Recently, there have been many rumors about Xi Jinping in the past few months. Some say Xi is facing health issues, some say he is experiencing a “soft coup,” some say he has been criticized by party elders, some say he is “retreating for advancement,” and some say he has been stripped of some powers.
There is no smoke without fire. These rumors related to Xi, whether true or not, are not coincidental. The infighting within the top ranks of the CCP has never stopped. The rumors about Xi are directly related to the internal power struggles within the CCP.
Due to the opaque nature of CCP politics, especially after the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, where some high-ranking party, government, and military officials personally promoted by Xi were successively taken down, CCP politics entered a “black box within a black box.” People can only judge the situation of the CCP’s top-level power struggle through some subtle clues.
For example, on October 30, the CCP military newspaper reported that the Central Military Commission had approved the issuance of the “Implementation Outline for Prosperity Development and Strengthening Military Culture.” The report not only did not mention “Xi Jinping Thought,” but also did not mention Xi’s name at all. This is quite different from previous related reports. Recently, such reports have been frequent.
These abnormal situations indicate that Xi’s power is no longer as strong as before.
Based on my observation, I believe that Xi’s power is not only shaking but also likely facing dramatic changes, for four reasons:
In recent years, there have been continuous rumors about Xi’s health. Although Xi has appeared in public after these rumors, they continue to circulate.
Why? Because Xi often shows signs of illness, such as tilting his head and involuntarily swaying slightly, having difficulty walking and sitting down during overseas visits, looking haggard at times, sudden weight loss, and more.
On October 22, when Xi arrived in Kazan, Russia for the BRICS Summit, he was seen slowly descending the airplane stairs with support, in contrast to Indian Prime Minister Modi who descends without assistance.
Xi’s health issues are not surprising, given the immense pressure he is under. Xi has taken on all the mistakes made during the Mao Zedong era, the Deng Xiaoping era, and the Jiang Zemin era, shouldering the burden of all these mistakes like “three mountains.” Xi has been in power for 12 years, investigating over 600 high-ranking officials and central leaders, making enemies with many officials. Xi is very suspicious and does not trust anyone, always fearing someone will snatch his power and threaten his life.
With such enormous pressure, it would be strange if Xi’s health did not deteriorate.
Over Xi’s 12 years in power, significant domestic and foreign policy decisions have led to a series of mistakes:
While the anti-corruption campaign targeted corrupt officials, it failed to tackle the root of corruption; proclaiming to defend all territory inherited from ancestors, Xi did not punish those selling out the country; claiming there are a thousand reasons to improve US-China relations but treating the US as the top enemy; advocating for sovereignty and territorial integrity but not condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; neglecting North Korea for five years only to revert to supporting the Kim dynasty; persisting with extreme “zero-COVID” measures against common sense; emphasizing the Party’s control of the media and continuing to suppress freedom of speech; stirring up anti-Japanese sentiment over Japan’s nuclear wastewater release; pushing through the Hong Kong national security law 27 years ahead of schedule, effectively ending the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong; exerting extreme pressure on Taiwan instead of winning hearts and minds; retaining three key Jiang faction members — Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, and Han Zheng — undermining himself; promoting and appointing severely corrupt individuals to high-ranking party, government, and military positions; hastily establishing the Xiong’an New Area without thorough planning; prioritizing national interests over people’s livelihoods, leading to a rapid economic decline; heavily investing in the Belt and Road Initiative with questionable returns; allowing nearly 600 million Chinese to earn around 1000 yuan a month while spending extravagantly abroad; rejecting universal values while championing the notion of a “community of shared human destiny”; pursuing “wolf warrior diplomacy” at the cost of losing genuine allies internationally.
These major decisions have plunged the CCP into an unprecedented comprehensive crisis, making Xi isolated and despised by many.
When Xi first came to power, some Chinese people respectfully referred to him as “Xi Dada” (Uncle Xi); twelve years later, both domestically and internationally, criticisms against Xi have become increasingly harsh.
To consolidate his power, Xi has been emphasizing “loyalty to the Party,” which essentially means loyalty to Xi himself, insisting on upholding the “two assurances” and the “two safeguards,” and enforcing policies according to “Xi Jinping Thought.”
However, in the face of the significant mistakes made under Xi’s leadership, even high-ranking officials directly under Xi’s command would question why they should remain “loyal” to him.
The CCP has always believed that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Whoever controls the military holds the true power within the CCP. For 12 years, Xi has been striving to grasp military authority.
Yet today, Xi has not been able to fully control the military.
After the 20th National Congress of the CCP, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign within the military directly targeted personnel under Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia of the Central Military Commission, including Li Shangfu, a member of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defense, and many former subordinates under Li Shangfu when he served as the Minister of Equipment Development of the Central Military Commission.
