Recently, there have been numerous rumors surrounding the Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping. Some say Xi had a stroke, some say he had a liver transplant, some say he is under military control, some say he was reprimanded by “political elders,” some say he uses body doubles, and there are even rumors of major changes in leadership at the top levels of China. These rumors are abundant and varied.
On the morning of August 19th, Xi Jinping received the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and President of the country, Su Lin, in Beijing. However, rumors about Xi continue to circulate.
Despite Xi appearing in public, the rumors about him persist. Why is this happening? I believe the key lies in the fact that after Xi’s “third term” at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, there has been no significant progress in domestic or foreign policies; rather, internal and external challenges have intensified.
Let’s first talk about the internal challenges.
The biggest internal challenge is that a group of party, government, and military officials personally promoted by Xi have betrayed him, posing an unprecedented blow to Xi.
For example, the youngest party and state leader promoted by Xi, Qin Gang, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Councilor for only seven months, was dismissed from his position.
Now, whether Qin Gang is alive or dead remains unknown to the public.
On August 10th, Gao Zhikai, who had served as Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter, revealed some strange information during an interview with Al Jazeera host Mehdi Hasan.
Hasan asked: Why did the former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang disappear? What crime did he commit? Was he interrogated?
Gao Zhikai, a longtime friend of Qin Gang, stated that Qin Gang lost his job due to corruption. When Hasan asked, “Where exactly is Qin Gang?” Gao Zhikai replied, “He has been swiftly dealt with.”
Hasan pressed further: “Where has Qin Gang gone? He is your good friend, and you don’t know where he has gone?” Gao Zhikai said, “You will never know.” “He (Qin Gang) is in some place in China, you will never see him.”
Rumors of Qin Gang’s death had circulated previously. Now, an official within the Chinese Communist Party system, Gao Zhikai, told a foreign journalist, “You will never know,” “you will never see him.” Some interpret this statement as Qin Gang being deceased. Otherwise, how could the dismissed Qin Gang just disappear in China indefinitely?
Moreover, two Central Military Commission members and State Councilors, as well as the Ministers of National Defense, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, personally promoted by Xi, have been expelled from the party and referred to judicial authorities for review.
From the reports in the Chinese Party media, the core issue with these two individuals is not just corruption but political “disloyalty,” in other words, political betrayal of Xi.
Furthermore, high-ranking officials from the Rocket Force who were personally promoted by Xi, including the Commander, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, and Equipment Minister, have all been “taken down.” The Rocket Force, established by Xi in the 2015 military reform, is the “ace force” designed to deter the United States and target Taiwan. All high-ranking officials of this “ace force” have betrayed Xi.
Additionally, the new military branch established by Xi after the 2015 military reform, the Strategic Support Force, has been disbanded. The key reason should also be disloyalty to Xi among the top military and political leaders.
On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, the designated successor to Mao Zedong, Mao’s close comrade-in-arms, and the second-ranking member of the Communist Party of China, died in a plane crash in Mongolia. Lin Biao’s betrayal and the impact on Mao’s body and political authority were unprecedented.
Lin Biao’s death marked a significant turning point from the peak to the decline of the Cultural Revolution initiated by Mao.
The recent betrayals by a group of party, government, and military officials personally promoted by Xi, the blows to Xi’s body and political authority, are no less significant than Lin Biao’s betrayal of Mao at that time.
Now let’s turn to external challenges.
During the Russia-Ukraine war, the Chinese Communist Party actually supported Russia, leading to a confrontation between China, supported by the United States, and most countries backing Ukraine.
After two and a half years of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine recently made a surprise move by directly attacking Russian territory, catching President Putin off guard and exposing further weaknesses in the Russian military to the world. This not only poses a major challenge for Putin but also for the Chinese Communist Party. The sounds for the reunification of Taiwan under Chinese military control have been persistent. If China faces a similar surprise attack as Russia, how will it respond?
China supports Hamas in the Middle East. From July 21st to 23rd, China invited Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as a “distinguished guest” to Beijing to participate in a “reconciliation dialogue” among 14 Palestinian organizations. On July 31st, Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran, Iran.
China supports the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina. On July 10th, Xi Jinping met with visiting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh. On August 5th, a coup took place in Bangladesh. Hasina was forced to resign and flee to India.
China supports Venezuela’s President Maduro. On July 30th, Xi Jinping called Maduro to congratulate him on being re-elected as President of Venezuela. The day before, on July 29th, the opposition presidential candidate in Venezuela, Gustavo Gonzalez, stated that his campaign team had evidence showing he had won 73.2% of the vote in the presidential election, claiming an “irreversible victory.” Disputes over the Venezuelan election results are ongoing.
China has long been the biggest supporter of the Kim dynasty in North Korea. However, recently, there have been some issues in the relationship between North Korea and China.
On July 27th, during an event commemorating the 71st anniversary of the Korean War armistice, North Korea invited diplomats from Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, and other countries to attend but notably did not invite the Chinese Ambassador, Wang Yajun.
On the evening of July 11th, Ambassador Wang Yajun of China in North Korea held a reception to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the signing of the “China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.” However, Pyongyang did not send high-ranking officials to the event; only Kim Sang-chan, President of Kim Il Sung University, and other officials attended.
