On September 13, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced the dismissal of former State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, Li Shangfu, and former Deputy Commander of the CCP Army, Deng Zhiping, from their positions as National People’s Congress deputies. Li Shangfu was declared “not representing” during the two sessions in March this year, and now the dismissal has been officially announced. Deng Zhiping’s dismissal, on the other hand, came suddenly.
According to a qualification review report released on September 13 by the CCP National People’s Congress website, Deng Zhiping was dismissed on June 6, 2024, by the army for “suspected serious violations of discipline and law.” However, the specific details of Deng Zhiping’s involvement, like many other fallen military leaders in recent times, have not been disclosed by the authorities. He has since disappeared, and how he was dealt with is another example of the CCP’s secretive operations.
Deng Zhiping, born in May 1964 in Xingan, Jiangxi Province (some sources say Emei, Sichuan), has a history of participating in border combat against Vietnam in the 1980s. He played a role in the battle to retake Laoshan in 1984 as a member of a reconnaissance unit and was decorated multiple times for his service.
Deng Zhiping served in important positions in the Chengdu Military Region and the 14th Group Army. The 14th Group Army, a disbanded CCP Army group stationed in Kunming, Yunnan Province, was founded by veteran CCP member Bo Yibo and was closely associated with him.
As part of a group tied to the Bo family, the 14th Group Army was ultimately disbanded in 2017 after experiencing a series of leadership changes following Bo Xilai’s downfall in 2012. Deng Zhiping’s background, although connected to the Bo faction, did not hinder his career progression, indicating that the Bo Xilai scandal did not impact him significantly.
Experts in Taiwan categorize the CCP’s current military leadership into two factions: the Vietnam War faction and the Taiwan Strait faction. Deng Zhiping falls into the Vietnam War faction due to his combat experience against Vietnam, which is rare among CCP military leaders.
Military leaders who participated in the Vietnam War have historically held higher status in the military, often viewing themselves as combat-oriented. These leaders, led by CCP Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, carry a sense of superiority. Zhang Youxia, who participated in the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts of 1979 and 1984, was retained by Xi Jinping due to his combat experience and loyalty.
On the other hand, the Taiwan Strait faction, composed of officers who served in the Nanjing Military Region’s Fujian Base or from the current Eastern Theater Command, is favored by Xi Jinping. Members of this faction have close ties to Xi Jinping during his time in Fujian. This group also includes current figures like Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang.
Recently, there have been speculations that the Taiwan Strait faction will dominate the military after the 20th National Congress of the CCP, given their familiarity with the geography surrounding Taiwan for the CCP’s goal of ‘reunifying’ Taiwan. However, members of the Taiwan Strait faction lack combat experience.
The downfall of Vietnam War veteran and former Deputy Commander of the Army, Deng Zhiping, represents a setback for the combat-oriented faction within the CCP military. This may have some impact on military morale. For Xi Jinping, who emphasizes military readiness and victory, losing a combat-experienced officer without engaging in an actual conflict represents a failure. However, what might concern Xi Jinping even more is the cardinal principle of “loyalty to the Party (Xi)” – Deng Zhiping’s alleged serious violations of discipline and law may suggest disloyalty to Xi Jinping, potentially linking him to recent cases of military equipment corruption.
As of September 13, the number of military delegates in the 14th National People’s Congress has decreased from 281 to 269. Among the 12 dismissed military representatives, there are four generals, six lieutenant generals, and two major generals. In the ongoing crackdown within the CCP military following the exposure of corruption in the Rocket Forces, several high-ranking officials, including former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu and former Rocket Force commanders Li Yuchao, Zhou Yaning, Wei Fenghe, have been implicated. Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu had both served as Minister of National Defense consecutively. Additionally, a group of military industry executives and experts have faced repercussions, while many high-ranking officials within the military industrial complex have seemingly ‘disappeared.’
However, arresting these individuals does not guarantee the elimination of corruption within the CCP military. In fact, the accusation of bribery against Li Shangfu implies the involvement of individuals of higher rank. The lack of investigations into this matter demonstrates the limits of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and suggests that it may only be a superficial attempt to address systemic issues within the Party.
It is unclear whether these measures will bring an end to corruption within the CCP military. Holding on to this collapsing corrupt system, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign may only skim the surface without addressing the core issues.