The local government of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is facing financial tension, with a recent wave of revocations of deliberative coordination mechanisms in many areas. Among them, Tongyu County, once one of the deeply impoverished counties in Jilin Province, revoked over 900 deliberative coordination mechanisms.
In a report by the “China News Weekly” on September 12th, it was highlighted that in the recent period, numerous deliberative coordination mechanisms have been revoked in various regions. Tongyu County of Baicheng City in Jilin Province, a small city located in the northeast, has come into the public eye due to this. During the current round of local institutional reforms, Tongyu County revoked over 900 deliberative coordination mechanisms. Among them, 150 county-level deliberative coordination mechanisms had 125 revoked and 25 retained; the 810 deliberative coordination mechanisms set up by 3 streets and 16 townships under county jurisdiction were all revoked.
Within these townships and streets, Shuanggang Town had the highest number of deliberative coordination mechanisms revoked, reaching 109. Various deliberative coordination mechanisms such as the leadership group for promoting “ground” rectification work were no longer retained.
Tongyu County is located in the western part of Jilin Province, under the jurisdiction of Baicheng City. Baicheng City suffers from droughts, land desertification, and salinization. Tongyu County in Baicheng City is one of Jilin’s deeply impoverished counties, with an official population of 265,000 permanent residents. Authorities claimed in 2020 that “all 90 poor villages in Tongyu County have been lifted out of poverty”.
Shuanggang Town is located in the northern part of Tongyu County, with a current population of over 6,000 permanent residents. In this round of organizational reform, Shuanggang Town had the highest number of deliberative coordination mechanisms revoked in the entire county.
Data shows that deliberative coordination mechanisms are established to strengthen leadership and organizational coordination in certain cross-sector, cross-departmental important work. These mechanisms are named variably, such as leadership groups, coordination groups, committees, command centers, offices, etc.
The principal officer of Shuanggang Town’s government stated that after the revocation of deliberative coordination mechanisms, it did not affect the progress of various works but rather “more efficient in saving time and energy” compared to before. A staff member of the town mentioned that compared to the same period last year, fewer meetings were held by about 18 times and the production of documents decreased by about 50.
Reports indicate that in the new round of local institutional reforms, many regions including Tongyu County in Jilin Province have streamlined and revoked a large number of grassroots deliberative coordination mechanisms in Hunan, Shandong, Sichuan, Jiangxi, Guangxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and other provinces.
This incident has sparked online mockery among mainland Chinese netizens, with comments like “Don’t talk about how many organizations have been reduced, ask how many people have been reduced, have the dismissed personnel gone to subsidiary third-party companies again?” and “Just hang a sign and report attendance to get money lying down.”
On September 13, current affairs commentator Yue Shan stated that the CCP government, especially at the local grassroots level, often receives missions from higher-ups and then sets up temporary leadership groups, command centers, etc., to manage funds. In reality, the personnel primarily come from various departments, and once the work is done, they no longer receive funds. These so-called coordination mechanisms continue to exist without anyone managing them. Now, a newly appointed official may want to show some achievements and target these empty structures. Removing these structures does not necessarily reflect any financial difficulties, but rather the bureaucratic operational mode of the CCP. However, the official media’s exaggerated promotion of this issue makes it quite boring.
As early as the second year of the trade war between China and the U.S., starting in 2019, the CCP authorities issued multiple notices requiring all levels of government to “tighten their belts” and prepare for “tough times.”
In the second year of lifting epidemic control policies in March 2023, Chinese Finance Minister Liu Kun emphasized that “the government tightening its belt is not a short-term response but a policy that should be adhered to in the long term.”
In March of this year, 14 finance department heads of local CCP governments disclosed the situation concerning local debt resolution. The finance department head of Gansu Province mentioned the province’s government debt situation and the formulation of debt resolution plans such as “tightening the belt” and finding funds through measures like selling idle assets.
With a significant decline in revenue from land sales by local governments, many areas are experiencing faster growth in non-tax revenue. Common sources of non-tax revenue include administrative fees and revenue from confiscations.
Additionally, just last month, the CCP announced further deepening of fiscal and tax reforms, expanding local tax sources, and appropriately increasing local tax management authority. In response to this, Professor Xie Tian from the Darla Moore School of Business at the University of South Carolina previously told The Epoch Times, “Local governments now have the ‘magic sword,’ they will definitely significantly increase taxes, adding to the burden on the ordinary people, just like killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. It reduces the pressure on the government deficit, but places greater pressure on the people.”