From June 17th to 19th, the Chinese Communist Party held a political work conference for the military in Yan’an, Shaanxi. CCP leader Xi Jinping mentioned in his speech that “the global situation, national conditions, party dynamics, and military situation are all undergoing complex and profound changes.” He emphasized the need to “adhere to the party’s absolute leadership over the military” and to “continuously deepen political training” to ensure that the guns are always in the hands of “loyal and reliable” individuals. With internal and external situations becoming more tense, Xi Jinping expressed concerns about the risk of military power slipping away, hence proposing the “requirements of political army building era” to focus on internal stability and prevent internal turmoil within the army from becoming a major issue.
Xi Jinping stated at the conference that “at present, the global situation, national conditions, party dynamics, and military situation are undergoing complex and profound changes,” with the military facing “complex and intricate challenges politically”; it is necessary to “constantly promote political army building.”
The Xinhua News Agency’s report did not disclose how the “global situation, national conditions, party dynamics, and military situation” have undergone complex and profound changes, only vaguely mentioning that Xi Jinping “profoundly analyzed the deep-seated contradictions and problems that need to be addressed in current political army building,” stating that “these problems manifest in political, ideological, organizational, style, discipline aspects.”
Given the current international situation where tensions between the CCP and the United States and its allies are escalating, the primary task for the CCP military at this time should be to be prepared for a potential war at any moment, whether it is initiated by the CCP or arises from accidents or miscalculations.
In summary, the most crucial task for the CCP military at the moment is preparation for war. The militaries of the United States, its allies in the Indo-Pacific region, and NATO are also intensively preparing for war. In recent years, the CCP has faced threats from all directions and is now surrounded on all sides. Despite occasional provocations by the CCP, it is increasingly aware of the serious consequences of initiating a war. The CCP military appears to be adopting an offensive posture, but in reality, it is being forced into a defensive position. In other words, compared to initiating a war, the CCP may be more fearful of being on the receiving end of an attack.
Despite the grave “global situation,” the focus of CCP leader’s speech is not on “preparing for war,” but on “continuously deepening political training,” further emphasizing “adhering to the party’s absolute leadership over the military” to ensure that the guns are always in the hands of “loyal and reliable” individuals. The theme of this military conference seems to have strayed from the “global situation,” but Xi Jinping not only mentioned the “global situation” but also emphasized the “national conditions, party dynamics, and military situation.” The latter three apparently hold more significance and pose a greater threat.
Contrasted with the severe “global situation,” the “national conditions, party dynamics, and military situation” within the CCP are causing greater concern to the party leader. Hence, Xi Jinping proposed to “grasp the requirements of political army building era” and to “continuously deepen political training,” focusing on promoting only “loyal and clean” military officers.
“Preparing for war” pertains to external threats, while “political training” involves internal challenges. This conference primarily aims to redirect the focus internally, eliminating potential risks within the military. Previously, rumors spread by the “Second Red Generation” suggested internal discontent within the military, with allegations of some seeking to seize power through coups or overthrow Xi Jinping. Such rumors have evidently had a significant impact, inadvertently increasing Xi Jinping’s concerns about the military.
In November 2014, the CCP military held a political work conference in Gutian, where Xi Jinping’s speech discussed “upholding discipline, punishing corruption,” and “strengthening the military.” At that time, former Vice Chairman of the CCP Military Commission, Xu Caihou, had fallen, serving as a typical example of anti-corruption efforts within the military. Despite this, the central theme of military political work and reform continued to rally around “strengthening the military” as the slogan. Xi Jinping also mentioned “using combat readiness as the only fundamental criterion for military construction,” emphasizing the focus on being able to “fight and win battles,” while advocating for “strengthening the work of the Party Committee” and “upholding the party’s absolute leadership over the military.”
Xi Jinping previously stated that “the criteria for good military cadres are to be loyal to the party, good at planning battles, willing to take responsibility, achievers, and honest and upright.” Ten years later, the CCP convened another military political work conference in Yan’an. While Xi Jinping once again referred to the “criteria for good military cadres,” there was no further emphasis on being “good at planning battles” or “outstanding achievements.” Instead, the focus shifted to “improving the assessment of cadres and enhancing the ability to identify and select talents accurately.”
