When temples became a capital game cloaked in “kasaya”

In recent years, China’s economy has stagnated, unemployment has risen, and consumer spending has declined. However, three years after the epidemic lockdown, a new trend called the “Temple Fever,” characterized by the participation of young people, has quietly emerged. Mainland Chinese media are enthusiastically promoting the “Temple Economy,” with some viewpoints suggesting that temples have become a “spiritual sanctuary” for young people. Yet, the harsh reality behind the “Temple Fever” is drawing increasing attention.

Nowadays, more and more young people are keen on buying various temple-related products, indirectly boosting the Temple Economy. This trend has led to the listing of travel companies, such as Mount Putuo, which is preparing for an initial public offering, and Mount Emei and Mount Jiuhua Travel Co., Ltd., which has already been listed.

The “Temple Fever” began three years after the epidemic lockdown. According to data from Ctrip, starting from 2023, ticket bookings for Buddhist cultural attractions have shown explosive growth, with a year-on-year increase of up to 310%. Young people in urban areas have become the main force behind the Temple Fever, with those born after 1995 and 2000 accounting for as much as 50%.

Popular temples like the Lama Temple in Beijing and Lingyin Temple in Hangzhou have seen a surge in visitors—Lama Temple-related topics have garnered over 1.6 billion views, while Lingyin Temple has surpassed 1.4 billion views. Young people not only visit temples to pray but also turn them into “Internet-famous check-in spots.”

On June 11, a reporter from Dajiyuan viewed Douyin and found a plethora of related videos under the search term “offering incense.”

Regarding the Temple Fever, it is generally believed that young people are seeking a place of spiritual solace due to economic and life pressures. Data from iMedia Consulting shows that 56.5% of young people admit that offering incense is one of their ways to relieve stress.

The issue of high youth unemployment rates has been a major concern in recent years. Official data shows that the youth unemployment rate steadily increased month by month in the first half of 2023, reaching a new high of 21.3% in June 2023. The government subsequently suspended the release of the latest relevant data from August onwards, citing the need to “improve and optimize” statistical work. The data released months later did not include students currently in school but remained in the double digits. Reports of falsifying university employment rates have become prevalent, with the phrase “unemployed upon graduation” gaining popularity.

On June 10, Beijing scholar Liu Ming told Dajiyuan that during the strict epidemic control measures imposed by the Chinese Communist Party over the past three years, the entire economy was paralyzed, leaving many unemployed young people feeling lost and turning to religion for spiritual comfort.

Some believe it is a revival of traditional culture. Mainland China-based lawyer Wu stated that although the CCP has imposed atheism on the Chinese people from a young age, many young people are not true believers in the CCP’s propaganda.

On June 11, Huang Qianfeng, Chief of the Department of Psychiatry at Miaoli Hospital in Taiwan, told Dajiyuan that whether in a state of material affluence or in times of hardship, people seem to seek a higher spiritual meaning, which may be God’s mercy towards humanity.

He believes that some young people have found spiritual meaning in China’s 5,000-year-old traditional culture, perceiving virtues such as loyalty, perseverance, and the cultivation of one’s character behind poems and prose. Although there was a period of cultural poverty after the Cultural Revolution, people are longing for revival, seeing the brilliance in traditional Chinese orthodox divine culture.

Canadian-Chinese writer Sheng Xue told Dajiyuan that the current Temple Fever seems like Chinese young people have fallen in love with temples, religious culture, and a seemingly detached traditional way of life. However, this is not a return to traditional culture. “Because the CCP is very afraid of traditional culture, it will not allow a return to traditional culture. All of this is wrapped in money, making it look glamorous.”

She further stated that the Temple Fever is primarily a projection of a spiritual crisis of the times. “The political high pressure of the CCP prevents people from speaking out, to the point that they’re afraid to even ‘like’ something online. Economic decline makes young people see no hope, and information censorship disrupts normal judgment. The severe social alienation leaves some non-conformists without any sense of belonging. Some people still have a spiritual need, which they place in the seemingly ancient and peaceful temple spaces. However, the Temple Fever does not signify a revival of religious beliefs in China; it is a form of escapism for the crowd after life has completely spiraled out of control.”

Against the backdrop of the “Temple Fever,” the “Temple Economy” has emerged as a new term in the Chinese economy in recent years.

According to reports from mainland and Hong Kong media, there are over 30,000 existing temples in China, with the vast majority already commercialized. Most temples are concentrated in major cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, with a significant number generating revenue exceeding a billion yuan. Temple income mainly comes from ticket sales, offerings, merit boxes, ceremonies and services, offerings, and other commercial activities such as trademark licenses, rental income, and advertising fees.

Many temples are designated as 5A national tourist attractions with expensive ticket prices. For instance, the entrance ticket to Mount Putuo costs 220 yuan, Emei Mountain requires a pure ticket of 160 yuan, Lingyin Temple 210 yuan, Shaolin Temple 80 yuan, and Lingyin Temple 45 yuan. Sometimes, after entering the temple, additional tickets for offerings and other activities need to be purchased separately. The price of “First Incense” during Chinese New Year starts from tens of thousands of yuan, becoming a major source of profit for temples.