Looking around the world, China not only lacks a true friend but is facing increasingly severe containment from the Free World, led by the United States.
In the midst of internal and external challenges, the biggest concern for China is still the possibility of a military revolt. There are three main aspects to this concern:
Firstly, Dong Jun has become the Defense Minister with the lowest status in history.
Dong Jun’s predecessors as Defense Ministers, Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, were both members of the Central Military Commission, State Councilors, and vice-ministerial level officials, among the “party and state leaders” of the Chinese Communist Party. Previously, there had been precedents of members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee concurrently serving as State Councilors and Defense Ministers.
However, after being appointed as Defense Minister, Dong Jun was not appointed as a State Councilor during the National People’s Congress in March of this year. Moreover, at the Third Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee in July, he was not appointed as a member of the Central Military Commission.
Dong Jun became the Defense Minister with the lowest status in the 75-year history of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Why is this the case? It is because Xi does not trust him, harbors suspicions, and is still concerned that he might be two-faced, showing loyalty to Xi in front of him but harboring rebellious thoughts behind his back.
Secondly, Xi has been frequently reshuffling senior military leaders.
The recent significant changes in military personnel have been evident in the reshuffling of Commanders in the three major theaters.
On July 31st, Liaoning Province held a “August 1st” symposium where Northern Theater Commander Huang Ming attended. This indicates that the former Central Theater Commander Huang Ming has been reassigned as the Northern Theater Commander. The Guangdong provincial government’s website showed that a day before “August 1st,” Guangdong Provincial Party Secretary Huang Kunming visited the Southern Theater for condolences. The Southern Theater Commander present at the relevant meeting was not Wang Xiubin but the former Central Theater Commander Wu Yanan. This signifies that there has been a change in the Southern Theater Commander. Who is the new Central Theater Commander? The official Chinese party media has not yet announced it, but the change should have taken place. Where have the former Northern Theater Commander Wang Qiang and former Southern Theater Commander Wang Xiubin been reassigned? The outside world still lacks clarity on this matter.
Following the military reform in 2015, Xi transformed the original seven military regions into five theaters of operation. These five theaters are: the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater.
Since the establishment of these five theaters in 2016, there have been numerous changes in Central Theater Commanders, with nine Commanders replaced within nine years.
Among them, the second Commander, Yi Xiaoguang, had the longest tenure, serving for only four years (from August 2017 to August 2021). The third Commander, Lin Xiangyang, had the shortest tenure of just five months (from August 2021 to January 2022); the first Commander, Han Weiguo, served for one year and seven months (from January 2016 to August 2017); the fourth Commander, Wu Yanan, served for only a year (from January 2022 to January 2023); the fifth Commander, Huang Ming, served for one and a half years (from January 2023 to July 2024). Who the current sixth Commander is, is still unclear but likely to have been appointed.
The primary reason for Xi’s frequent shuffling of senior military leaders is his deep-seated suspicion and lack of trust in anyone.
Thirdly, nearly two hundred senior military leaders investigated by Xi are a major headache for him.
Before the 20th National Congress of the CPC, Xi investigated over 170 senior military leaders, including former members of the CPC Political Bureau and Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. Some of these high-ranking leaders died by suicide, by methods such as jumping from buildings, drowning, hanging, or poisoning.
After the 20th National Congress of the CPC, Xi again investigated a group of senior military leaders personally promoted by him, including former Central Military Commission members, State Councilors, and Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, former Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao, former Rocket Force Deputy Commander Liu Guangbin, former Rocket Force Chief of Staff Sun Jinming, and former Rocket Force Equipment Minister Lu Hong.
Each of the nearly two hundred senior military leaders investigated by Xi has become Xi’s “enemy”; their families, children, and proteges promoted within the military have also become potential “enemies” of Xi.
Xi must remain vigilant against the possibility of a military revolt.
In June, Xi held a Central Military Commission Political Work Conference in Yan’an. Xi reiterated, “Corrupt elements must not be allowed to find refuge in the military,” and urged all cadres, especially senior cadres, to engage in self-reflection and expose shortcomings with courage, promoting a deep and practical development of political military building. This shows that Xi’s extensive purge of senior military leaders is not over, and there may be more senior military leaders falling from grace.
Xi is now caught in a vicious cycle: to ensure the loyalty of senior military leaders to him, he must continuously conduct military “cleansing”; the more senior leaders Xi investigates, the more “enemies” Xi creates within the military; the more “enemies” Xi has within the military, the more insecure Xi feels, forcing him to continue the “cleansing” in the military.
In conclusion, the internal and external challenges facing the Chinese Communist Party now are the culmination of all the problems accumulated during the eras of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and the 12-year rule of Xi.
Xi is under the weight of “four great mountains,” making it difficult for him to find a way out. Since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Deng Xiaoping personally terminated political system reform within the Chinese Communist Party. In his 12 years in power, Xi has regressed politically from centralization to extreme authoritarianism.
Xi finds himself confined in an “information cocoon” he has constructed, unable to hear real information. Xi’s decisions are inevitably based on false information, leading to a series of mistakes.
Xi demands the senior military leaders to be loyal to him every day, but Chinese senior military leaders might ask, “Why should we be loyal to you?” A potential military revolt remains Xi’s biggest concern.