiences of struggle and distress.
However, acquiring property in the current U.S. market is not as straightforward as one desires. Although there is a significant number of capable Chinese buyers (most Chinese property buyers in the U.S. use cash), the challenge lies in the federal and state legislative “counterforces.”
In November 2025, the Federal Appeals Court ruled that Florida could enforce the 2023 law (SB 264) limiting property purchases by Chinese nationals. Anyone with a “domicile in China,” not a U.S. citizen or green card holder, is restricted from buying real estate, with very few exceptions.
These exceptions are narrow: buyers, classified as having a “domicile in China,” must hold a “non-tourist” U.S. visa (such as F-1, H-1B, L-1, among others) or have been granted asylum in the United States. They can only purchase one residential property, recorded under the buyer’s visa holder’s name, with a land area limit of 2 acres. Locations are restricted from military facilities or within a 5-mile radius of such establishments.
Furthermore, in Texas, beginning September 2025, SB 17 was enacted, prohibiting individuals and entities associated with “hostile nations” such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, from purchasing most real estate, including residential and commercial properties. Only those meeting specific legal and residency conditions are exempted.
The exemption in Texas is similar to Florida’s, with slight differences. Texas defines the exception as individuals establishing a “true, fixed, and permanent home and principal residence,” intending to return whenever absent. Texas places emphasis on a “true permanent home + primary residence + intention to return after departure,” offering a more specific definition.◇
Disclaimer: The above is a preliminary explanation and introduction to legal provisions, not legal advice or ground. Individuals with queries regarding these laws or similar needs should seek legal counsel or consult professionals for assistance.