In order to generate revenue, temples occasionally hold ceremonies and fundraising events, with entrance fees ranging from hundreds to tens of thousands of yuan. The price of incense offerings ranges from tens of yuan to astronomical amounts, with individual cases exceeding 100,000 yuan. The subsidiary of Mount Putuo, Ji Xiang Incense Industry, had sales revenue of 32 million yuan in 2019 from incense offerings alone.

Temples offer not only vegetarian noodles and self-service vegetarian meals but also alcoholic beverages, milk tea, and coffee for consumption, as well as lucky charm bracelets for purchase. Lingyin Temple’s 58 yuan “Tangerine Peel Soy Sauce” had annual sales of 3.2 million yuan, while sales of the “Eighteen Seed Bracelet” on Taobao surged by 566%. Temples also attract young people through live streaming, short videos, and other emerging methods.

The merit boxes in temples have turned into electronic versions, allowing for direct scan code donations. Some temples claim that donations through electronic merit boxes have increased by over 30% compared to traditional methods.

Temples with assets totaling hundreds of millions or even billions have established foundations engaging in investments, cultural tourism, water management, art troupes, network technology, and even passenger transportation, turning temples into diversified conglomerates.

Reports indicate that it is a wave of young people and various revenue-generating methods that are making temples increasingly wealthy, with some temples even seeing the emergence of publicly listed companies. When temples are transformed into travel companies, it becomes a capital game veiled in “monk robes.”

Regarding this, mainland Chinese netizens also have many doubts: “Do temple offerings pay taxes?” “Buddhism has become a business.” “I once heard about money laundering through merit boxes, which was shocking.” “Both temples and lotteries are the same.” “It is said that Fujian Putian people have bought a large number of temple operating rights in China. This is a good business.” “Are we giving them all the money we donate?” “First deal with the tourism bureau.”

Sheng Xue stated that from what she has seen online, temple-made small commodities are elaborately packaged and marketed to bring in more money. This is not about religious belief because the CCP does not allow anyone to have genuine religious faith. All major religions in China are controlled by the CCP, and temples themselves have party branches. Temples can never become true spiritual sanctuaries; instead, they become commercial spaces to extract money from already beleaguered young people. “This Temple Fever is actually very distressing. Because young people have no political aspirations, they have been squeezed by the reality of society to a point of having no way out, only to be taken advantage of even more when they enter the temple.”

Beijing scholar Liu Ming stated that rather than the prosperity of temple economics, it is more about young people’s despair about their own future and the future of the country as a whole. However, the CCP ruthlessly harvests the despair, pessimism, and frustration of these young people.

According to mainland Chinese media reports, the market size of the Chinese temple economy reached between 80 billion and 90 billion yuan in 2023, with predictions that it will surpass 100 billion yuan in 2025. Data shows that Mount Emei’s annual income reaches 820 million yuan, Jiuhua Mountain 720 million yuan, and Lingyin Temple 670 million yuan. As temple revenues have been performing well, they have become a significant engine for regional economic growth, prompting local governments to provide strong support.

Reportedly, based on the revenue from temple entrance tickets, the revenue is divided between the local government and the temple in a 7:3 ratio, with the revenue from small tickets going to the local Communist Buddhist Association, which is then autonomously allocated between them and the temple.

Sheng Xue stated that Chinese temples are entirely under the control of the CCP, managed by CCP party branches. Many temples have become places for concealing and accumulating dirt, with many people in monk robes engaging in romantic relationships, keeping mistresses, engaging in debauchery, and cheating and extorting money under this guise.

The famous Shaolin Temple, under the united front of the CCP, has long been established as a commercial entity, even being referred to as a “pillar industry” in Henan Province. The current abbot, Shi Yongxin, is known as the “political monk” and “Shaolin CEO,” engaging in commercial operations since 1986. On June 21, 2020, the Henan Songshan Shaolin Temple held a fashion show in front of the temple gate, promoted by CCP official media as the “first time in Shaolin’s 1,500-year history.”

Shi Yongxin is also the Vice Chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association and the President of the Henan Provincial Buddhist Association. Shi Yongxin has been repeatedly reported to have dual households, keep several mistresses, have illicit children with nuns, and engage in various scandals.

In 2018, the former head of the Chinese Buddhist Association, Shi Xuecheng, was accused of sexually assaulting multiple female disciples.

In 2023, there was public outcry on Chinese social media regarding the scandal involving Shi Zhaojie, a member of the Sichuan Provincial Political Consultative Conference, former Vice President of the Provincial Buddhist Association, and abbot of the Shixiang Temple in Pujiang County, Chengdu. Shi Zhaojie was involved in an improper relationship with a female anchor named Cai, leading her husband Qian to extort more than three million yuan from him.

In November 2023, Wei Gang, abbot of the Dean Monastery in Taiwan, Jilin Province, was sentenced to prison. Wei Gang was revealed to have profited from multiple temples under his control, luring and assaulting 14 women.

Those who truly seek spiritual practice within religions are being marginalized.

In December last year, the government of Shaoguan, Guangdong, released a video claiming that three nuns chanting scriptures near the Nan Hua Temple were “non-religious professionals.” The three individuals later released a video stating that they were true nuns who never received a penny from anyone, while the monks under the temple who engage in eating, drinking, gambling, deception, and theft are seen as real monks by the Communist Party. The nuns accused the CCP of deceiving the public and stated that there should be no place for such deceit.

This concludes the translated and rewritten news article on the “Temple Fever” and the emerging “Temple Economy” trend in China.