The Chinese Communist Party’s Xinjiang Party Secretary, Ma Xingrui, was unexpectedly removed from his position yesterday (July 1st), with reports indicating that he has been “appointed elsewhere.” The circumstances surrounding his removal and his future career path have sparked speculation. Observers believe that Ma Xingrui may have been sidelined as a representative of the “old military-industrial complex,” stepping away from the decision-making core, with some suggesting that his dismissal is one of the consequences of Xi Jinping’s reshuffling.
According to a report by the Chinese state news agency Xinhua on July 1st, Ma Xingrui, a current member of the Political Bureau, will no longer concurrently serve as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang, as a new appointment has been made, with Chen Xiaojiang taking over.
This marks another rare adjustment among members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Bureau, following the exchange of duties between Li Ganjie, Minister of the Organization Department, and Shi Taifeng, Minister of the United Front Work Department in April this year.
Prior to Ma Xingrui, when former Xinjiang secretaries Zhang Chunxian and Chen Quanguo stepped down, alternative appointments were also announced. Zhang Chunxian later assumed the role of Deputy Head of the Central Party’s Construction Work Leading Group and became Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 2018. Chen Quanguo went on to become the Deputy Head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group. Both positions were considered idle roles.
Aged 66, Ma Xingrui, a native of Yuncheng, Shandong, has held various positions including Vice President of the China Academy of Aerospace, Deputy General Manager of the Aerospace Science and Technology Group, and General Manager of the Aerospace Science and Technology Group from 2007 to 2013. Since 2013, he has served as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Director of the National Space Administration, and Director of the Communist Party of China’s State Administration of Defense Science, among other roles. He took over as the Party Secretary of Xinjiang from Chen Quanguo in 2022 and was appointed as a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party in the same year.
Ma Xingrui and Xi Jinping’s wife, Peng Liyuan, are fellow townspeople from Yuncheng, Shandong, and his career advancement has been linked to his relationship with the Xi couple.
Shen Mingshi, a researcher at the Taiwan Institute for National Defense Security, told Dajiyuan that if things proceed as usual, Ma Xingrui may be reassigned to an idle position following the pattern of his predecessors. Xi Jinping had specifically moved him out from the military-industrial system to Guangdong and then to Xinjiang, grooming him to become a member of the Central Political Bureau. If all had gone smoothly, he could have potentially become a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau at the 21st Party Congress or beyond.
He speculated that it may be due to recent corruption cases within the military-industrial system where Ma Xingrui has been implicated, as some officials who have been investigated were promoted by him. Another possibility is that as Xi’s influence wanes, those he promoted like Ma Xingrui would also be affected.
Since 2023, numerous senior executives from Chinese military-industrial enterprises have fallen from grace, with China Aerospace Science and Technology Group being particularly hard-hit. This includes former chairmen Wu Yansheng and Lei Fanpei, as well as Dai Shunlun, former secretary of the Heilongjiang Provincial Committee, among others.
Former Chinese media personality Zhao Lanjian told Dajiyuan that Ma Xingrui’s removal cannot simply be attributed to being “marginalized.” His departure must be viewed within the broader context of the “cleansing of the military-industrial system.” Ma Xingrui is a rare figure within the system, being both a “technocratic bureaucrat, military-industrial power player, and governing cadre with experience in managing Xinjiang.” It is precisely due to these roles that he has become a key figure in the current crackdown on corruption within the military-industrial system. The crackdown targets not only corruption but also personnel changes.
Zhao further emphasized that this wave of purges may be a systematic preparation for a comprehensive deployment of a “wartime mechanism.” Ma Xingrui appears to be a representative of the “old military-industrial complex” in this systemic reorganization. Zhao believes Ma Xingrui may be moved to a “well-placed idle position” or may serve as a “behind-the-scenes advisor” in the military-industrial field, gradually withdrawing from the decision-making core.
In recent years, Xi Jinping’s confidant Miowen has been taken down within the military, and Li Ganjie was also replaced midway during his term, with Ma Xingrui now suddenly removed from his position.