Such a noticeable change likely correlates with recent turmoil within the CCP military. Over the years since Xi Jinping came to power, there have been significant personnel changes within the military, with the removal of senior generals promoted during the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras. In his second term, Xi Jinping continued to elevate military leaders he deemed loyal and reliable, particularly those affiliated with the former 31st Army. With Xi Jinping’s third term, his trusted ally, He Weidong, was finally promoted to a Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, thereby finalizing personnel appointments in the Central Military Commission, various military branches, and military regions before the CCP’s 20th National Congress.
Ironically, the military leaders whom Xi Jinping believed to be the most reliable have encountered significant issues. Incidents involving Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, then-Defense Minister Li Shangfu, and the Equipment Department of the Military Commission have disrupted the impact of the misjudgment in selecting military leader candidates, undermining the original standards of a “good military cadre.” Therefore, Xi Jinping’s recent speech emphasizes the need to “enhance the accuracy of identifying and selecting talents.”
On April 19, the CCP publicly announced the establishment of a new Information Support Force, splitting the original Strategic Support Force into three units. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized “the party’s absolute leadership over the military,” “strict discipline and rules,” and ensuring the troops are “absolutely loyal, absolutely clean, and absolutely reliable.” In reality, the Strategic Support Force underwent significant cleansing, necessitating the CCP to restructure and rename units to obfuscate the chaotic state.
In the current international landscape, one would expect Xi Jinping to place more emphasis on “preparing for war,” with “planning for victory” as the primary assessment criterion for military officers. However, being “loyal and reliable” has now seemingly become the sole criterion. The CCP’s military conference redirecting focus internally indicates that Xi Jinping no longer trusts anyone and the internal military concerns far surpass external worries.
Since assuming office in 2012, Xi Jinping has primarily consolidated military power through anti-corruption campaigns and military reforms, leading to substantial changes in military personnel. As such, he now proposes the “requirements of political army building era,” urging for “continuous deepening of political training,” with only “loyal and clean” military officers entrusted with this mission, primarily delegated to political work officials.
Amid recent internal strife within the CCP military, there have been more incidents concerning military leaders holding military status. Political work officials appear to have assumed a lesser role. While former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao has effectively vanished, the former Political Commissar of the Rocket Force, Xu Zhongbo, can still be seen at the CCP National People’s Congress.
Political work officials are primarily responsible for supervising military leaders and usually lack significant military capabilities, reducing the possibility of orchestrating or initiating coups. These officials are adept at currying favor with superiors and know how to align themselves strategically during critical moments, making them more favored now than military leaders. On March 28, the Political and Legal Affairs Secretary of the CCP Military Commission, Wang Renhua, was promoted to a senior ranks, a departure from past practices. Xi Jinping now needs more officials of this nature.
Xi Jinping’s speech also called for “enhancing party organization’s leadership, organizational, and executive capabilities … increasing the ability to prepare for war and ensuring the party’s leadership pervades all aspects of war preparation and combat throughout the process.” He also demanded to “strengthen the party secretary’s responsibility as the principal person in charge of party governance.”
Political work officials are tasked not only with managing political work but also with continuing to supervise military leaders and enhancing preparedness for war. They are likely not genuinely expected to prepare for external conflicts but rather to focus the guns inward. In other words, CCP’s leader no longer has much trust in military leaders and must rely on numerous political work officials with limited military capacity to secure military power. Relying on non-military leaders to “prepare for war” is evidently unreliable. This approach is likely a public stance to emphasize internal military supervision, fostering a mutual atmosphere of vigilance among all members. As for the previously stressed concepts of “preparing for war” and “strengthening the military,” these may have to be set aside temporarily.
Recent reports from Beijing indicate that the CCP’s top brass believes the U.S. is goading CCP’s military to attack Taiwan, but Beijing will not take the bait. This suggests that the internal and external situations are becoming increasingly tense, especially given the difficulties in resolving internal turmoil within the CCP. Consequently, the CCP high command may temporarily abandon plans for a military attack on Taiwan, attributing a diplomatic layer to the U.S. involvement. The CCP leadership may now also be reluctant to engage in war.
