The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has concluded. While the Party presented the “15th Five-Year Plan,” the public showed little interest in it and instead focused on the changes in the Party leadership. Former insiders of the CCP system have conducted in-depth analysis of the key points in the plenary session communique and revealed through relevant channels that Xi Jinping has been completely stripped of his military power.
After the release of the Fourth Plenary Session communique by the CCP, it sparked various interpretations. A wealthy businessman known as “Lao Wang,” who had previously worked in the CCP’s National Development and Reform Commission system and is currently residing in Canada, provided an analysis of the communique in a video program, highlighting several key points that caught the attention of netizens.
According to Xinhua News Agency, the plenary session confirmed the promotion of Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This was the only high-level personnel appointment announced at the meeting.
Lao Wang remarked that there were no additional members appointed to the Central Military Commission. He jokingly commented that this was unexpected. The Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP seemed to be as uneventful as not having a meeting at all, surprising people as it cost a large amount of money and mobilized a considerable number of troops, yet the only change was Zhang Shengmin’s promotion as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Speculations were rife outside about the possibility of Xi Jinping’s military power undergoing changes.
He disclosed that a source with high-level connections in the CCP privately messaged him, indicating that Xi’s military authority had been completely stripped.
The CCP announced the opening date of the Fourth Plenary Session, which would deliberate on China’s 15th “Five-Year Plan.”
Lao Wang revealed that one of his fans in Beijing, Lao Xu, emailed him, providing insights from mainland China about the Fourth Plenary Session: no one wanted to see the “15th Five-Year Plan,” as no one was interested in it; the focus was on personnel adjustments, who is moving up and who is moving down, which was the real concern.
He mentioned that only three sentences in the Fourth Plenary Session communique were significant. The first sentence: the session decided to appoint Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission; the second sentence, “The entire Party, the whole country, and all the people of all ethnic groups in the country must unite even more closely around Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of the Party Central Committee…”; and the third sentence, 168 Central Committee members and 147 alternate members attended the session.
The Central Military Commission should have filled three more positions, and all were eager to know who those three individuals would be, but in the end, there were no additional appointments made. Zhang Shengmin, who was promoted to Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, is a close subordinate of Zhang Yuxia. Currently, there are only four members on the Central Military Commission apart from Xi Jinping, with only three wearing military uniforms, having led troops in battle: Zhang Yuxia and Zhang Shengmin as Vice Chairmen of the Military Commission, and one member, Liu Zhenli, who is also a direct subordinate of Zhang Yuxia.
Therefore, Zhang Yuxia continues to have full control over the military, and at present, no one in the CCP’s top leadership can restrain Zhang Yuxia in terms of the military, as all critical departments are under his control. If Xi wants to deal with Zhang Yuxia, what measures can he take? Hence, Xi Jinping has now become a nominal commander in the military, with reports suggesting that personnel from the Special Guard Bureau and the Central Security Bureau have been reassigned under Zhang Yuxia’s command. In other words, the military has currently deviated from the command of the “Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core.” In reality, this situation had already emerged before the Fourth Plenary Session.
Lao Wang stated that now the “gun is in charge of the Party, but it cannot be effectively commanded, as the communique of the Fourth Plenary Session, ‘unite around the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core,’ proves this point. This also indicates that Zhang Yuxia only controls the military. The CCP’s Party, government, and military have three separate systems; the party and government do not comply with military orders, leading to the need to bring in the ‘Elderly Gang,’ but even the ‘Elderly Gang’ lacks unity and is even incompatible with each other.”
Lao Wang pointed out that the second highlight of the Fourth Plenary Session communique was a significant decrease in the number of attendees.
When the Fourth Plenary Session was convened, there should have been 205 members of the 20th Central Committee and 167 alternate members. However, the official figures revealed that there were 168 Central Committee members and 147 alternate Central Committee members present at the Fourth Plenary Session. This meant that 37 Central Committee members and 20 alternate members were absent, totaling 57 individuals.
Lao Wang remarked that the absentee rate of Central Committee members at the Fourth Plenary Session was much higher than in previous sessions. This indicates that the anti-corruption measures taken by the Xi administration have intensified to a point where the Central Committee (comprising both Central Committee members and alternate Central Committee members) – the highest governing body of the CCP – has experienced a significant hollowing out, including the absence of a large number of Central Committee members who have been removed or detained and largely belonging to Xi’s faction, thus being in a “missing” state.
