In recent days, former Shanghai entrepreneur Hu Li-ren publicly disclosed that there is great anxiety among the ranks of high-level officials in the Communist Party of China (CPC) after a shake-up in the military leadership. A former Deputy Minister of the Central Organization Department has successfully left the country. Hu Li-ren relayed the official’s statement that since Xi Jinping came to power more than a decade ago, a large-scale purge has been carried out under the guise of anti-corruption, affecting nearly tens of millions of individuals, including retired officials.
Hu Li-ren revealed for the first time on a YouTube live broadcast on January 28th that following the investigation of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia, panic within the system has escalated dramatically, leading to a senior official from the Central Organization Department successfully leaving China. On the broadcast on January 29th, Hu Li-ren provided additional information regarding the situation after the official’s defection.
Hu Li-ren stated that he had directly communicated with the official. The official is currently “safely landed” overseas, but some family members remain in China and have been contacted by relevant authorities. Hu Li-ren indicated that for the safety and out of respect for the individual involved, the mode of defection, specific itinerary, and personal identity information will not be disclosed at this time.
According to the relayed information, the official is currently in contact with relevant Chinese authorities, with the core demand being the “safety of family members not being implicated.” Hu Li-ren suggested that the official may possess a wealth of insider information within the system, and whether further relevant content will be disclosed depends on the development of the situation.
Hu Li-ren focused on relaying the former Deputy Minister of the Central Organization Department’s internal observations regarding the “anti-corruption campaign” under Xi Jinping’s administration.
The official stated that in the decades since Xi Jinping came to power, the official figure released by the authorities claiming to have processed around 5 million officials under the “anti-corruption” campaign differs significantly from the actual number of individuals purged, processed, marginalized, or included in the investigation system, which may be close to or exceed 10 million people.
Among them, grassroots officials (including village-level officials) make up about 50% of the overall number; tens of thousands of department-level officials have been arrested; around 10,000 provincial and ministerial-level officials have been purged over a decade, including a large number of retired officials; and approximately 50,000 military officers have been dealt with in the military system, involving over 200 senior officers such as major generals and lieutenant generals.
The official believes that the purging has not put an end to corruption but rather is rooted in the system itself. He pointed out that within the CPC system, a top-down “chain of responsibility-benefit-risk” has been formed, and once an official enters the system, maintaining a “clean” record is nearly impossible, and not participating leads to elimination.
Hu Li-ren relayed that currently, what causes the most panic within the system is not the serving officials but a large number of “semi-retired” or already retired officials at the departmental level and above.
The official assessed that the next phase of purification will focus on a comprehensive investigation of officials and their family assets; the backward investigation could span 20 to 30 years, starting as early as the 1990s during the initial stages of state-owned enterprise reform and marketization; targeting not only individuals but also their affiliated companies, family members, and historical relationships.
In the official’s view, the “power realization-profit distribution” structure that has emerged since the 1990s is the core source of systemic corruption, and almost no one can completely escape it, meaning that the authorities “theoretically can target anyone.”
Hu Li-ren also mentioned in the program that the official noticed a concerning phenomenon: amidst a decrease in criminal activity, prison systems across the country are expanding, receiving additional budgets, and accelerating construction.
The official concluded that this expansion is not aimed at ordinary criminal offenses but is more likely preparation for the future large-scale detention of officials.
Hu Li-ren pointed out that using Beijing’s Qin Cheng Prison as an example, even during the “Gang of Four” period, the number of high-ranking officials detained there was very limited. However, if the cumulative number of provincial and ministerial-level officials to be purged reaches tens of thousands, the current system is clearly unable to handle this.
In this context, there is a widespread sense of unease within the system, with many retired or semi-retired officials who no longer hold real power or access to factional resources also feeling a deep sense of insecurity.
Regarding the case of Zhang Youxia, Hu Li-ren unequivocally expressed his judgment: Zhang Youxia is not a force against Xi but rather an important supporter of Xi Jinping’s constitutional amendments and consolidation of military power.
Hu Li-ren believes that Xi Jinping has challenged three forces. The first barrier is within the Party—there was no public opposition to the 2018 constitutional amendments, and Xi Jinping completed comprehensive suppression within the Party; the second barrier is in society—epidemic containment and the blank sheet movement did not lead to a nationwide challenge; the third barrier lies in the military—the most critical and challenging one.
In his view, Zhang Youxia played a crucial role in constitutional amendments and military power integration, but ultimately was “used and discarded” by Xi Jinping, becoming a sacrificial lamb in the political purge.
As for the rumors of mutinies, battles, and troops marching on Beijing circulating in the outside world, Hu Li-ren holds a highly skeptical attitude. He believes that the longstanding political defense and military control system of the CPC make it almost impossible for individual leaders to successfully launch a mutiny, and the likelihood of open military conflict in the short term is extremely low.
Hu Li-ren emphasized that all his disclosures are relayed information and personal judgments, and the final confirmation must be based on actual developments. He stated that the upcoming meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the CPC in the next few days will be a crucial checkpoint for observing the situation.