The ongoing fentanyl crisis in the United States is deeply rooted in a multinational supply chain that starts with Chinese chemical companies, extends to drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, and ultimately reaches American markets. This intricate network is currently under continuous investigation by U.S. law enforcement agencies. A recent report published in October 2026 by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) indicates that China remains one of the primary sources for illegal precursor chemicals used in the manufacturing of fentanyl. It is noted that transnational criminal organizations primarily operate in Mexico, utilizing these raw materials to produce fentanyl, which is then smuggled into the United States.
According to estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), approximately 37,393 people in the U.S. died from synthetic opioid overdoses in 2025, with fentanyl and related substances being the main contributors. Although this number shows a noticeable decline from previous peak years, fentanyl continues to pose a significant public health threat in the country.
A recent investigative report by Bloomberg, published on November 13, highlights that despite the U.S. government’s intensified efforts to combat the supply chain for fentanyl precursor chemicals, certain Chinese chemical companies may still be operating under new business names, establishing separate entities, and altering their operational strategies to continue engaging in these illegal activities.
The Bloomberg report draws on a specific undercover case conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 2023. This investigation was based on thousands of legal documents and interviews with several involved parties, most of whom requested anonymity to protect their identities while discussing the details of the law enforcement investigation.
The indictment released by the U.S. Department of Justice reveals that by the end of 2022, DEA undercover agents contacted Hubei Amarvel Biotech Co., Ltd., a chemical company located in Wuhan, China, via encrypted communication software. During this interaction, the undercover agents directly informed a sales representative from the company that the chemicals they intended to buy were meant for fentanyl manufacturing. The representative acknowledged this intended use but nonetheless proceeded to negotiate the deal.
Subsequently, the two parties agreed on payment through cryptocurrency and arranged for the shipment of chemical precursors from China to the U.S.
In March 2023, the company’s principal individual, Qingzhou Wang, along with marketing manager Yiyi Chen, traveled to Bangkok, Thailand, to meet with the DEA undercover agents. According to court documents, the agents posed as a superior of a fentanyl manufacturer and discussed the potential for supplying large quantities of fentanyl precursor chemicals with the two individuals. Even after the agents expressed their desire to modify the fentanyl manufacturing formula and mentioned that several American customers had reportedly died, Wang and Chen asserted that their company had many clients in the U.S. and Mexico and could offer technical assistance in fentanyl production.
After their meeting, both parties agreed to conduct the transaction via cryptocurrency, involving about 210 kilograms of fentanyl precursor chemicals.
On May 5, 2023, the DEA seized this shipment at a warehouse near Los Angeles, California, where laboratory tests confirmed that it contained a precursor chemical that could be used to manufacture fentanyl analogs. According to the Department of Justice, if the precursor were processed into fentanyl as discussed, it could yield around 50 to 55 kilograms of finished product, equivalent to approximately 25 million potentially lethal doses.
This multinational undercover investigation soon extended to Fiji. On June 8, 2023, Wang and Chen traveled to Fiji to discuss plans for a monthly supply of several tons of precursor chemicals with undercover operatives. Both individuals were expelled from Fiji that day and subsequently arrested by the DEA, appearing in court in Hawaii the following day.
On February 3, 2025, a jury in a federal court in New York found both individuals guilty of charges related to the importation of fentanyl precursors and money laundering. Subsequently, on August 22, Chen was sentenced to 15 years in prison, while Wang received a 25-year sentence on September 18. Both individuals are Chinese nationals.
However, the case did not conclude with the conviction of these two corporate executives. Bloomberg’s latest investigation reveals that Hubei Amarvel Biotech Co., Ltd. has ceased operations under its original name following the exposure of its activities but is believed to have been succeeded by another Wuhan chemical company linked to former sales personnel, Wuhan Ruichi Technology Co., Ltd., which may be continuing parts of the related business.
This has prompted questions regarding whether these companies are persisting in chemical transactions by simply changing their names and establishing new business platforms.
The investigation also sheds light on a characteristic of such illicit supply chains: individuals selling fentanyl precursor chemicals to drug trafficking organizations may not necessarily fit the traditional image of shadowy drug lords but can also include educated professionals working in chemical companies, including managers and marketing personnel.
Reports indicate that Yiyi Chen studied in Italy, obtaining a master’s degree in communication from the University of Bologna and returning to China to work in online marketing, living an ordinary nine-to-five lifestyle.
The implicated companies superficially exhibit typical operational structures of private enterprises, including websites, marketing departments, technical support, and even organizing employee events like New Year gatherings. However, these seemingly normal business operations are fundamentally misused to recruit drug dealers, sell chemical precursors, and arrange for the concealment of goods and cross-border transport.
According to case files from the U.S. Department of Justice, Qingzhou Wang serves as the leading figure of the company, with Yiyi Chen acting as the marketing manager, and there is another sales representative responsible for directly interfacing with clients. The Department of Justice indicates that the individuals involved in business decision-making and transaction arrangements extend beyond the two convicted defendants, including a sales representative named Er Yang, who remains at large.
This investigation further highlights a significant obstacle in the U.S.’s efforts to combat the fentanyl supply chain: the limited substantive cooperation between Chinese law enforcement and their U.S. counterparts. The challenges faced by the U.S. are not only in intercepting fentanyl already on American soil but also in tracing chemical companies, transnational intermediaries, cryptocurrency payments, and disguised transportation from the source.
The Hubei Amarvel case reflects the challenges encountered by the U.S. in dismantling the fentanyl supply chain, especially in terms of tracing chemical companies within China and obtaining cooperation from Chinese law enforcement.
Bloomberg’s reports indicate that U.S. investigators had provided the Chinese side with information about companies suspected of supplying fentanyl precursor chemicals, yet often received little effective response in return. Following the deterioration of U.S.-China relations after the visit of then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in 2022, existing limited communication channels between the DEA and Chinese public security departments were temporarily interrupted.
Despite the establishment of a U.S.-PRC Counternarcotics Working Group in 2024, and claims from Beijing of actively assisting the U.S. in addressing the fentanyl crisis, along with tightening regulations on certain chemical exports in recent years, investigations have indicated that related precursor chemicals continue to circulate on a large scale. Some Chinese chemical companies might also be evading regulations by adjusting their products, methods of trade, or even seeking alternative production avenues in Southeast Asia.