Recently, over the past two to three years, the Beijing authorities have increasingly emphasized “preparing for war” and have taken measures from various aspects such as politics, military, technology, economy, society, legislation, in preparation for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In recent times, there have been three noteworthy developments.
One of them is the establishment of a new unit in Fujian and other places: the National Defense Mobilization Professional Support Team. For example, on April 2 this year, Fujian established a total of 16 teams consisting of 1580 members in Zhangzhou City, including professional support teams for emergency rescue and repair, maritime search and rescue, medical care, psychological protection, chemical defense and epidemics prevention, camouflage protection, firefighting, public security, civil defense engineering, transportation, economic mobilization, political mobilization, battlefield environment, communication, information technology, and special services.
Fujian, as an important province involved if conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait, the establishment of these support teams raises questions about the reasons behind it. Particularly, the “chemical defense and epidemics prevention professional support team” is particularly thought-provoking.
In addition to Fujian, in the previous months, Wenzhou in Zhejiang established the first National Defense Mobilization Electromagnetic Spectrum Professional Support Team in March. In July 2023, Xiangyang, Hubei, established 12 national defense mobilization support teams; in September, Shiyan, Hubei, set up 10 support teams and 10 industry action centers for national defense mobilization; in October, Hangzhou established an unmanned aerial vehicle national defense mobilization professional support team; in December, Shaoxing set up 12 teams consisting of 380 people for national defense mobilization…
Why does the CCP establish National Defense Mobilization Professional Support Teams in multiple locations? On October 23, 2021, the CCP National People’s Congress Standing Committee decided to temporarily adjust the regulations regarding the leadership and management system, military and local functional configuration, organizational structure, and the command and utilization of national defense mobilization resources under the CCP’s “National Defense Mobilization Law,” “People’s Air Defense Law,” “National Defense Transportation Law,” and “National Defense Education Law,” during the deepening of the reforms of the national defense mobilization system.
Subsequently, the National Defense Mobilization Department, originally a functional department under the CCP General Staff, was transformed into a large military region-level unit directly overseeing at least 28 provincial military districts and defense areas. Interestingly, since the end of 2022, local governments have set up National Defense Mobilization Offices following top-level CCP directives. Local officials also emphasized “prioritizing and taking initiative in national defense mobilization.”
According to party media reports, in addition to organizing business training in various local National Defense Mobilization Offices to educate more personnel on the basic knowledge of national defense mobilization, understanding current situations and tasks, and integrating with local development, they also “strengthen coordination with military agencies.” For instance, in February 2023, at the Xiamen City Committee Military Council Meeting, Cui Yonghui, the city party secretary, urged to “incorporate national defense construction tasks into overall economic and social development plans, strengthen coordination between military and local needs, tap into high-quality potential, and further enhance maritime defense control capabilities.”
Why has the CCP partially transferred the responsibility for national defense mobilization, originally under the military system with the cooperation of local governments, to local authorities? It’s actually a lesson learned from Russia.
During the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia initially expected a quick victory, but faced strong resistance from Ukraine, resulting in a protracted conflict. Consequently, the Russian military faced issues such as slow overall mobilization and inadequate resource allocation.
If the CCP wants to initiate a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it naturally needs to conduct national defense mobilization, transitioning various sectors of society into a wartime or emergency state to support the CCP’s military actions. This cannot be solely reliant on the military.
According to the CCP, national defense mobilization includes at least seven aspects: armed forces mobilization, national economic mobilization, air defense mobilization, civil defense mobilization, political mobilization, scientific and technological mobilization, and strategic material reserve mobilization. In addition, there are mobilization efforts to enhance information support, electromagnetic spectrum, meteorology and hydrology, mapping and navigation, medical care, and high-tech equipment maintenance. Looking at the establishment of National Defense Mobilization Professional Support Teams across different regions, they are all built around these components.
It’s evident that the establishment of National Defense Mobilization Offices and Professional Support Teams by local governments is aimed at assisting the CCP in an all-encompassing mobilization during wartime, facilitating the swift transition of civilians into military roles. In line with the CCP’s 2010 “National Defense Mobilization Law,” it stipulates that during wartime, society, economic operations, energy, supplies, among others, must revolve around the war machine, even involving requisitioning personal assets. In short, it is about fully “mobilizing the country’s manpower, financial resources, and materials to strive for victory in war,” with little regard for the losses suffered by the people in the name of war. This means that once the CCP engages in warfare, the rate at which the people become cannon fodder will also increase.
If the establishment of National Defense Mobilization Offices and Professional Support Teams in various regions is seen as the CCP preparing for a wartime mass mobilization, then the significant increase in funding for the so-called “National Seven Sons,” including Harbin Institute of Technology, with a total budget of 19.463 billion yuan, a 16% increase, signifies a more obvious intention. As an institution under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Harbin Institute of Technology, strong in aviation, aerospace, electronics, electrical engineering, automotive, and welding, a large number of its graduates are also employed in the military industry. Following a series of sanctions imposed by the United States for stealing or potentially stealing American high-tech, the CCP has increased its investment in the institute, clearly linked to top-level CCP’s intensified preparations for conflict and intention to attack Taiwan.
Beijing is well aware that to secure Taiwan, it must confront the United States. Apart from strengthening alliances with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and causing disruptions around the world to disperse the U.S. military forces, it also needs to enhance its own technological capabilities.
The third war-related aspect is the splitting of the CCP’s Strategic Support Force into three separate forces on April 20: the Information Support Force, Military Aerospace Force, and Cyberspace Force, aimed at making the Chinese military more specialized in these three areas to better counter the United States. This move also serves the purpose of dismantling power centers within the military to facilitate Xi Jinping’s control over military authority.
The core mission of the Information Support Force is to coordinate the construction and utilization of the CCP’s various military network information systems, “in addition to each military branch’s dedicated information network, to establish a centralized information network for the entire military to support integrated joint operations in multiple domains.” Additionally, this force will be responsible for various intelligence collection, analysis, and transmission tasks.
The signals of war repeatedly released by Beijing, including the aforementioned, only serve to make the U.S., Europe, and the world more vigilant, hoping to deter Beijing’s “madness” through deterrence. It remains uncertain whether the top echelons in Beijing, in their preparations for war, realize that no matter how well they plan, unexpected circumstances could lead the CCP down a path of destruction if a conflict were to erupt in the Taiwan Strait.