There is a viewpoint suggesting that Xi Jinping is engaging in a form of “self-castration” in terms of personnel changes. The Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party held a political study session on June 30th to implement the so-called “Eight Provisions of the Central Committee” and anti-corruption measures, with Chinese state media also mentioning Xi once again advocating for “self-revolution.”
However, Shen Mingshi believes that by promoting a “self-revolution,” Xi has opened himself up to potential demands from others to handle his affiliated personnel using the same principles he promotes in his “self-revolution” or the “Eight Provisions.”
Shen further analyzed that there have been rumors surrounding Li Ganjie being investigated, and Ma Xingrui may also be under investigation due to corruption within the military-industrial system. When anti-Xi factions or elders demand Xi Jinping to deal with the people he promoted, Xi is compelled to address the situation.
“This is purely a factional struggle because the people promoted by Xi Jinping are themselves not clean; he has no choice but to handle them. As he gets weakened, Xi Jinping’s influence declines, and subsequently, he lacks the strength or ability to counteract challenges from other factions or crackdowns on him,” Shen said.
In May, Dajiyuan received information from authoritative sources indicating that Xi Jinping had begun to lose power since April last year. Although Xi Jinping still appears to be in power on the surface, the overall trend is against him, with senior Chinese Communist Party figures like Wen Jiabao and Zhang Youxia becoming crucial factors in shaping China’s political situation. Currently, Xi is simply going along with the show, doing what he is told.
It is noteworthy that the official Chinese report on July 1st mentioned that a leadership meeting for officials in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was held that day, with Huang Jianfa, Deputy Minister assisting in overseeing daily work, announcing the aforementioned decision. This was the first public appearance of Huang Jianfa in his role under the new title “Deputy Minister assisting in overseeing daily work.” Huang Jianfa is a member of the Central Committee, currently ranked third in the Organization Department.
Within the Organization Department leadership, there are two “Vice National Level” leaders, namely Xi Jinping, a member of the Political Bureau and Minister of the Organization Department, and Jiang Xinzhi, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and Deputy Minister assisting in overseeing daily work.
Traditionally, for the installation of new officials at the level of Political Bureau members overseeing the four direct-controlled municipalities and Xinjiang and Guangdong, the Minister of the Organization Department generally visits and officially announces the appointments to demonstrate the importance of the position. For the appointment of provincial and municipal party secretaries, a deputy minister or even a department director from the Organization Department typically makes the announcements.
In 2010, when Zhang Chunxian took over from Wang Lequan as Xinjiang Party Secretary, then Organization Department Minister Li Yuanchao personally announced the appointment. Even then-Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice President of the State Xi Jinping attended and spoke at the event. In 2016, when Chen Quanguo succeeded Zhang Chunxian, then Organization Department Minister Zhao Leji also went to Urumqi, Xinjiang, to make the announcement and had Zhao Zuyi, the Organization Department’s Deputy Director and head of the Cadre Bureau, accompany him.
However, when Ma Xingrui took over from Chen Quanguo at the end of 2021, it was Deputy Minister assisting in overseeing daily work Jiang Xinzhi who announced the appointment, without making any public endorsement. This time, with Chen Xiaojang succeeding Ma Xingrui, the Organization Department only had Huang Jianfa, ranked third, announce the appointment without any public endorsement.
Zhao Lanjian believes this is a very significant detail. The downgrade in the representation level from the Organization Department indicates that the period of “political experimentation” in Xinjiang has come to an end. From the 2009 “7-5” incident to Chen Quanguo’s era after 2017, Xinjiang was utilized by the Chinese Communist Party as a “social governance technology testing ground,” implementing a set of techniques including large-scale data monitoring, concentration camp models, community penetration, etc. This system of human rights abuses has now been extended nationwide.
He stated that Ma Xingrui’s succession by Chen Xiaojiang as a “technocratic bureaucrat of the State Council” is merely to facilitate a political transition, signaling the absence of a “stabilizer” in Xinjiang. The subdued nature of the official ceremonies is in itself an indication of Xinjiang’s diminishing political significance.