The Chinese Communist Party held a Central Military Commission Political Work Conference in Yan’an from June 17th to 19th. During the meeting, CCP leader Xi Jinping emphasized that “the gun must always be controlled by people who are loyal and reliable to the party.”
In essence, the statement “the gun must always be controlled by people who are loyal and reliable to the party” means that the gun must always be controlled by people who are loyal and reliable to Xi Jinping.
As early as November 16, 2012, Xi Jinping emphasized at an expanded meeting of the CPC Central Military Commission the need to strengthen the party’s construction within the military to ensure the firm grasp of the troops from a ideological, political, and organizational perspective. It is essential to appoint and employ cadres based on political loyalty to ensure that the gun is always in the hands of those loyal to the party.
From that time until now, Xi Jinping has reiterated this theme on several important occasions, indicating the significance he places on this matter.
The reason the current party leader repeatedly emphasizes that the gun must always be in the hands of those loyal and reliable to him is not a sudden decision but a calculated move. Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party, whoever controls the gun can grasp the highest power of the party. Only when those loyal and reliable to the party leader control the gun can the party leader’s position be secure and their authority be ensured. Does Xi Jinping not understand this? This is why he always emphasizes this point.
So, are the guns currently in the hands of those loyal and reliable to Xi Jinping? I believe they are not.
Certainly, some may disagree. They may argue that Xi Jinping eliminated various factions within the party at the 20th National Congress, consolidating power even surpassing Mao Zedong. The military leadership are all his trusted confidants handpicked by him. How could the gun not be in the hands of those loyal and reliable to him?
Indeed, after the 20th National Congress, Xi Jinping’s power is unprecedented, and the military leadership is indeed composed of his trusted confidants. However, this does not guarantee that the gun is already in the hands of those loyal and reliable to him.
Former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, was he handpicked by him? Were the high-ranking officials in the Rocket Force who were removed from their positions his appointees? These individuals were all members of Xi’s faction, handpicked by him. However, the fact proves that they are not loyal to him; they are all typical double-dealers. Does Xi Jinping not know this? If he was initially unaware, he must have become aware later on. This is why he conducted large-scale purges within the military, convened a meeting to rectify the military commission’s work on the eve of the 20th Third Plenum, and issued another warning to the high-level military officials – “the gun must always be controlled by people who are loyal and reliable to the party.”
After assuming the position of party leader, Xi Jinping’s most pressing concern remains how to ensure that the gun is in the hands of those loyal and reliable to him. But why, after more than a decade, with the factions led by Jiang and Hu dismantled in the military, does the gun still not firmly controlled by those loyal and reliable to him?
The reasons for this are complex, yet straightforward.
Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party, the ways in which party leaders control the military mainly revolve around a few key points: relying on the leader’s personal authority and charisma; utilizing financial incentives; and utilizing political pressure combined with ideological indoctrination.
Why was Mao Zedong able to control the military? While he also used political pressure and financial incentives, his primary leverage was his authority and charisma, with military leaders obedient and rarely exhibiting political duplicity.
Mao was one of the founders of the Communist military and his authority and charisma were established and honed in warfare, unmatched by others. Hence, military leaders held high loyalty towards him, enabling him to maintain control over the military.
Deng Xiaoping didn’t wield the same level of control as Mao Zedong but most military top brass listened to him and aligned with him, primarily due to his historical authority and charisma.
Jiang Zemin lacked the authority and charisma of Mao and Deng, but he managed to maintain control over the military. How did he achieve this? Through financial incentives. Those who followed his orders could secure promotions and wealth. Hence, the military obeyed him.
Xi Jinping lacks practical experience within the military and does not have a solid foundation within the army. He lacks the authority and charisma of Mao and Deng. Moreover, after coming to power, he rigorously implemented anti-corruption measures in the military, cutting off various military officers’ paths to wealth. His means of controlling the military boil down to political pressure – primarily through anti-corruption efforts – and so-called ideological education, essentially brainwashing military leaders with orthodox Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies. The anti-corruption drive may instill fear in military leaders, but inwardly, they may resist. As for brainwashing, today’s military leaders are not the same as the Red Army leadership of the past, immune to idealistic beliefs. So how is Xi Jinping supposed to truly control the gun with these double-dealing individuals?