In recent days, there has been widespread speculation overseas about significant personnel changes at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, with various opinions circulating.
One opinion suggests that at the plenary session, Xi Jinping may pass the General Secretary position to the youngest member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, Ding Xuexiang, and Li Keqiang’s position as Premier may be taken over by the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee Chen Jineng. Li Keqiang would replace Zhao Leji as Chairman of the National People’s Congress; and Xi Jinping would remain as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Another opinion suggests that at the plenary session, Xi may retain only the ceremonial role of President, relinquishing the positions of General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission.
Yet another opinion proposes that the current Vice Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Hu Chunhua, may take over as General Secretary and the Chairman of the Military Commission.
These speculations cannot be confirmed at present, but where there’s smoke, there’s fire. These speculations are not groundless and are likely leaked by different factions within the CCP ahead of the Fourth Plenary Session.
As for who will succeed Xi in any particular position at the Fourth Plenary Session, I do not wish to discuss that. Instead, I will share my thoughts on the potential scenarios Xi may face at the upcoming session.
At the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party in July 2024, Xi suddenly fell ill and was hospitalized. Subsequently, his power was significantly weakened, and the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, became a key figure in shaping the CCP’s political landscape.
Since last July, significant changes have occurred within the CCP’s military. The most notable change is under Zhang Youxia’s leadership, Xi’s top confidant in the military, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, He Waidong, and the second confidant, member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department under the Military Commission, Miao Hua, were investigated and removed from their positions.
With the fall of He and Miao, Xi’s power within the military was significantly undermined. The situation surrounding this can be seen in my article published on May 3 on Dajiyuan, titled “He Waidong and Others Purged: Who is Behind the Scenes?”.
The official announcement of the investigation into He Waidong by the CCP has not been made public yet. If the Fourth Plenary Session is convened, the CCP will undoubtedly need to address the issue of He Waidong. If the CCP officially confirms the investigation into He Waidong, it would indicate that Xi Jinping’s power is indeed waning. The Fourth Plenary Session should have a statement on whether Xi will hand over power.
So, what could be the possible scenarios Xi will face at the Fourth Plenary Session?
In my opinion, Xi’s positions as General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission may be difficult to maintain, given the numerous senior party, government, and military officials he has antagonized.
Before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, under the guise of anti-corruption efforts, Xi investigated over 160 senior CCP military officers. This number exceeds the combined total of generals who fell during internal and external conflicts since the CCP military was established in 1927. Additionally, there were some cases of individuals committing suicide by jumping off buildings, drowning, or poisoning themselves.
Following the 20th Congress, Xi initiated a major purge within the military, targeting a group of senior generals including the member of the Central Military Commission and State Councilor, Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu, and the former commanders of the Rocket Force, Wei Fengbing, Zhou Yaning, and Li Yuchao, among others, pressuring the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia.
The military purge supervised by Zhang Youxia focused on issues related to military equipment. Zhang Youxia previously served as the first minister of the Equipment Development Department of the Military Commission after the 2015 military reform. The senior military officers taken down by Xi were all former subordinates of Zhang Youxia.
If Zhang Youxia does not act promptly, he may become the next target for Xi after the purge of He Waidong and Miao Hua. The sudden hospitalization of Xi in July last year during the Third Plenary Session provided Zhang Youxia with an excellent opportunity to counterattack.
Subsequently, under Zhang Youxia’s leadership, a group of key allies in Xi’s camp within the military were either transferred or removed.
After Zhang Youxia oversaw the removal of Xi’s first and second confidants, He Waidong and Miao Hua, Xi’s military authority was sidelined, and Zhang Youxia emerged as the key figure controlling the military power.
During the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, Xi essentially eradicated the Communist Youth League faction. Prominent figures associated with the Communist Youth League faction who were potential candidates for the Politburo were all excluded under Xi’s leadership.
At the closing ceremony of the 20th Congress, in front of the international mainstream media, Xi personally ordered the removal of the head of the Communist Youth League faction, 80-year-old retired former top CCP party, government, and military leader Hu Jintao, who had been retired for ten years. This action left many people feeling cold.
Another representative figure of the Communist Youth League faction, former member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang, who had retired only seven months prior, suddenly passed away. Former Xinhua News Agency journalist Gu Wanming, who publicly questioned the cause of Li Keqiang’s death, was surprisingly sentenced to one year in prison. These incidents have stirred dissatisfaction among many towards Xi.
At the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, Xi ordered the removal of Hu Jintao as a way to humiliate and punish the Communist Youth League faction, as well as a form of humiliation and punishment for retired “political elders”. At that time, the “benefactor” who promoted and valued Hu Jintao – the former member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, the 105-year-old Song Ping was seated on the main stage.
Since taking office, Xi has been vigilant against “old people in office” and has imposed various restrictions on retired “political elders”.
For instance, on May 15, 2022, Xinhua News Agency published the Central Office Opinions on Strengthening the Party Building Work of Retired Cadres in the New Era. The opinion requires retired cadres to “not randomly discuss the major policies of the Party Central Committee, not spread politically negative comments, not participate in illegal social organizations, and not use their former positions or duties to influence benefits for themselves and others”. This amounts to placing another restriction on retired “political elders”, especially concerning significant issues related to the 20th Congress, rendering these elders unable to voice opinions.
From March 26 to April 6, 2021, eight years retired and 79-year-old Wen Jiabao, published four articles in the Macau Daily News reminiscing about his deceased mother. Some mainland websites reprinted the articles but were soon blocked. On April 17, the WeChat public account “scholar” reposted the article, but it was subsequently banned from further sharing, with WeChat citing a violation of the operating regulations of the WeChat public platform.
Having served as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party for two terms, experienced leadership positions in Tibet, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Guangdong, and having been the Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council for five years, Hu Chunhua, only 59 years old, was unexpectedly excluded from the Communist Party’s Politburo during the 20th Congress and assigned to retirement within the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. This event caught many by surprise.
Another figure representing the Communist Youth League faction, former member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang, passed away just seven months after retiring. Gu Wanming, who publicly questioned Li Keqiang’s cause of death, was surprisingly sentenced to one year in prison. These incidents have stirred dissatisfaction among many towards Xi.
At the Fourth Plenary Session, Xi may be forced to hand over power, as indicated by the plethora of negative titles associated with him. Observing the shift in the titles associated with Xi, it seems that he has reached a point where “the wall falls as the crowd pushes”. Hence, it is not impossible that Xi may be compelled to relinquish power at the upcoming session.