In early 2026, the crackdown on high-ranking officials within the Chinese Communist Party has significantly accelerated, with Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, Military Commission member Liu Zhenli, and former Zhejiang Provincial Party Secretary Yi Lianhong and other top officials being investigated. Many analysts have pointed out that this round of purges shows a “assembly line” operation characteristic, with the introduction of AI technology to review financial and communication data, significantly increasing the efficiency of the crackdown. The scope of the cleansing also covers both the military and the party and government system, seen as an important signal of escalating power struggles.
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia, Chief of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli, after being announced under investigation, the PLA Daily consecutively published commentary articles, showing recent significant turmoil in the military leadership.
Aside from the military turmoil, anti-corruption efforts within the party and government system have also intensified. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced on February 10th that Yi Lianhong, Vice Chairman of the Finance and Economic Committee of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress, is under investigation, becoming the third senior official to fall from grace in 2026.
Public resumes show that Yi Lianhong has served as the leader of provincial capital cities such as Changsha and Shenyang and has successively served as the Party Secretary of Jiangxi and Zhejiang provinces, crossing multiple provinces in his career. His transition to the National People’s Congress in 2024 was seen as a “smooth landing,” making his downfall this time garner external attention.
Professor Zhang Tianliang of Fei Tian College’s Humanities Department in the United States pointed out in a self-media program that within the past 40 days, more than a dozen mid-level cadres have been investigated. There have been consecutive senior “tigers” being targeted, clearly speeding up the pace of the cleanup. He described the authorities’ actions against officials as showing a “slaughterhouse-style assembly line mode”: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has expanded the scope of the investigation and concentrated isolation for questioning, significantly shortening the handling period.
Commentator Tang Jingyuan in a self-media program stated that such high-density cleanups reflect the ongoing power struggles within the CCP. He noted that some of the officials under investigation were once considered vital members of Xi Jinping’s camp, indicating that the scope of the purge is no longer limited to traditional opposing factions.
In addition to changes in handling methods, technological factors have also become a focus of observation. Multiple sources indicate that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has introduced artificial intelligence technology to conduct big data analysis on officials’ bank records, communication logs, and social relationships, in order to quickly trace fund flows and relationship networks.
Zhang Tianliang believes that the application of such technology has shifted anti-corruption efforts from a traditional “interrogation-driven” model to a “data-driven” model, significantly enhancing efficiency. He pointed out that AI can quickly identify complex fund chains and social networks, making the cleanup more systematic.
Tang Jingyuan expressed that in a highly centralized system, the nature of anti-corruption tools often depends on the political environment. He believed that in the current political structure, anti-corruption “essentially still serves the reorganization of factional power,” with technological means only improving execution efficiency.
A recent article in the CCP’s military newspaper on February 9th reviewed the history of Zhang Guotao’s splitting from the Red Army, emphasizing that “political reliability” is the fundamental requirement for party members and cadres. Many political commentators believe that this historical analogy has clear practical implications.
Zhang Tianliang pointed out that such political metaphors are often used to lay the groundwork for high-level cleanups, suggesting the existence of “political issues” within the military and providing ideological basis for Zhang Youxia’s case classification. He stated that since the 2014 Gutian Conference on Military Political Work in Fujian, Xi Jinping has promoted the “political construction of the military”, repeatedly emphasizing “the party commands the gun.” In recent years, the Rocket Force, equipment systems, etc., have been successively targeted for cleanup, and Zhang Youxia’s case may mark a new round of escalation of high-level military purges.
Regarding the political signals released by the military newspaper article, independent commentator Cai Shenkun stated in a self-media program that its core focus is not just on corruption issues but on the political loyalty issues within the military.
He analyzed that the article, using the historical case of Zhang Guotao as a mirror, emphasizing that “the political wall is the fundamental wall”, aims to warn of potential internal division risks within the military. Such statements typically appear before and after significant political purges.
Cai Shenkun pointed out that the continuous top-level changes in the military in recent years indicate a deep-rooted lack of trust in Xi Jinping towards the existing power structure within the military. He believed that the core purpose of the cleanup is to eliminate potential obstacles for major political events in the future.
Against this backdrop, he described the current cleanup as a systematic reorganization centered around the highest power, rather than just an anti-corruption operation.
Combining the viewpoints of the three commentators, the current high-level cleanup within the CCP exhibits three main features: simultaneous cleansing of the military and party-government systems, expanded scope; centralized and scaled handling methods; the introduction of AI and other technological means to enhance cleanup efficiency.
Zhang Tianliang believes that this “assembly line” processing mode indicates that the cleanup has entered a stage of institutionalization. Tang Jingyuan pointed out that anti-corruption still carries evident power struggle characteristics in the current system. Cai Shenkun emphasized that the turmoil at the top levels of the military reflects a deep crisis of trust.
Multiple analysts believe that this large-scale cleanup not only reflects a trend towards centralized power but also exposes unstable factors within the system.