On April 19, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made a high-profile announcement of the establishment of an Information Support Force, splitting the original Strategic Support Force into three units, all under direct command of the military commission. The CCP claimed that the formation of the Information Support Force was for the “coordination of network information system construction,” but Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized “the Party’s absolute leadership over the military,” “strict discipline,” and ensuring the military’s “absolute loyalty, absolute purity, absolute reliability.” This restructuring was seen as an attempt to cover up larger turmoil within the military, forcing a deep cleansing of the Strategic Support Force through reorganization and renaming.
Xi Jinping attended the founding ceremony of the Information Support Force held by the CCP’s military commission on April 19. According to Xinhua News Agency, the newly formed Information Support Force is now under the direct leadership and command of the Central Military Commission, with the disbanding of the Strategic Support Force designation and corresponding adjustments in the leadership and management relationships of the military aerospace force and network space force.
The first commander of the Information Support Force, Bi Yi, made an appearance, and with the disbanding of the Strategic Support Force designation, the former commander, Ju Gansheng, was effectively removed from office.
The former political commissar of the Strategic Support Force, Li Wei, was reassigned as the new political commissar of the Information Support Force, seemingly unaffected but effectively demoted. The Strategic Support Force was responsible for space warfare, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, intelligence reconnaissance, satellite management, aerospace research and operations; whereas the new Information Support Force is only described as “coordinating the construction of the network information system.”
The splitting of the Strategic Support Force signifies another wave of deep cleansing within the military, with the former commander being indirectly stripped of his position.
Xi Jinping stressed in his speech that, “We must resolutely obey the Party’s command, fully implement the fundamental principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military… maintain strict discipline… and ensure the military’s absolute loyalty, absolute purity, and absolute reliability.”
This should explain the true reasons behind the splitting of the Strategic Support Force. Xi Jinping did not mention military corruption, attempting to disguise the issue and indicate that corruption is not the main reason for the latest military purge. Many generals were suspected of issues related to loyalty or failure to adhere to rules, leading to successive purges of the Rocket Force, the Equipment Department of the Military Commission, and the Strategic Support Force.
The Rocket Force and the Equipment Department of the Military Commission were only tasked with capturing and changing personnel, while the Strategic Support Force was completely dismantled. Such operations make it easier for significant personnel reorganization, outwardly claiming to be “Newly Created Strategic Branches” to mask the chaos within the CCP’s military, especially to save face for Xi Jinping.
Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, there has been a major purge of military leaders, with a forced military reform at the end of 2015; the original major military regions were abolished and replaced with five major theaters of command, effectively dismissing all military district commanders; the 18 army groups of the Army were reorganized into 13, and a large number of mid-level officers were also purged; the Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force were established; and the four military headquarters of the Military Commission were split into 15 departments.
Through such tactics of separation and consolidation, along with military anti-corruption efforts, officials who were mainly promoted under the influence of the former Jiang faction have been largely purged, with individuals now selected and promoted based on Xi Jinping’s approval. However, after Xi Jinping’s third term, major issues within the military emerged once again, prompting a second significant purge.
The splitting of the Strategic Support Force attempts to cover up political purges, but founding a military branch only to have its designation revoked a few years later, no matter how spun, is challenging to save Xi Jinping’s face.
Xi Jinping emphasized the need for “strict military governance in all respects… maintain order… and ensure a high degree of unity and security stability within the military.”
As the political situation within the CCP becomes increasingly chaotic, with the military becoming a source of disorder, the CCP leaders are extremely concerned, realizing that a crackdown has become necessary. However, fearful of further destabilizing military morale, they can only attempt to cover up by splitting the Strategic Support Force, turning to what appears to be a reluctant last resort.
Xi Jinping’s speech also stated that the adjustment and formation of the Information Support Force is a “significant decision” by the military commission, and a “strategic measure” for “constructing a new structure layout for military branches.”
Modern military forces worldwide are shifting towards informatization, with the U.S. military being a prime example. The U.S. has established a Space Force and a Cyber Command, but they do not have a so-called Information Support Force; information technology has already been integrated into various military branches, forming a more comprehensive system, rather than relying solely on an independent information force.
The newly established Information Support Force of the CCP may provide technical support and guidance, but the claim of “coordinating the construction of the network information system” seems tenuous. The rank of this new branch is clearly subordinate to the major military branches, likely lacking the ability to coordinate and integrate various branches and theaters effectively. Xi Jinping and the CCP’s military commission are unlikely to grant excessive power to the Information Support Force, and if forced to coordinate, it will inevitably lead to new divisions or unequal distribution of resources.
The establishment of the Information Support Force by the CCP reflects the structural abnormalities within the military, highlighting a significant gap compared to modernized military forces.
The former political commissar of the Strategic Support Force, Li Wei, who was reassigned as the new political commissar of the Information Support Force, stated, “I will resolutely follow the commands of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.”
The new commander of the Information Support Force did not speak, instead delegating the task to the political commissar, once again showing Xi Jinping’s lack of trust in senior military officials; political workers lack military capabilities but can closely monitor senior officials on behalf of Xi Jinping, and therefore gain favor.
A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense briefly introduced the reform as a “new structure layout for military branches.”
This does not truly constitute a “new structure layout for military branches,” but rather the splitting of the original Strategic Support Force into three units, not a new branch but merely a type of military branch with a lower rank.
The Strategic Support Force originally had Aerospace System Department, Network System Department, upgraded to the Military Aerospace Force and Network Space Force, now directly under control of the military commission and Xi Jinping.