Li Shangfu succeeded Zhang Yuxia as the Minister of Equipment Development of the Central Military Commission. Xi’s targeting of Li Shangfu and his subordinates is a direct challenge to Zhang Yuxia.
Zhang Yuxia closely monitored Xi’s anti-corruption efforts within the military. Jiang Zemin, the former Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was the root cause of corruption in the CCP’s military. Xi knowingly turned a blind eye; Jiang Zemin’s chief aide, Jia Ting’an, was also deeply corrupt, but Xi chose not to investigate; Xi also ignored a group of senior military officers promoted by Jiang and Jia through bribes. Yet Xi decided to take action against Li Shangfu and his associates, placing Zhang Yuxia in a difficult position. Would Zhang agree? Perhaps outwardly, but internally, he likely harbors resentment.
In 2024, significant changes occurred in key positions within the CCP military:
Two of Xi’s closest confidants, who facilitated Xi’s major purges within the military, Zhang Shaojun, the Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission and the Director of the Office of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was transferred to the political commissar of the National Defense University. Chen Guoqiang, the deputy secretary of the Central Military Commission’s Discipline Inspection Commission and the deputy director of the Central Military Commission’s Supervision Commission, was transferred to the political commissar of the National University of Defense Technology.
Overseas sources have revealed that former Navy Political Commissar Qin Shengxiang, former Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong, and the current Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi (all senior generals) have been taken away for investigation.
Qin Shengxiang previously served as Director of the General Office of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Military Reform Office, a close aide and assistant in Xi’s military reforms; Qin Shutong previously served as the Director of the Political Department and Deputy Political Commissar of the Fujian 31st Group Army, promoted under Xi’s patronage, considered a typical member of Xi’s military inner circle; Yuan Huazhi, promoted by the Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission Miao Hua, is also a member of Xi’s military inner circle.
These significant changes are likely orchestrated by Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia of the Central Military Commission.
After Xi’s successful “triple reelection” at the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, he believed that his authority represented by “Xi Jinping Thought,” the “two assurances,” and the “two safeguards” written into the Party charter, as well as “Xi Jinping Thought” and the “two safeguards” incorporated into the CCP disciplinary regulations, would ensure his victory in internal struggles.
However, he never expected to fall seriously ill during the Third Plenum. Furthermore, he did not anticipate that his influence within the military would be far inferior to Zhang Yuxia.
Xi may have investigated Li Shangfu et al. in an attempt to curb Zhang Yuxia’s military authority, but since the Third Plenum in July this year, Zhang Yuxia’s position within the military has not weakened, appearing to have become the decisive power behind the political scenes, displaying the following thirteen prominent features:
(1) On July 31, retired professor at Renmin University of China, Cold Jiefu wrote an open letter to Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia of the Central Military Commission, which was published online in early August. The letter mentioned Xi Jinping’s serious illness and his inability to work, shifting the full weight of party, government, and military affairs to Zhang Yuxia. Cold Jiefu believed the situation the CCP faced was dire and suggested that instead of being overthrown, it would be better to voluntarily exit the historical stage and transition to constitutional democracy, calling for the establishment of the “Republic of the United Chinese Federation.” On August 11, Professor Cold Jiefu confirmed to a Da Ji Yuan reporter that he indeed wrote the letter.
After the publication of Professor Cold Jiefu’s open letter, nothing significant happened. This indicates that the mention of Xi’s “serious illness” in the letter was not unfounded; Xi really was unwell. The acknowledgment that “party, government, and military affairs fall on Zhang Yuxia” following Xi’s illness was not baseless either. In the absence of Xi, Zhang Yuxia had become the effective decision-maker influencing the political landscape.
(2) Since July and August this year, changes have taken place in the military leaders of three of the five major war zones in the CCP: Huang Ming was appointed Commander of the Northern Theater Command, Wu Yanan was appointed Commander of the Southern Theater Command, and the Commander of the Central Theater Command is currently unclear, with some speculating that the Political Commissar Xu Deqing may be assuming full responsibility.
Individuals familiar with the internal workings of the Chinese military have noted that the military and political leaders of the Northern, Southern, and Central Theater Commands have close ties to Zhang Yuxia, either having served under him or having deep connections with him.
(3) From August 27 to 29, US National Security Advisor Sullivan visited China for the first time during his tenure. Surprisingly, Sullivan met with Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia of the Central Military Commission. This was the first meeting between a US National Security Advisor and a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in eight years.
(4) On September 10, the awarding ceremony for the Shenzhou 16 and 17 astronauts was held in Beijing, with Zhang Yuxia in attendance presenting the awards.
