The senior leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is entering a new round of personnel changes, with the potential for a significant increase in the number of seventh-generation officials. However, it remains unclear who will succeed Xi Jinping. The Economist cited analysts as saying that if Xi Jinping chooses a successor late in his tenure, the lack of a long-term trust relationship with the successor could lead to a “rather turbulent period” in Chinese politics.
The 21st National Congress of the CCP is expected to be held in 2027, bringing about a round of personnel adjustments from local to central levels.
The Economist’s recent analysis indicated that about two-thirds of current central committee members are expected to retire next year, and the proportion of seventh-generation officials born in the 1970s may increase from around 8% in 2022 to about 40%.
These officials grew up during the era of economic reforms and opening up, with higher levels of education and backgrounds in fields such as economics, finance, and engineering. Figures like Zhu Zhongming, acting mayor of Shanghai, Liu Jie, governor of Zhejiang Province, and Yin Yong, mayor of Beijing, are all seen as representatives of the new generation of local officials.
However, a younger leadership does not necessarily indicate a more open political direction. The Economist quoted Wu Guoguang, a senior researcher at the China Economic and Institutional Research Center at Stanford University in the United States, who pointed out that when officials truly wield significant power, they have often undergone long-term political socialization and training.
Moreover, the changing age structure of officials has not necessarily addressed the issue of succession to the highest levels of power. The Economist noted that theoretically, seventh-generation officials could potentially enter the Politburo Standing Committee in the future. However, if a young official enters this core position too early, they may be seen as a clear successor. Currently, Xi Jinping has not shown signs of hastening the identification of a successor.
While the seventh generation may see a significant influx into the central leadership, a clear “seventh-generation successor” has yet to emerge.
At a time when the CCP’s senior leadership is preparing for a new round of personnel adjustments, there have been significant personnel changes in the military leadership.
On September 21, the CCP announced that Zhang Youxia, former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, former chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission, have been expelled from the party and the military, and have been transferred to military procuratorial authorities for investigation and prosecution. The CCP officially stated that the two individuals were involved in “forming cliques,” “disloyalty and dishonesty to the party,” and abuse of power.
Zhang Youxia was previously one of the top figures in the CCP’s military and had been a key figure favored by Xi Jinping for a long time.
According to Reuters, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were removed from their positions on the Central Military Commission in August, and they are now accused of issues related to “forming cliques” and “disloyalty to the party.” Such political accusations carry significant weight in the CCP’s senior leadership purges.
The Economist previously mentioned that since Xi Jinping began his third term, there have been continuous removals of members from the CCP Central Committee and military leadership, with some officials previously elevated by Xi Jinping also facing scrutiny. These personnel changes, combined with the upcoming leadership transition, have heightened attention on the succession arrangements.
Xi Jinping has not publicly designated a successor. Unlike the past practice of the CCP where a clear succession plan was arranged before the retirement of the top leader, there has been no clear signal of young political figures emerging as successors.
In 2018, the CCP abolished term limits for the state presidency. After the 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping began his third term as general secretary of the CCP, without introducing young political figures seen as successors into the core of highest power.
By the time of the 22nd National Congress in 2032, Xi Jinping will be 79 years old, while most seventh-generation officials will already be in their fifties or sixties. In this regard, Jonathan Czin, a former analyst with the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) quoted by The Economist, raised the question, if Xi Jinping is over 80 years old by then and passes power to a official around 70 years old, would such a succession arrangement be reasonable?
Czin believes that if Xi Jinping selects a successor later in his tenure, he may have to choose someone with whom he has not had a long acquaintance and established a deep trust relationship, potentially leading to further political turmoil in China.
“The person Xi Jinping chooses the first time won’t be the last,” Czin said. He cited examples from the eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, where several initially designated successors were replaced. Czin anticipates that Xi Jinping’s future succession arrangements could bring about a period of “significant political upheaval.”
Researcher Shen Mingshi from the Taiwan Institute for National Defense and Security previously discussed the succession issue from another perspective in an interview with the Epoch Times. He pointed out that according to past succession arrangements, a potential successor to the paramount leader of the CCP would usually enter the Politburo Standing Committee in the previous term, but this signal has not yet appeared. He believed that if Xi Jinping were suddenly unable to govern due to health issues or unforeseen circumstances, it would increase the risk to the CCP regime.
This scenario differs from a normal retirement transition of a leader. If the paramount leader were to suddenly lose the ability to govern and there is no open and clear succession plan within the CCP, how power would reallocate among the party, government, military, and security systems would become another issue.
If the paramount leader suddenly loses the ability to govern, it could create a power vacuum. Yu Maochun, a specialist in Chinese affairs from the Hudson Institute in the US, takes this issue a step further to a more extreme scenario: if the CCP regime itself loses centralized control over China, is the external world prepared?
In an article in The Washington Times in September, Yu Maochun advocated for the United States and its allies to begin considering contingency plans for the “post-CCP era.” He believed that the West’s policies towards China over the past decades were largely based on the assumption of the CCP’s long-term existence, with little consideration of how to handle a situation where the CCP suddenly loses control over China’s military, nuclear weapons, financial system, and state assets.
Yu Maochun did not predict an imminent collapse of the CCP. He stated in the article that the CCP could continue to rule for decades or might, like some Eastern European communist regimes near the end of the Cold War, lose control within a short period. The core issue he raised was, since major political changes are unpredictable, should different scenarios be studied in advance.
He particularly focused on the issues of control over the military, armed police, security apparatus, strategic weapons, yuan, banking system, state-owned enterprises, and state assets in the event of central authority suddenly weakening, as well as the distribution of power that would follow. He emphasized that the end of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily lead to a democratic system, and without institutional preparation, a new oligarchic political system or another authoritarian regime could emerge.
Yu Maochun thus advocated for countries like the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Europe, Australia, South Korea, and India to conduct advance research into potential scenarios of major changes to the CCP regime, including issues related to strategic weapons security, financial stability, state assets management, and political transition. He stressed that this was not about deciding China’s future political system but preparing for significant unforeseen events that could occur.