The original Strategic Support Force also included the 311 Base (responsible for public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare), Information Communication Base, Electronic Equipment Testing Center, which should be subsumed under the new Information Support Force; and a nuclear test base, the fate of which remains unclear.
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense could not provide specific details about the new Information Support Force but instead focused on the Military Aerospace Force and Network Space Force. Spokesperson Wu Qian of the Ministry claimed to be “advancing the construction of the Military Aerospace Force” while also stating “peaceful utilization of space.”
The Chinese military controls almost all of China’s space systems but paradoxically emphasizes space peace, which is rather awkward. While the CCP loudly announced the establishment of a new Information Support Force, no corresponding ceremonies for the Military Aerospace Force and Network Space Force were held, likely intentionally downplaying the event and keeping personnel appointments low-key.
Recent exposure of Chinese cyber-attacks by various countries and concerns over Chinese military threats in space have put a spotlight on the upgraded Military Aerospace Force and Network Space Force in China. China’s claims of “peaceful space utilization” and “development of network security defense capabilities” are typical falsehoods.
With the splitting of the Strategic Support Force and the subsequent thorough purge, political workers have gained more influence, further suppressing military officers and technical professionals. The post-split Military Aerospace Force, Network Space Force, and Information Support Force require high expertise but prioritize political loyalty; those who excel at showing loyalty tend to be promoted, disadvantaging technical specialists, and leading to intentional deception.
On April 18, Xinhua News Agency made a loud announcement regarding the commendation of astronauts Jing Haipeng, Zhu Yangzhu, and Gui Haichao by the CCP Central Committee and the Military Commission. In 2023, the three astronauts were launched into space on the Shenzhou-16 spacecraft to reside at the space station.
Jing Haipeng joined the Chinese Air Force in 1985 and later became an astronaut, promoted to Major General in 2013; in 2019, he served as Deputy Commander of the 82nd Army Group.
The second astronaut, Zhu Yangzhu, attended the National Defense University of the CCP and graduated as a military academy graduate with the rank of Colonel in the Army.
The third astronaut, Gui Haichao, graduated from Beihang University in Beijing and then pursued aerospace engineering studies at York University and Ryerson University in Canada, participating in research projects before returning to Beijing in 2017. With the CCP upgrading the Aerospace Force, Gui may now have to join the military, a requirement for participating in military projects, which may have already been done in secret.
The Chinese military dominates space business, with the first two astronauts being military personnel, albeit lacking professional knowledge; the third astronaut possesses expertise, but domestic institutions struggle to cultivate such talent, necessitating education overseas. With limited space talent domestically, they are mainly used for military purposes, yet not fully trusted.
Following the splitting of the Strategic Support Force and a significant personnel reshuffle, military officers with technical backgrounds might have to compromise, leading to further difficulties in advancing. The so-called nationwide system or autonomous development advocated by the CCP may not be achievable.
The newly appointed commander of the Information Support Force, Bi Yi, previously served as Chief of Staff of the 40th Army Group, Deputy Commander of the 78th Army Group, and Commander of the Hunan Military Region; in 2021, he became Deputy Minister of Training Management at the Central Military Commission; and in July 2023, he joined the Strategic Support Force as Deputy Commander.
Having army officers lead the Information Support Force may seem like a joke to outsiders, but the CCP persists in these actions. Troubles for the Strategic Support Force and the Rocket Force likely occurred in the first half of 2023, leading to the assignment of an army officer to the Strategic Support Force in July 2023, making it hard for the original team to gain trust.
The former political commissar of the Strategic Support Force, Li Wei, retained his position but was demoted. Li Wei previously served as Director of the Political Department of the 47th Army Group, Political Commissar of the Southern Xinjiang Military Region, Political Commissar of the 21st Army Group, and Xinjiang Military Region; he was appointed Political Commissar of the Strategic Support Force in December 2020. A member of the CCP Central Committee, he is considered loyal.
The former commander of the Strategic Support Force, Ju Qiansheng, graduated from Xi’an University of Electronic Science and Technology and held positions such as Deputy Director of the Technical Reconnaissance Department of the General Staff and Commander of the Network System Department of the Strategic Support Force; he was promoted to Commander of the Strategic Support Force in 2021 but has now been effectively removed.
The first commander of the Strategic Support Force, Gao Jin, had a long-term career in the Second Artillery Corps, taking office in December 2015. However, in April 2019, he was transferred to become Minister of Logistics Support of the Central Military Commission, retiring early in January 2022. The original team may not have been in favor for being associated with the Rocket Force or Second Artillery Corps.
The second commander of the Strategic Support Force, Li Fengbiao, served as Division Commander of the Airborne 44th Division, Chief of Staff of the 15th Army, Army Commander, Deputy Commander, and Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region; he assumed command of the Strategic Support Force in April 2019. Despite these qualifications, the fact that a professional from the Army now leads the newly established Information Support Force indicates a significant shift.
The former two political commissars of the Strategic Support Force were transferred from other branches, showing Xi Jinping’s lack of trust in the original team from the beginning. Li Shangfu, considered a professional with experience at the Xichang Satellite Launch Center and Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, served as the first Deputy Commander of the Strategic Support Force in 2016 before returning to the Equipment Department; he was appointed Minister of National Defense in 2023 but was quickly removed from office.
Following the split of the Strategic Support Force, major personnel reshuffling took place, potentially forcing technically proficient officers to compromise but face difficulties advancing. The Strategic Support Force, under the pretext of reform, was effectively dismantled, attempting to mask internal military disarray, yet following a similar path as the Rocket Force, falling into a deep purge. The chaos within the CCP’s military continues.
(Translated and rewritten from the original article in Chinese)