On May 23, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping presided over a symposium with entrepreneurs and experts in Jinan, Shandong, discussing the “further comprehensive deepening of reform”.
According to party media reports, “reform” has been a high-frequency term mentioned from this year’s two sessions to recent domestic inspections. The symposium with entrepreneurs and experts not only laid the groundwork for the upcoming 20th Third Plenum but also signaled further reform.
Those familiar with the history of the Chinese Communist Party know that the themes of the Third Plenum after the Cultural Revolution have always been about reform.
The 20th Third Plenum should have been held last year as per usual, but due to various reasons, it was delayed until July of this year. With just over a month left until July, the upcoming Third Plenum is drawing significant attention. Given the increasingly challenging domestic and international situations, what kind of reform proposals will be put forward at the 20th Third Plenum? How will they “comprehensively deepen reform”?
Since taking office as the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping has been nostalgic for the Mao era. Despite talking about reform, his actions have effectively negated Deng Xiaoping’s reform path, leading to a comprehensive regression in Chinese society. Today, China is not only unprecedentedly isolated in the international community but also facing economic stagnation and extreme social tensions.
In the face of immense pressure, Xi Jinping has had to reconsider reform and opening up to revive the economy and maintain political power.
Some believe that among the experts attending this symposium is Zhou Qiren, known for advocating “marketization” and “privatization.” It is possible that this Third Plenum may reset the button for reform and opening up.
Even if the 20th Third Plenum abandons Xi Jinping’s previous regressive approach and restarts Deng Xiaoping’s model of reform and opening up, it may not save the Chinese Communist Party and China. The reality has shown that Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up, focusing solely on economic reforms without changing the one-party dictatorship, cannot establish a standardized modern market economy or achieve democratic constitutionalism. The outcome would only serve the interests of the privileged few.
From various indications, the upcoming Third Plenum is likely to make adjustments to the policies since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, perhaps significant adjustments, and introduce some so-called new measures related to reform and opening up. However, even so, this meeting will never fully resurrect Deng Xiaoping’s reform path.
When Xi Jinping talks about reform and opening up, he never explicitly acknowledges Deng Xiaoping, let alone mention his name.
Why doesn’t he mention Deng Xiaoping? It’s because inwardly, he has always been dismissive of Deng’s reform and opening up.
In Xi Jinping’s speech at the symposium with entrepreneurs and experts, the most noteworthy aspect is not his emphasis on the importance of reform or his outline of the reform theme but rather how he explicitly sets boundaries and imposes constraints on reform.
While Xi repeatedly mentions “comprehensively deepening reform,” it does not mean that everything is up for reform. He stresses, “No matter how the reform is carried out, the fundamental principles of insisting on the Party’s overall leadership, adhering to Marxism, upholding the socialist path with Chinese characteristics, and maintaining the people’s democratic dictatorship must never be shaken.”
At first glance, Xi Jinping’s “four insistences” seem to echo Deng Xiaoping’s four basic principles. However, the devil is in the details. In terms of the critical issue of party leadership, Deng Xiaoping emphasized adhering to the leadership of the Communist Party of China, while Xi Jinping emphasizes the Party’s overall leadership, placing it as the first of the “four insistences.” Though the difference in wording may seem minor, the connotations are significant.
While Deng and Xi both emphasize the need to uphold the Party’s leadership, their views and positions on how to do so differ significantly. Deng emphasized improving the Party’s leadership alongside upholding it, advocating against personality cults, against centralized power, and addressing problems like the separation of party and government functions. This relaxation in political control post-Cultural Revolution provided the necessary conditions for Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented reforms. Without this relaxation, market reforms would have been impossible.
On the other hand, Xi Jinping’s notion of improving Party leadership involves strengthening it, even at the cost of weakening or abandoning it. His emphasis on the Party’s overall leadership aims to reassert the weakened party leadership from the periods of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. This includes reverting politically to the Mao era (including reinstating lifelong leadership and personality cults), where every aspect of society must obey the Party, and all controls over the people are reinforced.
As a result, regardless of how the Third Plenum “comprehensively deepens reform,” the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to politically loosen its grip. The tightening of speech controls, the implementation of anti-spy laws, secrecy laws, the expansion of police powers, etc., all indicate this trajectory.
With continued political control strengthening, how will the 20th Third Plenum “comprehensively deepen reform”? I believe the focus will revolve around three main aspects—activating the private economy, stabilizing and attracting foreign investment, and vigorously developing high technology. These can be summarized in one sentence: loosening up the economy. In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party has already introduced a series of measures in these areas, and this Third Plenum is likely to announce even more significant initiatives.
However, the tightening of political control and the loosening of the economy are conflicting. Without political reforms, true activation of the private economy, stabilization and attraction of foreign investment, genuine development of high technology, establishment of a standardized market economy—all of these would not be achievable. Thus, no matter how many reform measures are introduced at the Third Plenum, they may ultimately be futile.