Zhou Xiaohui: What Does He Weidong’s Meeting with Cuban General Signify

According to reports from mainland official media on April 15, Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Political Bureau member and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Weidong, met with visiting Central Committee member of the Cuban Communist Party and chief of the political department of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, Rojo, in Beijing. Rojo, a lieutenant general, had visited Vietnam two years ago.

During the meeting, He Weidong emphasized the “unbreakable” friendship between China and Cuba and expressed firm opposition to external forces interfering in Cuba’s internal affairs. He also vowed to continue supporting Cuba and its military development. Rojo, on the other hand, expressed gratitude for China’s long-standing assistance and pledged to strengthen bilateral relations, uphold the One China principle, and jointly oppose hegemony and bullying.

The implied understanding between He Weidong and Rojo is that China will continue to provide various forms of assistance to Cuba, including military support, in its efforts against the United States. In return, Cuba is expected to reciprocate the assistance, especially concerning anti-American issues. The military cooperation between China and Cuba has been close in the past, with Cuba hosting visits from the Chinese Liberation Army at its ports on multiple occasions, and China providing technical assistance to upgrade Cuba’s air defense systems and procure advanced communication equipment.

Currently, conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflict in Syria, and potential attacks by Iran on Israel are ongoing, while tensions in the Taiwan Strait persist. In this context, the meeting between He Weidong and Rojo is not just a simple diplomatic exchange; it signifies China’s intention to stir up trouble in America’s backyard and divert US attention.

This speculation is not unfounded. In June 2023, current and former US intelligence officials disclosed to The Wall Street Journal that China and Cuba were in negotiations to build a joint military base in northern Cuba. The report indicated that both countries had reached a tentative agreement to establish new listening posts in Cuba. These facilities would enable China to station troops permanently on the island, just 100 miles from the Florida coast, to expand its intelligence gathering capabilities on the US, including electronic surveillance of emails, communications, and navigation information.

Two days later, the declassified information from the White House confirmed that Chinese intelligence collection facilities had been present in Cuba since at least 2019. Chinese military personnel were reportedly monitoring US communications from locations near Havana, including the Lourdes base and three other undisclosed sites in Cuba. This poses a significant threat to the US.

US intelligence officials expressed concern and urgency in contacting Cuban authorities to prevent the deal. Secretary of State Blinken explicitly conveyed US concerns regarding Chinese intelligence or military activities in Cuba.

The reason for US anxiety and apprehension is due to Florida’s proximity to Cuba, which has become a major hub for technology, financial services, and military command centers. Florida houses key military and detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, the Joint Interagency Task Force South, the FBI’s Miami field office, and the US Southern Command.

Additionally, near Cuba, there are the US Central Command in Tampa and the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center in the Bahamas, a vital acoustic testing facility for submarines, underwater weapons testing, and anti-submarine warfare research.

Following the exposure of China’s plans to establish military facilities in Cuba and the longstanding presence of listening posts, there has been a strong reaction. Military analysts suggested that China could potentially turn Cuba into an intelligence hub, threatening US interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, and possibly leveraging geographic advantages and infrastructure in Latin American countries during a Taiwan Strait conflict to disrupt US military operations and target the US mainland.

Author of “China’s Coming Collapse” and US columnist Zhang Jiadun cited Richard Fisher from the International Assessment and Strategy Center in an article, expressing concerns that in the event of a short-term war, China could utilize Cuba as a base to plan and carry out large-scale cyberattacks and spy operations. This collaboration with Cuba’s robust intelligence apparatus could lead to a range of covert actions from assassination attempts to attacks on US facilities, including civilian targets like gas stations.

Zhang Jiadun’s apprehensions illustrated a potential scenario where China might deploy ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads in Cuba for nuclear deterrence during a Taiwan Strait conflict, due to Cuba’s proximity to the US.

China’s meddling in America’s backyard extends beyond Cuba. Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Suriname’s President Santokhi in Beijing, as another move in China’s strategy to cause trouble in the US backyard.

Suriname, a small country in northeastern South America with a population of just over 500,000, neighbors Guyana to the west, the Atlantic Ocean to the north, French Guiana to the east, and shares a border with Brazil to the south. Should China’s political and economic influence in Suriname extend to military cooperation?

Reports indicate that Venezuela, in South America, is the largest buyer of Chinese military equipment in the region, and countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru have purchased millions of dollars worth of Chinese military aircraft, ground vehicles, anti-aircraft radars, and assault rifles. In Panama, Chinese-funded companies are involved in several projects.

Moreover, China has 40 ports in Latin America under ownership or operation and is pushing to establish a naval base near Ushuaia. At least 11 space facilities related to China exist in Latin America, including Bolivia’s two largest ground satellites that can provide backend access to Beijing.

Considering the possibility of a crisis in Taiwan, would China take action in Latin America to constrain the US or even launch attacks on the US mainland through activities such as terrorism to divert US attention? Such scenarios are not beyond plausibility.

The US is increasingly aware of China’s activities in Cuba and Latin America and has taken undisclosed actions. However, the meeting between He Weidong and Rojo indicates that China’s military actions in Cuba have not been terminated. With sanctions against Cuba proving ineffective, the US’s only choice appears to be to focus its efforts on China to address the unresolved Russia-Ukraine war and the disturbances instigated by China in America’s backyard. Additionally, exposing the overseas assets of China’s Politburo Standing Committee could prove to be a worthwhile option.