(5) From September 12 to 14, the military-focused Xiangshan Forum was held in Beijing, where Vice Chairman Zhang Yuxia played a leading role on the Chinese side.
(6) From October 15 to 16, during Xi’s inspection of regions bordering Taiwan in Zhangzhou and Xiamen, he surprisingly did not have any military leaders accompanying him. Xi also did not meet with “officers at the division level or higher” stationed in Fujian.
(7) On October 14 and 15, while Xi was inspecting Fujian, the Military Theoretical Work Conference was held in Beijing presided over by Zhang Yuxia, who delivered a speech.
(8) On October 15, during Xi’s visit to Fujian, Zhang Yuxia met with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, who was in Beijing.
(9) From October 20 to 22, while Xi was visiting Kazan, Russia, Zhang Yuxia attended a comprehensive military training event in Zhangjiakou, Hebei Province, and delivered a keynote address at the concluding ceremony.
(10) From October 24 to 26, Zhang Yuxia visited Vietnam and received high-level treatment equivalent to a national leader. Vietnamese official media reports showed that during the meeting between Zhang Yuxia and Vietnamese Communist Party leaders, Xi Jinping’s name was not mentioned.
(11) On October 25, the 2024 Conference of the Advisory Committee of the School of Economics and Management at Tsinghua University was held at the School of Economics and Management of Tsinghua University, where Li Luming, the President of Tsinghua University, conveyed greetings from Zhu Rongji to the advisory committee members and invited experts. Former Vice Premier Zhu Rongji has taken over as the Honorary Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the School of Economics and Management at Tsinghua University, hosting a banquet for attendees.
After retiring, former members of the Politburo Standing Committee and former Prime Minister Zhu Rongji rarely made public appearances. Since retiring, former Politburo Standing Committee member and former Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission Wang Qishan’s former subordinates have been continuously investigated, resulting in humiliation. Now, Zhu Rongji and Wang Qishan have reappeared, attracting public attention.
Despite Xi’s ongoing efforts to eliminate retired senior officials from politics, his mismanagement of domestic and foreign affairs, bureaucratic negligence, and public grievances have led to discontent among retired elders.
Some analysts believe that Zhang Yuxia is also a member of the “second generation red,” with close ties to the CCP’s elderly leaders. Since the Third Plenum in July this year, while Xi was sick, Zhang Yuxia, along with the CCP elders, has initiated the process of stripping Xi of power. This possibility cannot be ruled out.
(12) On October 28, the CCP Political Bureau convened to review the “Comprehensive Report on the Third Round of Inspections of the 20th Central Committee.” Notably, the Xinhua News Agency report raised two anomalies: no mention of “Xi Jinping Thought” and no reference to the “two assurances and safeguards.” Previous reports on the First and Second Round of inspections reviewed in CCP Political Bureau meetings all mentioned these elements.
This Political Bureau meeting also emphasized the need to “strictly implement democratic centralism and promote the ability to promote and demote leadership cadres.”
Since Xi’s “triple reelection” at the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, there has been little mention of democratic centralism, with an emphasis on “one-man rule,” meaning Xi’s words are final. Suddenly emphasizing “strict implementation of democratic centralism” at this juncture suggests that Xi’s absolute power structure has been dismantled. This is likely related to Zhang Yuxia’s strong control over the military authority.
The report specifically noted the need to “promote the ability to promote and demote leadership cadres.” Who should move up? Who should move down? Some commentators believe this hints that Xi should also be subject to demotion.
In my view, Xi should certainly be subject to demotion. If Xi Jinping were not Xi Zhongxun’s son years ago, he would now be retired.
(13) On October 29, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the “Special Seminar on Studying and Implementing the Spirit of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee for Senior Leaders at the Provincial and Ministerial Levels,” where, unusually, he did not mention “Xi Jinping Thought.”
From October 30 to November 3, Xinhua News Agency published four consecutive articles by commentators learning from Xi’s speeches, none of which mentioned “Xi Jinping Thought.” The October 2 military report by the Army and Navy published an article titled “Effectively Unifying Thoughts and Actions, Creatively Implementing Reform Tasks,” which also did not cite “Xi Jinping Thought.”
In conclusion, since July this year, due to a sudden illness, Xi’s military authority likely has fallen into the hands of Zhang Yuxia.
While Xi still nominally holds the positions of General Secretary of the CCP, President of the country, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he merely reads prepared scripts during significant events.
To avoid significant political unrest until a suitable successor to Xi is found, Zhang Yuxia may opt for a conciliatory approach for the time being, moving from “one-man rule” back to “collective leadership.” Once the timing is right, he may find a pretext to announce Xi’s “retirement.”
Of course, it cannot be ruled out that Xi may still fight to the end. If so, Xi’s fate may be dire.