Xi Jinping mentioned that since the 18th National Congress, they have been “promoting political training with the spirit of rectification … to a greater extent than ever before”; he continued to mention the so-called “new era political army building,” and emphasized that “all levels, especially senior officials, must examine themselves, have the courage to discard superficiality, expose shortcomings, and push forward political army building by thoroughly searching for root causes and touching souls.”
The comparison of “political training” with the “Yan’an Rectification Movement” suggests a significant effort beyond mere rhetoric. The fact that Xi Jinping and other high-ranking CCP officials were summoned to Yan’an for this conference points to a carefully orchestrated initiative. Prior to the conference, Xi Jinping led a tour of the historical sites in Yan’an, where the CCP’s Central Military Commission was stationed between August 1937 and March 1947.
According to reports from Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping viewed exhibits depicting significant battles of the Yan’an era and gleaned insights into the leadership wisdom and artistry of that period. This pre-arranged visit to a historic red site provides a glimpse into the true intentions of the CCP leader.
In 1937, the CCP ended its retreat from Jiangxi and regrouped in Yan’an, yet their strength remained extremely limited. Without the full-scale invasion by Japanese forces, the CCP might have been obliterated or forced into exile in the Soviet Union. Despite using the anti-Japanese banner, the CCP effectively avoided major battles to preserve its limited military resources. Following Japan’s surrender in 1945, the CCP initiated a civil war but remained on the defensive for the first two years, transitioning to an offensive posture in September 1947, by which time, the Military Commission had already left Yan’an.
This period of history marks a phase in which the CCP was forced into hiding, with the party’s top leaders enduring hardship in caves. Due to the encroachment of the Nationalist forces, the CCP Central Committee was even forced to temporarily abandon Yan’an and seek refuge in mountainous regions. Conducting a political work conference in such a location, ostensibly for ideological education, may suggest ominous signs. The high-ranking CCP officials are likely preparing for the worst-case scenario.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump recently stated that if he were re-elected, the U.S. military would bomb Beijing if the CCP attacked Taiwan. While this may have been an offhand remark, it likely struck a nerve, making Beijing genuinely anxious. The fact that the CCP military conference was not held in Beijing but in Yan’an indicates that should conflict erupt, the CCP’s Military Commission may relocate from Beijing to Yan’an. Although they may not reside in caves, staying in underground bunkers for an extended period may be necessary. This military conference may be a rehearsal for such evacuation scenarios, as the CCP seeks to prepare for worst-case scenarios in advance.
While the CCP military conference still claims to be the “People’s Liberation Army,” it essentially functions as the CCP’s personal guard. On June 18th, Xi Jinping conducted inspections in Qinghai and issued instructions for flood prevention and drought relief. Meanwhile, several areas in southern China were afflicted by heavy rainfall, flooding, landslides, and geological disasters, resulting in significant human and property losses. Nevertheless, CCP leader had time to visit Qinghai for inspections but did not extend the same attention to the affected areas in the south; the military conference was not an urgent military affair and proceeded as usual.
After Xi Jinping issued instructions, the CCP military’s website reported on June 19 that Meizhou City in Guangdong Province experienced collapsed buildings, power outages, communication failures, blocked roads, landsides, and other hazardous situations. However, the Meizhou Military Subdistrict only mobilized 10 batches of over 500 militiamen, while the People’s Armed Police Force Guangdong General Corps sent only 59 personnel. In Fujian, multiple areas suffered road collapses, house collapses, with the Fujian Provincial Military District sending only 758 soldiers and militiamen, while the People’s Armed Police Force Fujian General Corps dispatched over 180 personnel.
Amid widespread calamities, the “People’s Liberation Army” and even the regular military troops are reluctant to conduct rescue operations, with only some militiamen and a few members of the People’s Armed Police responding. The CCP’s top military leaders are preoccupied with “political training” and turning their guns inward, contemplating how to ensure individual survival rather than focusing on disaster relief or preparing for war. The military is even hesitant to mobilize resources swiftly. These political maneuvers are likely to continue to exaggerate the CCP military’s “false combat readiness” and cultivate more “double-faced individuals.” Xi Jinping likely realizes this approach might not salvage the fate of the CCP.
Source: 大紀元 (Epoch Times)