The Fourth Plenary Session confirmed the previous decision of the Politburo of the CCP to expel 14 members of the Central Committee, including 10 Central Committee members and four alternate Central Committee members.
In December of the previous year, Central Committee member and former Director-General of the General Administration of Customs, Yu Jianhua, died under abnormal circumstances. Coupled with the expulsions of the 10 members of the 20th Central Committee, the Fourth Plenary Session decided to nominate 11 alternate Central Committee members as Central Committee members: Yu Huiwen, Ma Hancheng, Wang Jian, Wang Xi, Wang Yonghong, Wang Tingkai, Wang Xinwei, Wei Tao, Deng Yiwu, Deng Xiuming, and Lu Hong.
From the list of alternate Central Committee members of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, it is evident that seven alternate members were skipped in the nomination process. These individuals included Major General Wang Liyan, Deputy Commander of the Rocket Force; Major General Wang Kangping, Commander of the Logistics Support Force; Deputy Minister of Education Wang Jiayi; Major General Fang Yongxiang, Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission; Fang Hongwei, Party Secretary of the CPC Shaanxi Provincial Committee and Secretary of the Xi’an Municipal Committee; Shi Yugang, Deputy Party Secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the CPPCC; and Major General Shi Zhenglu, Commander of the Northern Theater Command. Those who were skipped might have encountered some issues.
Lao Wang stated that the skipping of these seven central alternate committee members was also a notable point. With a significant reduction in the number of CCP Military Commission members and the collapse of the Central Committee, why were such crucial positions bypassed?
He analyzed the political backgrounds of the individuals who were skipped. Wang Liyan, born in 1962, served as the Deputy Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission in 2019, with the then Director being Zhong Shaojun. After Wang Liyan was promoted to Deputy Commander of the Rocket Force, his commanding officer – his superior – was Wang Houbin. In other words, his previous superiors were Zhong Shaojun and Wang Houbin, with Wang Houbin being expelled from the Party during the Fourth Plenary Session.
He continued, mentioning Wang Kangping, born in 1965, being a protégé of He Weidong, originating from the 31st Army. In June 2021, Wang Kangping was appointed Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater Command, with the Commander at the time being He Weidong, who was recently expelled from the Party.
Wang Jiayi, born in December 1965, had an academic background and held various positions in education and provincial governments before serving as Deputy Minister of Education. Throughout his career, Wang Jiayi had worked as an assistant to Lin Duo and Yin Hong and had served as Lin Duo’s chief secretary, thus epitomizing a reserve force for Xi’s faction.
Fang Yongxiang, born in 1966, served in the Fujian 31st Group Army from 1989 to 2014, with his immediate boss being Miao Hua. In March 2024, Fang Yongxiang went to Beijing to succeed Zhong Shaojun as the Military Commission’s Chief Secretary, holding a pivotal position under Xi Jinping in the military. There were rumors circulating that he had been dismissed and was under investigation, leading to his omission from the promotion list.
Fang Hongwei, born in 1966, originally from Fuping, previously worked as Secretary to Vice Premier Liu Guozhong of the State Council.
“Lao Wang” remarked that the seven skipped alternate Central Committee members were all part of Xi’s faction.
Rumors about Xi Jinping relinquishing his military power at the Fourth Plenary Session were widespread before and during the meeting, with multiple versions of the military commission’s changes circulating.
In conclusion, Lao Wang summarized that the intense power struggle at the top echelons of the CCP in recent years was a glaring reality, with no consensus reached. Looking at the absent Central Committee and alternate Central Committee members, as well as the overlooked alternate Central Committee members in the nomination process, it was evident that Xi Jinping’s influence had been severely diminished.
He likened the current situation within the CCP to Xi Jinping losing his leadership position while the Central Military Commission remained powerful, but unable to ascend due to the lack of legitimacy, as the CCP’s elders each had their own agendas, making it impossible to reach a consensus on personnel and leadership arrangements. The only consensus that could be reached was that the CCP gang needed to maintain a facade, avoid internal conflict, preserve the status quo, and facilitate a graceful power transition for Xi.
He noted, however, that this facade could not be sustained for long. The upcoming CCP Two Sessions next year and the subsequent 21st National Congress provided opportunities for a major showdown – they needed to stake their claims beforehand, resulting in continuous political maneuvers. Any illusions about enlightened figures emerging within the CCP and calling for change were misguided, as it failed to grasp the true nature of this political gang.